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Abstract 
In the 21st century, information security has become the heartbeat of any organisation. 
One of the best-known methods of tightening and continuously improving security on 
an information system is to uniquely and efficiently combine the human aspect, 
policies, and technology. This acts as leverage for designing an access control 
management approach which not only avails parts of the system that end-users are 
permitted to but also regulates which data is relevant according to their scope of work. 
This research explores information security fundamentals at organisational and 
theoretical levels, to identify critical success factors which are vital in assessing the 
organisation’s security maturity through a model referred to as “information security 
digital divide maturity framework”. The foregoing is based on a developed conceptual 
framework for information security digital divide. The framework strives to divide end-
users, business partners, and other stakeholders into “specific information haves and 
have-nots”. It intends to assist organisations to continually evaluate and improve on 
their security governance, standards, and policies which permit access on the basis 
of each end-user or stakeholder’s business function, role, and responsibility while at 
the same time preserving the traditional standpoint of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. After a thorough review of a range of frameworks that have influenced the 
information security landscape, COBITTM was relied upon as a baseline for the 
development of the framework of the study because of its rich insight and maturity on 
IT management and governance. To ascertain that the proposed framework meets the 
required expectation, a survey targeting end-users within three participating 
organisations was carried out. The outcome revealed the current maturity level of each 
participating organisation, highlighting strengths and limitations of current information 
security practices. As such, for new organisations relying on the proposed framework 
for the first time, the outcome of such an assessment will represent a benchmark to 
be relied on for further improvement before embarking on the next maturity 
assessment cycle. In addition, a second survey was conducted with subject matter 
experts in information security. Data generated and collected through a questionnaire 
was then analysed and interpreted qualitatively and quantitatively in order to identify 
aspects, not only to gauge the acceptance of the proposed conceptual framework but 
also to identify areas for improvements. The study found that there was a general 
consensus amongst experts on the importance of a framework for benchmarking 
  
vi 
 
information security digital divide in organisations. It also provided a range of valuable 
input relied upon to improve the framework to its final version.       
 
Keywords: Capability Maturity, Digital Divide, Information Security, Information 
Systems, Critical Success Factors, Information Security Digital Divide, Information 
Security Maturity Level, Frameworks, Benchmarking  
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1.1. Introduction 
Over the years, heavy dependency by enterprises on information systems for business 
operations has made information security a key ingredient in the quest for success 
and long-term survival. Traditionally, information security is about preserving 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of corporate data. However, this traditional 
security standpoint alone does not provide much defence in terms of access control 
and preventing information from leaking to unauthorised end-users within and outside 
the domain of an organisation.  
This research focuses on information security at organisation level. It investigates the 
segregation of end-users, business partners, and other stakeholders into “specific 
information haves and have-nots” based on a relatively new concept referred to as 
information security digital divide (ISDD).  
Usually, the digital divide in the digital world concerns the unequal access to and usage 
of new technologies which are important for economic development in any country. 
This trend falls in the ambit of Information and Communication Technology for 
Development (ICT4D) (Fuchs & Horak, 2008). In the context of ICT4D, a high divide 
in any economy is considered bad for development because the poor and so-called 
“information have-nots” will seldom take advantage of the digital world. This would put 
them at a disadvantage, while a low divide would promote development because 
everyone, whether from “the haves” or “have-nots”, would have access to the same 
kind of technology and information. With that noted, this research, however, introduces 
digital divide from a different perspective. It narrows down the concept to information 
systems security at enterprise level.  
Unlike in ICT4D where a high digital divide is not good for development and the 
opposite is, in the context of this research, in order to promote a highly secured 
information system with decent access control among all end-users, both internal and 
external, a high ISDD appears very effective for organisational growth. On the other 
hand, a low ISDD is bad for any such organisation because it leaves information 
exposed.  
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By tapping into the rich insight of COBITTM on IT governance and associated metrics, 
the concept of ISDD can be used to develop a self-appraisal tool which determines 
the degree of vulnerability of aspects of the organisation’s information systems. 
1.2. Background and Motivation 
The motivation for this research is driven by first-hand experience on the devastating 
impact a security breach may inflict on a business. It is not only dollars and cents that 
are at stake. Aside from the financial burden of having to deal with a security incident, 
other factors could severely damage an organisation’s ability to operate (Caballero, 
2009). While working with a number of organisations within Namibia, implementing 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and digital divide- (DD) related 
projects, the researcher was fortunate to interact with several information systems, 
management teams, information ICT experts, as well as information system end-users 
of various organisations. It was during this phase that the researcher realised the need 
to devise a concept within information systems that would ensure extra security urge. 
The concept would aid to curb information overlap, which often emanates from 
uncontrolled ability of end-users and stakeholders to access information according to 
the boundaries of their business roles and functions. 
An organisation consists of its members and their interactions. Each member has his 
or her own role to play and sphere of responsibility, which contribute towards realising 
the organisation’s goals (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). It is important, from a data 
and information access point of view, to ensure that, these members are segregated 
correctly. Often, organisations with low ISDD are characterised by frequent security 
breaches that can cause revenue loss, system crashes, information leakage, ruined 
reputation, and theft. 
This research aims to develop a framework for benchmarking ISDD to be relied upon 
for assessing the maturity of ISDD in organisations. The framework can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of organisations’ information systems in order to determine 
their compliance when compared to other proved state-of-the art systems referenced 
in literature review. High ISDD entails a highly secured information system, while a low 
ISDD is a sign of a highly exposed environment. The tool strives to align all end-users 
and stakeholders in organisations, to use information within and outside the 
organisation based on the relevance to their roles and responsibilities. Finally, the idea 
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is to issue them access to information resources but not more than they need to 
perform their roles and responsibilities (CA Technologies, 2015). 
1.3. Problem Statement 
According to Jaquith (2007), a security programme can only be improved if it is 
measurable. In any given organisation, all stakeholders have various roles and 
responsibilities which have an influence on the success of information security and, 
therefore the organisation’s success as a whole. These stakeholders require access 
to corporate data, information, and systems at different levels according to their roles 
and responsibilities in order to achieve organisational vision and mission. However, in 
real-life contexts, organisations seldom put in place structured and standardised 
information security policies and governance instruments on which stakeholders 
should rely upon throughout undertaking their respective duties. Besides standard 
systems security practice that often comes with the vendor of the system, lack of a 
structured and well-defined set of principles that obligate the organisation to regularly 
perform self-assessment for systems’ vulnerability minimisation remains a concern at 
corporate level. It is in this context that development of an appropriate framework 
aiming at regularly assessing the organisation’s maturity level and identifying areas 
for improvement concerning information security appears to be of high importance in 
literature. 
1.4. Research Objective 
The main objective of this research is to develop a framework for benchmarking 
information security digital divide.  
The premise of the research will be people, processes, and technology at organisation 
level. As such, the developed framework will be used by organisations to measure 
their current ISDD maturity level for further improvements should the need arise. Such 
an assessment will form the basis for the identification of various vulnerability issues 
and promote the implementation of counter-measures adequately designed to 
manage the ever-changing business ecosystem from a security perspective.  
The framework is also intended to promote the understanding of ISDD among all 
stakeholders and help to secure information systems. It will ensure that end-users, 
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stakeholders, and partners according to their business roles and responsibilities 
understand their part in the implementation, compliance, and evaluation of a 
successful conceptual framework. It will also contribute to formulating 
recommendations on the best approach to manage the digital divide to the benefit of 
the organisation. The foregoing main objective will be achieved through the sub-
objectives that follow. 
1.4.1. Sub-objectives 
The sub-objectives below pertained to this study. 
Sub-objective 1: Investigate the state-of-the-art with regard to theory and practice of 
information security in organisations – This sub-objective forms part of the literature 
review whereby research will be undertaken not only on the understanding of the 
functioning and structure of organisations in general but also the approach used to 
define critical success factors with regard to information security.  
Sub-objective 2: Understand the theory of digital divide and its contextualisation to 
information security: This sub-objective intends to provide a contextual definition of 
ISDD by merging both theories of digital divide and those of information security critical 
success factors. The intention is to baseline the concept of ISDD in order to contribute 
to the realisation of the main objective of this research.  
Sub-objective 3: Develop and validate a conceptual framework for assessing ISSD 
in organisations – This sub-objective will be achieved by relying on the aforementioned 
sub-objectives as well as a critical analysis of existing frameworks so as to 
conceptualise an appropriate framework for ISDD. Reliance will also be placed on a 
range of case studies in real-life context for the validation and improvement of the 
framework in organisations. 
1.5. Research Question 
Based on the aforementioned problem statement as well as the main objective of this 
research, the main research question is formulated as follows:  
 How can a framework for assessing the maturity of ISSD in organisations for 
further improvements be developed?  
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1.5.1. Sub-research Questions 
Secondary research questions of the study are as follows: 
 Sub-research question 1: What are the current information security 
organisational practices and how is success measured in such context? 
 Sub-research question 2: How can the concept of digital divide be leveraged 
positively in the context of information security at organisation level?  
 Sub-research question 3: How can a framework for assessing ISDD capability 
maturity be developed and validated in real-world context?   
1.6. Limitations and Delimitations 
Only three target organisations in three different sectors participated in this research. 
This research can, however, be extended beyond those three organisations and even 
sectors different from those they hailed from. Only COBIT was relied on as a reference 
framework in order to develop the ISSD framework, but many other well-established 
reference security frameworks and standards such as ITIL, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, ISF, 
and others could have been used to the same effect. 
1.7. Deliverables and Outcomes  
The main deliverable of this research will be an integrated conceptual framework that 
will be validated and adjusted based on outcomes which will emanate from case 
studies targeting ICT experts and system end-users within selected organisations in 
Namibia. The proposed conceptual framework will form a benchmark for organisations 
to establish the maturity of ISDD. Further, it will weigh the effectiveness of their 
information systems in order to make well-informed decisions with regard to 
improvements.  
1.8. Research Methodology  
This research relied on mixed methods of both interpretive and positivist due to the 
nature of the questions that had to be answered, i.e. the “what and how”. Co-jointly, 
mixed methods use a combination of two methodologies with one feeding off the other 
(Wright & Losekoot, 2010). Some researchers now consider qualitative and 
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quantitative methods as complementary rather than as opposites that cannot work 
together (Thomas, 2003; Creswell, 2003; Jack & Raturi, 2006).  
Interpretive research entails the attempt by the researcher to understand phenomena 
through accessing the meanings participants assign to them (Walsham, 2006). 
Interpretivist is characterised by, first, the researcher – who is the main factor; they 
interpret data gathered in a context; and then they analyse it and finally draw a 
conclusion (Clarke, 2009).  
Positivist, on the other hand, is based on quantification in the collection and analysis 
of data; it has a deductive relationship between theory and research and has an 
objectivist conception of reality (Wright & Losekoot, 2010). Positivist possesses the 
following characteristics: the researcher identifies a research problem, performs a 
literature review on it, collects data in a certain context, and analyses it statistically 
and interprets it to answer the research questions. 
In line with joint characteristics of both interpretive and positivist characteristics 
discussed in the literature in this study, literature was reviewed particularly directly 
filtering out applicable material. The material was on, amongst others, information 
security, digital divide, COBIT, capability maturity, and information systems with the 
sole purpose of coming up with a contextual framework based on an interpretation of 
the reviewed literature.  
In addition to the above, case studies were conducted in participating organisations, 
data was collected and analysed, with the determination of reporting the relevance of 
the framework based on feedback from system end-users mainly statistically to 
understand quantifiable trend patterns of end-users. Also, for checks and balances on 
the quality of framework produced, non-quantifiable data involving ICT experts within 
the ICT space were gathered, analysed, and interpreted, thus resulting in 
improvements representing the final contribution of this research. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that apart from the mixed research methods 
complementing each other to produce a robust result, it also provided an added 
advantage for the validation of data collected through cross verification, which is 
regarded as a powerful tool by many researchers in an effort to minimise 
inconsistencies (Creswell, 2014).  
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1.8.1. Sampling  
In this study, assessing ISDD attributes such as the culture of protecting information 
or observing standard security practices among all end-users in participating 
organisations took long. It was for that reason that a small target of 90 participants 
was the sample across all three participating organisations. Of that 90, only 65 
participants took part in this first survey, whereby Organisation X represented 29%, 
Organisation Y represented 25%, and Organisation Z represented 46%.  
Furthermore, there was quantitative data gathered from ICT experts whose main aim 
was to assess the quality of the proposed framework. In this second survey, a total of 
35 ICT experts were approached; however, only 25 participated. Quantitative analysis 
was more appropriate in this case because the intention was to understand the 
occurrences, sizes of responses on certain qualities of the framework, and the volume 
of agreements as opposed to disagreements on areas that needed change to make 
improvements on the proposed framework. 
1.8.2. Data Collection 
The most common sources of data collection in both quantitative and qualitative 
research are interviews, observations, questionnaires, and review of documents 
(Creswell, 2009; Locke, Silverman & Spirduso, 2010; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). The 
combined data collection methods that follow were used to collect data in this study. 
1.8.2.1. Documentation Review 
In accordance with the literature review performed on the critical success factors of 
information security, security policy as a living document was singled out to be a must-
have for every organisation as a first line of maintenance. The document also needed 
to be relevant to the setup of systems. For that reason, a review of the content of the 
security policy and how often it gets updated was performed in all participating 
organisations with findings recorded as part of ISDD metrics. Furthermore, other 
reviews on important aspects of information security such as business continuity plans 
for disaster recovery purposes were also entertained. 
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1.8.2.2. Interviews with Structured Questions 
Interviews were conducted with ICT experts who represented participating 
organisations only in order to understand areas such as systems landscape, types of 
security available, awareness and training programmes, access control management, 
and management support.  
1.8.2.3. Observation 
Observation as a data collection approach was used to monitor system end-users in 
all participating organisations. This was done randomly to observe the culture of 
protecting information on, amongst others, ISDD basic principles such as password 
use and sharing. It was also done to observe the culture of physical access to business 
functions using access control in areas such as access cards, keys, or biometrics. 
1.8.2.4. Questionnaire Surveys 
Two types of case studies were considered in this research. The first case study 
involved testing the relevance of the framework by engaging system end-users in all 
three organisations. This was achieved through a carefully designed questionnaire 
with mostly close-ended questions distributed to selected participants. The second 
case study consisted of a survey targeting ICT experts from the ICT space, using a 
questionnaire set to scrutinise the quality of the proposed framework. Their 
contribution provided an incentive to improve on the proposed framework to make it 
more consensual. 
1.8.3. Data Analysis  
According to Oira (2013), data analysis and interpretation is the process of assigning 
meaning to the collected information and drawing conclusions, significance, and 
implications of the findings. To efficiently validate data generated, this study depended 
on method triangulation. In both surveys involving system end-users and ICT experts 
respectively, data collected was both of a qualitative and quantitative nature.  
Qualitative research centred on narrative and performance analysis in order to 
discover similarities in the respondents’ responses was used. This was largely 
applicable to ICT experts discovering common opinions that would add value to the 
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initial framework. Quantitative data analysis, on the other hand, focused on 
mathematical approaches such as statistics to examine and interpret data collected. 
This was better suited when measuring the relevance of the framework, whereby end-
users’ responses were quantified to observe certain patterns on how well they 
complied with ISDD attributes such as the use of passwords when accessing 
computers or to simply measure the general culture of protecting information. 
1.9. Reliability and Validity 
According to Joppe (2000), reliability in research is the degree to which results are 
consistent over time and results can be replicated using the same methodology. For 
the purpose of this study, the simplest approach to reliability and validity was to use 
the split-half method as suggested by Oats (2006:227). Questions in questionnaires 
were divided into two equivalent groups. The score of a respondent in one half is 
compared to the score in the other half. If the questionnaire is reliable, the two scores 
should be the same (Oats, 2006:227). In the context of this research, 22 random end-
user questionnaires were coded in one table of two columns. The two columns were 
split into two halves, one with even numbers and the other with odd numbers. To find 
out the reliability of the responses on certain ISDD assessment within participating 
organisations, reliance was placed on SPSS whereby the table was imported and 
tabulated automatically. Given 22 value cases of respondents with each having 34 
ISDD items (questions), the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula retained a coefficient 
equal to 0.74, which is considered respectable for the small number of participants 
involved. 
As a further validation and reliability approach, retest reliability was also performed on 
applicable instruments used such as both end-user and expert questionnaires. Second 
opinions by suitable experts on the subject matter, were also done on data collection 
instruments such as, interview questions and observation sheets. Data collected was 
subjected to retests to further check for inconsistency and discrepancy in the result. 
Interviews can have a tendency of delivering inaccurate results, thus to reduce the 
chances of that happening, data triangulation was used, which was made easier by 
the fact that this study used both qualitative and quantitative types of data. Finally, 
findings were to be taken back to participants to ensure they agree that it represents 
the true situation, as a validation and reliability method. 
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1.10. Ethics 
Because ISDD is a very sensitive issue, ethics needed to be highly considered in this 
research. Ethics ensure target organisations do not suffer any loss, physical or non-
physical, or disadvantage them as a result of the research. Additionally, there is always 
a concern about breach of confidentiality, but the following measures were taken 
during this study to address the issue: 
 Names of respondents were not to be revealed to anyone. 
 Respondents were informed of their rights to withdraw from the survey if they 
felt uncomfortable continuing with participation at any point. 
 What individual respondents told the researcher was guaranteed not be 
revealed, neither was the organisation they were representing made known or 
revealed.  
 Respondents were not singled out for marketing purposes because they 
participated in the survey. 
 As shown in Appendix A, ethical clearance was obtained from the University of 
South Africa and the approval communicated to participating organisations 
before engaging in various surveys. 
1.11. Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the maturity and understanding of information security in 
organisations. An applied framework delivers the capability maturity level of 
information security and provides ample opportunities for further research. Further to 
that, the framework is meant to be used as a guideline tool by organisations when 
assessing the maturity of ISDD. It will help organisations to improve on security 
policies, standard, governance, and practice so as to strengthen ISDD. Auditors would 
benefit by using the framework as a guideline to perform quality assurance and control 
from an IT audit perspective, which will save both auditors and organisations time and 
money. The research will also contribute to the body of knowledge on how the various 
stakeholders, irrespective of roles and responsibilities, and position, can harmonise 
and work towards enforcing ISDD with the intention of safeguarding corporate 
information.  
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1.12. Research Process 
Figure 1.1 summarises the research process layout as follows: Chapter 1 introduces 
the research problem, objectives, questions, and limitations. Chapter 2 contains a 
literature review on information security and its importance to business operations. 
The third chapter focuses on the overview of the digital divide; it also formulates 
literature on information security digital divide as a concept and reiterates how it re-
enforces security. Chapter 4 concentrates on the development of the proposed 
framework. Furthermore, Chapter 5 sets the context for the validation of the proposed 
framework in terms of instruments used to perform data collection. In Chapter 6, an 
analysis of data collected from the first survey involving system end-users to measure 
ISDD is performed. Chapter 7 presents the second survey involving ICT experts 
whose primary purpose is to use the outcome to improve on the proposed framework. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the entire research including the findings and 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Research process flow  
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1.13. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research topic under consideration. It discussed the 
background and motivation on the need to explore information security digital divide 
at organisation level. A research problem was identified, leading to the formulation of 
research objectives to be achieved as well as research questions thereof. The most 
appropriate research strategy required to answer the research questions was 
discussed, as well as the reliability and validity of the research. The chapter further 
discussed ethical considerations, the significance of the research, as well as the layout 
of the study in the form of a research process. The next chapter focuses on an 
extensive literature review of information security at organisation level.  
1.14. Definition of Key Terms 
Benchmarking – establishing the basis for evaluation. Enabling organisations to rely 
on self-assessment for further improvement 
ICT4D – Information Communication Technology for Development, access difference 
to telecommunication facilities among natives of an economy 
Information security digital divide – A technique for regulating access control to 
information system resources on the basis of a stakeholder’s business role, 
responsibility, and function 
Information System – A combination of hardware, software, infrastructure, policies, 
and people, with the intention of collecting, processing, and storing corporate data. 
The purpose is to provide information for supporting business operations 
Information security – The act of defending information from unauthorised access 
within and outside an information system by both authorised and unauthorised parties 
Capability Maturity – Specifies a series of steps for development for the purpose of 
benchmarking 
Critical Success Factors – Areas in an activity or project that must be attained at all 
cost to realise the intended goal 
Framework – A basic conceptual structure mainly composed of theory on how 
something should be formed 
Mature ISDD - A well-organised, established, and appropriate mechanism for the 
management of the ability to access and process information and data within an 
organisation in such a way that security breaches are well contained 
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2.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter provided an introduction and background to the study. This 
chapter explores the literature on enterprise-wide information security basics that are 
relevant to understanding the concept of information security digital divide (ISDD). The 
chapter is significant to the research because it showcases a range of information and 
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure that are key in supporting business 
objectives and how this infrastructure needs to be protected in order to sustain the 
organisation. Additionally, it justifies how segregation of access and usage of an 
organisation’s IT infrastructure improves information security. In so doing, it 
conceptually suggests a method of dividing end-user access in an attempt to only let 
them access what is required for them to perform their routine duties. 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question on current 
enterprise information security practices as well as the identification of critical success 
factors and metrics thereof. The answer to the research question would thus require a 
thorough understanding of organisations at both structural and functional levels. Such 
an understanding will enable a seamless alignment to its entire ICT infrastructure 
needs from a security perspective. Of course, the exercise will not be materialised 
without exploring the literature on information security in general followed by its 
alignment to organisational requirements. The outcome of these investigations would 
result in a seamless identification of a range of information security-centric critical 
success factors aimed at contributing to the significant reduction of information 
security vulnerability.  
The chapter begins with an overview of a generic organisation, its purpose, structure, 
and operations in Section 2.2. It proceeds in Section 2.3 to discuss the generics of 
information systems in organisations, their infrastructure, and how they complement 
business operations. An overview of information security is detailed in Section 2.4 
where information systems threats, vulnerabilities, and risks are explored. The 
identification and description of critical success factors are provided in Section 2.5, 
with emphasis on what constitutes a secure information system. The chapter is 
summarised in Section 2.6. 
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2.2. Organisations and their Structure  
An organisation is a collection of people or a group that is arranged in such a way that 
a specific objective is achieved through collective effort (Business Dictionary, 2015). 
All organisations, small or big, have a management structure that aligns these people 
or groups between the different activities, roles, functions, and responsibilities to carry 
out specific tasks.  
2.2.1. Definition of an Organisation 
According to Buchanan and Huczynski (2010), an organisation is a social structure for 
achieving coordinated performance in pursuit of collective goals. Also, all 
organisations are structured in a way that determines relationships between personnel 
(Business Dictionary, 2015). Furthermore, organisations can be affected by the 
environment in which they operate, but in return, they also induce some effect on that 
environment. Irrespective of their type or operational environment, all organisations 
have a sole purpose of achieving a common goal, which is often to attain the mission 
and vision goals of that enterprise. 
2.2.2. Purpose of an Organisation  
The purpose of a business is articulated in its vision and mission statements. In most 
cases, organisations are largely profitable, manufacturing or selling products and 
services. While profit may not be the major objective of a business, it is imperative that 
the aim be to make a profit for the owners and also in order to survive in the long run 
(GCSE Business Studies, 2004:2). This research, however, works towards any kind of 
business, be it profit or non-profit-orientated, provided it operates in a competitive 
environment. Irrespective of the purpose of an organisation, it must have a structure. 
2.2.3. Composition of an Organisation 
An organisation can be compared to a system (MacNamara, 2015). Organisations 
have major sub-systems, such as departments, programmes, divisions, and teams. 
Along with other subsystems, each of an organisation’s sub-systems has a way of 
doing things to achieve the overall goals of the organisation. Often, these systems and 
processes are defined by plans, policies, and procedures. In the simplest form, an 
organisation is a social system that contains inputs, process, and output (Illinois State 
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University, 2010). Input basically refers to resources such as raw materials, personnel, 
and technology. Inputs go through processes or procedures in order to be transformed 
into output, which is the tangible product or services to consumers.  
For clarity purposes and in the interest of this study, a generic structure of personnel 
used by a European organisation called European Federation for Welding (EWF) has 
been adopted. According to observations (European Federation For Welding, Joining 
& Cutting, 2014:5; Chun & Mooney, 2009), the majority of organisations globally are 
structured in a similar fashion with the sole purpose of managing interactions between 
the various parts that make up the entire organisation. 
2.2.4. Structure of an Organisation 
An organisational structure shows the relationship between the internal departments 
and sub-systems (Petrauskas, 2006). Essentially, it is the operating manual that tells 
members how the organisation is put together and how it works (Smit, 2014). An 
effective organisational structure facilitates management and clarifies relationships, 
roles and responsibilities, levels of authority, and supervisory or reporting lines. Most 
organisations follow the traditional organisational structure style, where the hierarchy 
resembles a pyramid (Rishipal, 2014) as shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Generic traditional organisational structure  
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Source: Adapted from Organisational Development (2000) 
The pyramid organisational structure in Figure 2.1 shows how the organisation is 
managed and controlled. It also highlights the delegation of authority across different 
positions. Figure 2.2 provides a further breakdown of this organisational structure to 
show the different levels of authority and responsibility. 
 
Figure 2.2: Four-tier structure representing the chain of command of labour 
Source: Adapted from Smit (2014) 
According to Figure 2.2, the chief executive officer has the greatest responsibility over 
the other three tiers below the hierarchy. As the levels move down from senior 
management to middle management and general workers, the levels of authority and 
responsibilities also diminish (Smit, 2014). All business roles, functions, and 
responsibilities of personnel in an organisation combine as a system towards one 
common goal. That goal is articulated in the form of a vision and mission statement. 
For that to successfully happen, the roles and responsibilities of employees need to 
be coordinated in accordance with the laid-down structure that is aimed at meeting the 
objectives of the organisation. 
From a business operations perspective, as the flow of power, privileges and 
responsibilities diminishes, as depicted in Figure 2.2, so should the level of 
accessibility to certain types of information resources. This links to the notion that an 
CEO
Senior 
Management
Middle Management
General Employees
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employee should be allowed access to an organisation’s data and information based 
on the merit of their business roles, function, and responsibility. 
2.2.5. The Operation of an Organisation 
Business operations involves all the activities required to propel a business to 
generate its desired output for profit purposes while delivering goods or services to 
clients (The Open University, 2011:1). In modern times, these business activities are 
efficiently supported by the use of technology in the form of information systems which 
support businesses through distribution, storage, processing, and management of 
data and information. According to Shipsey (2010), businesses nowadays depend on 
the usefulness of information systems to reach their desired goals and also gain 
competitive advantage. However, in an exchange of fortune, it is also inevitable that 
information systems are also beneficiaries of businesses because they become a 
product of businesses that conceive them. 
Having provided an outline of an organisation and its operation in this section, it is 
common knowledge that such an operation should be supported by technology for 
efficiency purposes. In the next section, information systems are explored as the 
technological, operational backbone of an organisation. 
2.3. Information System 
An information system is a group of interrelated components that work collectively to 
carry out input, output, storage, and control actions in order to convert data into 
information (Hardcastle, 2008). In the same vein, Joseph and Schneider (2010) 
complement the definition further by arguing that information systems constitute a 
logical combination of hardware, software, and telecommunications to purposefully 
make up a system that can be used to gather, create, process, and distribute data in 
an organisation. Figure 2.3 shows the composition model of an information system. 
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Figure 2.3: Computer-based information system model  
Source: Stair and Reynolds (2012) 
2.3.1. Primary Function of an Information System 
The primary function of information systems is decision support, with the intention of 
guiding the organisation and operations on timely and correct information (Shipsey, 
2010). As such, an information system is intended to execute business processes in 
line with the mission and vision statements of the organisation. Above that, Whitten, 
Bentley, Dittman and Bentley (2004) also contend that information systems also 
improve business knowledge, which is a product of information and data. It additionally 
improves business communications, which represents how the system interfaces with 
its end-users and other information systems, as well as how people communicate and 
collaborate with one another. There are many components that are combined to 
produce an information system. 
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2.3.2. Building Blocks of an Information System  
Information system building blocks can be broken down into four categories. These 
include the database, applications, processes, and interface. 
2.3.2.1. Database 
A database is a collection of information that is organised so that it can easily be 
accessed, managed, and updated. The database management system allows 
managers and decision-makers within an organisation to perform qualitative analysis 
on the company’s vast stores of data in databases, data warehouses, and data marts 
(Jefrey, 2006). Furthermore, a database management system at heart is the 
administrative tasks associated with the storage, modification, and retrieval of data 
held within a database. Significantly, it can also link to external databases to give 
managers and decision-makers even more information and decision support (Holt, 
Ramage, Kear & Heap, 2015:163). External databases can include the Internet, 
libraries, government databases, and more. Access to a combination of internal and 
external databases can give key decision-makers a better understanding of the 
company and its environment. 
2.3.2.2. Application  
Application software is an essential part of an information system because it interfaces 
the system with the end-users. Bourgeois (2014:9) considers an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) as a good example of an application which is useful because it links 
the front-end of the system to the back-end.  
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2.3.2.3. Interface 
The interface of a system is the layer that allows system end-users to interact with the 
information system directly. For example, on a MicrosoftTM platform, the most popular 
interface is the operating system, e.g. Microsoft WindowsTM or Small Business 
ServerTM. Other supporting applications that form interfaces could be an application 
such as QuickBooksTM, which enables departments such as Finance, Marketing, and 
Sales to manage payroll, inventory, sales, and other needs. Further to that, the 
software’s features include marketing tools, merchant services, product and supplies, 
and training solutions. It is then easier for end-users in the aforesaid departments to 
manipulate data and use the system. 
2.3.3. Information System’s Processes and Services 
These are categorised as constant business activities that support and complement 
the entire business operations. They consist of sub-functions, processes, as well as 
tasks. Business processes are activities that respond to business events. Such 
activities and services may include the front-end and back-end office activities and 
services. Front-end office interacts directly with customers; a good example can be 
marketing, sales, and customer relations departments. On the other hand, the back-
end office is internal – behind the scenes; it does not interact with clients directly but 
offers support to the front-end office, e.g. human resource, inventory control, and 
finance. 
2.3.4. Infrastructure Required for an Information System 
2.3.4.1. Hardware 
Hardware in information systems incorporates all physical infrastructures that facilitate 
a computer network. It includes items such as computers, laptops, access points, 
servers, printers, scanners, mobile phones, and routers.  
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2.3.4.2. Software 
Software complements and controls hardware such as servers, computers, routers, 
and many others. Examples of the software may include the operating system, such 
as Microsoft Windows Small Business ServerTM, which operates servers; Microsoft 
Windows 8TM, which operate personal computers for network end-users; and word 
processor, internet web browsers, spreadsheets, and many others (Microsoft Inc., 
2015). 
2.3.4.3. Services 
These include telecommunications infrastructure such as telephone lines that facilitate 
the Internet. Internet service providers then provide lease lines from that and make 
dedicated internet traffic to networks. 
2.3.5. Information System Infrastructure of an Organisation  
This subsection discusses some of the devices that form part of an organisation’s 
internal information system. These devices are embedded with software that supports 
the operations of an information system. They are listed and briefly described next. 
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Figure 2.4: ICT infrastructure prone to attacks  
Source: Microsoft Inc. (2015) 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the components that are interconnected to form a local area 
network (LAN). According to Cisco (2015), a network router is a device that forwards 
internet traffic from one network to another. An Ethernet switch, on the other hand, 
connects all devices on the network such as servers, printers, computers, and other 
devices. For client computers and other network resources to operate, they need a 
special service; this is the role of a server. 
A firewall is the security centre of a network; it sits on the edge of the network to screen 
traffic into and out of a network. Access points provide wireless access to a wired 
network; it is connected to an Ethernet switch, which it then converts into wireless 
signals. Finally, handheld devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
smartphones, and tablets also make up part of the infrastructure. 
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All the aforementioned network components combine to support and sustain an 
information system. To a large extent, these components can also span over a larger 
geographic area to form what is called a wide area network (WAN). 
Information systems can also extend to incorporate other systems that are 
geographically far off but belong to the same organisation or partners. According to 
one IT department (CISCO, 2015), a wide area network is a computer network that 
geographically extends over a kilometre and has computers that are interconnected.  
All network components shown in Figure 2.4 are prone to various security challenges 
such as hacking, viruses, disgruntled employees, ignorant employees, and many other 
known threats as well as risks. The security of information systems is discussed in the 
next section. 
2.4. Information Security Overview 
Various authors reserve various definitions for information security. Most authors 
associate information security with three well-known characteristics, namely, 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, achieving these three 
characteristics is not a guarantee that a secure environment will be established (Saleh, 
2010). “In its most basic traditional definition, information security means protecting 
information and information systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction” (Fuchs, Pernul & Sandhu, 2011:748). 
Furthermore, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information are protected 
against threats and damage caused by faults in hardware and software, natural 
events, and wilful, negligent or accidental events (OECD, 2003).  
 
Whitman and Mattord (2008) perceive information security as the safeguarding of 
information including its elements that are considered crucial. However, Ashenden 
(2008) argues that information security is merely not about the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information alone, it should stretch beyond to accommodate real 
business benefits such as protecting while facilitating the controlled sharing of 
information and managing the associated risks across a changing threat and risk 
environment. 
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In light of the preceding section, organisations can implement information security 
protective measures through ISO/IEC 27001:2013 accreditation. The ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 is an internationally recognised information security management 
standard that emphasises the three characteristics (Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability – CIA) of information security (Caballero, 2009).  
2.4.1. Characteristics of Information Security 
2.4.1.1. Confidentiality  
Information assets are believed to possess confidentiality when they are protected 
from disclosure or exposure from unauthorised individuals or systems. In easier terms, 
it determines the level of secrecy. Furthermore, it also ensures that only those with 
rights and privileges to access the assets are able to do so. Besides, when 
unauthorised individuals or systems can view information, confidentiality is breached 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2012). One of the best ways of preserving confidentiality is using 
a method called encryption, which according to Padmapriya and Subhasri (2013) is a 
technique of concealing sensitive information by converting it into a code to protect it 
from unauthorised persons.  
2.4.1.2. Integrity  
Of the three CIA aspects, this aspect of information is the most critical (365 Computer 
Security, 2010). Information assets are considered to possess integrity if they can only 
be modified by authorised parties or in acceptable ways, and this applies to data, 
software, and hardware (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012).  
2.4.1.3. Availability  
Availability refers to the ability of a system or information assets to be accessible and 
usable upon demand by authorised personnel. Additionally, it points out the willpower 
of a system to carry on operating even when authorised personnel abuse it. The 
system must have the pedigree to continue operations even during eventualities such 
as security breach. Availability not only refers to data or software but also hardware 
being available to authorised end-users upon demand (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012).  
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Figure 2.5 summarises the three fundamentals of information security graphically. If 
the three fundamentals of information security are maintained and upheld, a highly 
secure and reliable information system is possible in any such organisation because 
the preservation of information is guaranteed when all principle attributes of 
information protection, namely, confidentiality, integrity, and availability are conserved 
during the life cycle of information (ISO/IEC 17001:2013) 
 
Figure 2.5: The relationship between integrity, confidentiality, and availability  
Source: Adapted from ISO 27001:2013 
The three characteristics of information security as depicted in Figure 2.5 
(Confidentiality, Integrity, & Availability) form the so-called CIA triangle. The CIA 
triangle has to be preserved for the safety of data at various phases within an 
information system as summarised in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Phases of information through a system 
Status Description 
 
 
In Transit 
 
 
Protection of data while being transmitted between the various 
components of an information system  
 
In Process 
 
Protection of data while being accessed by end-users or 
applications in the information system 
 
At Rest 
 
 
The protection of data while it is in its storage areas waiting to 
be used or processed 
 
Source: Whitteker (2014) 
Consequently, if the characteristics of information security (CIA) already discussed are 
not adhered to during the information stages mentioned in Table 2.1, it exposes 
corporate data to threats which have the ability to affect the overall operations of an 
organisation 
2.4.2. Information System Threats  
In this subsection, information system threats are reviewed to fully understand how 
they hamper the general operations of a business in an effort to compete successfully. 
The subsection further relates these threats to potential business risks. 
According to Bishop (2003:6), “a threat is a potential violation of security”. Accordingly, 
threats can cause incidents that may lead to both information system and organisation 
harm (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). Intentionally through acts of terrorism or hacking, threats 
can be deliberated towards an organisation’s ICT infrastructure. Sometimes, these 
threats are unintentional through accidental occurrences by ignorant employees, or 
they can also be perpetuated by natural occurrences such as floods, fire, earth 
earthquake, and many other natural disasters.  
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2.4.2.1. Classification of Threats 
In organisations, information security managers need to know and understand 
potential threats that can consequently impact their ICT assets. This is mandatory for 
them in order to perform a forecast to determine what they need to do to prevent 
attacks by selecting appropriate mitigation or recovery plans. Organisations possess 
unique attributes and specialise in different products and services; therefore, each 
organisation will face different threats and vulnerabilities (Layton, 2009). On that 
account, threats are exploited with a variety of attacks, some technical, others not so 
much (Caballero, 2009). Threats also affect systems differently according to the design 
and intention of the threat agent (Microsoft Inc, 2015). These threats can be classified 
as malicious, non-malicious, or natural as shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Classification of threats  
Source: Microsoft Inc. (2015) 
The classification in Figure 2.6 indicates that threats may come in different types and 
formats. They may hamper information systems in different ways. Whether the threats 
depicted in Figure 2.6 are of an intentional nature or not, they are likely to emanate 
from either internal or external sources. To provide a proper defensive mechanism, 
organisations need to understand these sources carefully. In the next subsections, 
internal and external threats, as well as general threats to information systems, will be 
briefly discussed. 
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2.4.2.2. External Threats 
External threats to an organisation’s information system can be individuals who 
operate from outside the organisation attempting to gain unauthorised access to the 
information system through the Internet or other means. A good example of a threat 
agent is a hacker as shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Demonstration of external threats to an information system  
Source: Adapted from Huang and Behara (2014) 
Figure 2.7 shows threat agents that may target an organisation’s information system 
using a variety of methods. It further shows that a security breach towards an 
information system has very damaging consequences towards the business; thus, a 
strong defensive mechanism is mandatory to protect a business and its ICT assets 
from threats.  
 Hackers 
According to Pfleeger (2007), a hacker is a computer genius who in most cases non-
maliciously carries out illegal hacking work into a computer system for their gain or 
access to sensitive information or resources. Usually, they perform this act on behalf 
of someone with hidden intent. They use many different techniques to achieve this 
objective such as worms, backdoor Trojans, horses, and many other false pretences. 
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 Malware  
Malware is software designed to destroy, steal private information, or spy on an 
information system without the prior consent of the owner (Meskovska, 2008). Its most 
popular form could be viruses, Trojans, adware, spyware, spam, and rootkits. These 
threats have the ability to perform and cause some of these activities: 
o steal user identifications (IDs) and passwords 
o remote control of computers and other network resources 
o theft of customer data 
o induce reduced network performance and bandwidth 
o increase internet traffic and changes to internet browser home pages and 
search engines 
 
 Social Engineering 
Social engineering is categorised as a non-technical intrusion approach that hackers 
use to exploit system vulnerabilities (Kaspersky, 2015). It is mainly dependent on 
human interaction and often involves tricking system end-users into defying security 
procedures.  
 Phishing Mail 
Phishing qualifies as a method of identity theft. Agents may use emails that look 
legitimate to lure system end-users into giving out sensitive personal or business 
information, such as a credit card, bank account, social security numbers, or other 
sensitive personal information (Trend Micro, 2015). 
 Web Exploits 
These take the form of malicious websites that threat agents use to exploit computer 
networks. They use features such as cookies, worms, and other spying means to 
extract information from information systems. They target end-users by using false 
pretences. 
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2.4.2.3. Internal Threats 
An internal threat may be caused by an employee, staff, management, onsite 
contractor, or other members of a host institution that operates a computer system to 
which the insider has legitimate access (Humphreys, 2008). Insiders, as a result of 
legitimate access to their organisations’ information, systems, and networks, create a 
significant risk to employers (Bellovin, 2007). Ironically, insider threats are an important 
yet often overlooked aspect of security (Williams, 2008). This potentially results in poor 
handling of the information system at the hands of internal system end-users with little 
or no computer and system know-how. 
 Untrained Employees 
The majority of reported security lapses and incidents which often lead to breach of 
corporate information security are perpetrated internally by members within the 
organisation. In this regard, internal end-users are perceived as the weakest link in 
information security (Warkentin & Wilson, 2009). The main threat to the integrity of 
corporate data primarily comes from legitimate system end-users or employees who 
are not aware of the result of their activities while interacting with the system (Microsoft 
Inc., 2015). Consequentially, an inside end-user without security awareness is a 
liability to the business (Logan and Clarkson, 2005). 
 Disgruntled Employees 
According to Humphreys (2008:247), a disgruntled employee is someone who might 
be resentful, be annoyed, or not content because of unfair treatment. This is the reason 
for the employee attempting to sabotage an IT system, to destroy company files and 
information assets, to speak badly about the company or their superior, to steal from 
the company, or to take other actions to compensate for their grievance. This conduct 
qualifies as a malicious insider threat (Microsoft Ink, 2015). Insiders are likely to have 
specific goals and objectives, and have legitimate access to the system. Employees 
are the people most familiar with the organisation’s computers, system, and 
applications, and they are most likely to know what actions might cause the most 
damage. Insiders can plant viruses, Trojan horses, or worms, and they can browse 
through the file system effortlessly. 
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2.4.2.4. Common Threats 
According to Jouinia, Rabaia and Aissab (2014), a security threat can cause one or 
several damaging impacts to the information system such as destruction of 
information, corruption of information, theft or loss of information, or disclosure of 
information. All of these are outlined next. 
 Interception 
This is considered when an unlawful person has got access to an information 
resource. The illegal party could be a person, a program, or a computing system. 
Examples of this type of bad conduct can include copying of program or data files, or 
wiretapping to obtain data in a network. Although a loss may be detected quickly, a 
silent interceptor may leave no traces through which the interception can be readily 
detected.  
 Interruption  
Interruption to a system can be qualified when an asset of a system becomes 
unavailable, goes missing, or gets destroyed intentionally by unwarranted parties. A 
good example is spiteful damage to a system’s hardware, manipulation of a program 
or data file, or alteration to an operating system to make it fail or function in a less 
efficient way. 
 Modification  
This refers to unauthorised change to information. For example, someone might 
change the values in a database, alter a program so that it performs an additional 
computation, or modify data being transmitted electronically. It is even possible to 
modify hardware. Some cases of modification can be detected through simple efforts, 
others not, and one may get modifications that they cannot do anything about. 
 Fabrication 
An occurrence is labelled a fabrication in systems when a third party creates fake 
objects to intrude a computing system with the intention of changing the original design 
and operation. The invader may do this by introducing false transactions to a network 
or include bogus records to an existing database. Sometimes these bogus additions 
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can be detected as falsifications, but when committed by professional hackers, they 
are not distinguishable from the real thing. 
In this subsection, information system threats have been discussed ranging from the 
classification, types, and how they affect systems. It is clear that if threats are not 
managed, they can impact business operations negatively. Threats excel easily where 
a system has vulnerabilities which make it easy for the threat agents to reach their 
objectives.  
2.4.3. Information System Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability is a weakness that allows a threat to cause harm (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2010). Examples of vulnerabilities are information systems 
without proper policies to protect the use of information resources, no security centre 
to perform activities such as internet content filtering, buildings without access control 
to information resources, or a network without a properly maintained antivirus. Other 
forms of vulnerabilities could surface from human errors or mistakes in handling data 
through, for example, careless working or lack of training. These are categorically 
system vulnerabilities that can threaten the integrity of information assets or lead to 
unknowingly disclosing corporate secrets (Humphrey, 2008:248).  
According to Bernik and Prislan (2011:208), the only way to control vulnerabilities and 
threats to information security is to have a process of risk management in place. Such 
risk management enables organisations to manage threats. 
2.4.4. Information System Risks 
A risk is the possibility of suffering harm or loss (Conklin & White, 2012). It is inevitable 
at some stage that organisations will suffer an information security incident. Such a 
downturn of events may create multiple negative impacts, such as loss of company 
reputation and customer confidence, legal issues, a loss of productivity and direct 
financial loss (Tøndel, Line & Jaatun, 2014). Generally, information security risks are 
hazards that individuals and firms all face (Hyeun-Suk Rhee, Ryu & Kim, 2012). It is 
therefore ideal for organisations to have a risk management programme within their 
organisation. 
  
35 
 
Risk management refers to the overall decision-making process of identifying threats 
and vulnerabilities and their potential impacts, determining the costs of mitigating such 
events, and deciding what actions are cost-effective for controlling these effects 
(Conklin & White, 2012:538). Figure 2.8 highlights the steps involved in risk 
management. It shows a step-by-step explanation of what needs to be followed in 
order to manage an identified risk according to ISO/IEC 27001:2013. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Risk management process  
Source: Adapted from ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
If a vulnerability is not attended to, it allows threats to progress and take advantage of 
the weaknesses in an information system. When threats succeed, it becomes a 
business risk that has the potential of creating a negative impact on the business. 
2.4.5. The Impact of Threats on a Business 
It is eminent that information technology (IT) and information system (IS) incidents 
have devastating consequences on a business and, as many examples show, may 
also have business-threatening impacts (Jarvelainen, 2013:583). Such destructive 
business incidents may result in multiple negative impacts, such as loss of company 
reputation and customer confidence, legal issues, loss of productivity, and direct 
financial loss (Tøndel et al., 2014:42). According to the observation of Brotby (2009), 
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about 90% of organisations that lose their information assets due to the impact of 
successful threat attacks do not survive. This is so because the impact sometimes can 
create irretrievable damage to a business in so many different aspects.  
The next subsection draws attention to potential consequences likely to result from 
successful threats to a business. 
2.4.5.1. Economic Impact 
One way or the other, information security attacks to any business setup may have 
negative effects on the organisation’s financial position (Basani, 2012:32). Some 
attacks can have marginal effects on the organisation’s business operations, while 
others may have enormous effects that may threaten its functioning and survival. In 
2015, Bitstamp, a Slovenian company, once the world’s biggest exchanges for trading 
the digital bitcoin currency lost around 19,000 bitcoins estimated at $650 million after 
a breach in its computer information security. The company was forced to suspend its 
services after the security breach (Reuters, 2015). The attack is believed to have 
targeted the UK-based exchange’s operational wallets (also known as “hot wallets”) 
2.4.5.2. Financial Loss and Lawsuits 
Information systems are frequently exposed to various types of threats which can 
cause different types of damages that might lead to substantial financial losses 
(Jouinia, Rabaia & Aissab, 2014). According to Kraemer et al. (2009), incidences of 
computer and information security vulnerabilities are on the rise, and the associated 
consequences have costly and business-threatening ramifications. A good example of 
high profile information security breach cases in 2014 involved Sony Incorporated and 
Bitstamp. The investigation that was carried out revealed that 25 million Sony 
customers’ information on Sony Online Entertainment (SOE) was stolen and made 
available to the public (Mirror, 2011). The information leaked included names, 
addresses, emails, birth dates, phone numbers, and other information from PC games. 
Among all the clients whose information was accessed, at least 10 million also saved 
their credit card data therein. This incident highlights how data breach represents one 
of the major threats ICT systems face. Additionally, this has caused damages to a 
multinational company such as Sony, for millions of Euros in losses, and it also faces 
potential lawsuits by its clients for failing to protect their information. 
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2.4.5.3. Reputation or Confidence Loss 
Negative publicity on an organisation has the ability to dent its reputation or brand, 
and could cause customers to lose confidence and loyalty, which prospectively may 
hand commercial rivals competitive advantage (Basani, 2012:81). For example, in the 
case of both Sony Incorporated and Bitstamp, existing customers who filed for lawsuits 
would never trust the safety of their private personal information at the hands of Sony 
or Bitstamp anymore. Even worse, the cost of capital in the effort to resurrect the 
corporate image and make up for the breach goes up. 
2.4.5.4. Stakeholder Trust Loss and Legal Action 
If an organisation reports a security breach, investors, customers, and stakeholders 
can use the courts to claim damages. It could even lead to some stakeholders 
withdrawing their shares, which could hamper business operations. After Bitstamp’s 
hack attack in 2012 that saw the Slovenian business close for a while, Carney (2015), 
on his blog website, raises the following key concerns on behalf of Bitmap’s clients: 
 How will Bitstamp cover the $5 million loss, and is it currently running? 
 Will it be through their own balance sheet?  
 Will it be through insurance? If so, what kind of coverage does the company 
have? 
 Will it try to recover through raising a new round of investment from existing or 
new investors, and has that been accomplished before? 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the consequences of computer security breach 
through threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to any organisation have a very devastating 
impact. On that basis, it is a high priority that ICT infrastructure be protected in 
accordance with standard information security critical success factors to minimise the 
probability of successful attacks while increasing the chances of operating in a highly 
secure environment. 
2.5. Information Security Critical Success Factors 
Following the discussion in this chapter, there is no doubt that an organisation ought 
to invent a good security procedure for its information system and infrastructure to 
meet its operational target. On that account, Table 2.2 summarises the critical success 
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factors (CSF) that are perceived to be of extreme importance when evaluating the 
maturity of the overall information security landscape of an organisation. While there 
is no single security formula that can guarantee 100% ICT infrastructure safety, to a 
certain extent, combining the CSFs in Table 2.2 obtained from ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
and investigations offers a convincingly high degree of confidence that the overall 
information and communication landscape is highly secure. 
A secure information system must be capable of preventing and detecting risks and 
threats, while at the same time, it crucially must possess the means to successfully 
recover from eventualities such as a successful attack (Saleh, 2007). To be able to 
comply with that, the factors in Table 2.2 need to be a reality. 
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Table 2.2: Information security critical success factors 
 Description 
 
 
CSF 1 
Security Policy 
 
It is mandatory for every organisation to have an information security 
policy document which is strictly enforced: this is the beginning of 
security. Many companies may have security policies, but the 
implementation to impose them on employees is weak (Kavanagh, 
2006). 
 
 
 
 
CSF 2 
Management 
Support 
 
Information security should be instituted as part of a strategy to protect 
a business, its operations, and assets. According to Caballero (2009), 
security in an organisation should not be looked at as an IT problem; 
it is in fact more a business problem. Layton (2009) further 
emphasises that information security strategy must be connected to 
an organisation’s business plans to appropriately protect employees, 
assets, and future business plans. It must get full management 
support. 
 
CSF 3 
Simplicity of 
Security Policy 
 
The security policy document must be comprehensively written using 
simple language understandable by even non-IT employees. System 
end-users must be acquainted with the security policy, procedures, 
and standard practice when they interact with the system. 
 
CSF 3 
Security 
Awareness & 
Training 
 
Information security must be promoted to employees effectively 
(ISO/IE 27001:2013). The value of security to business must be 
highlighted to all employees who are end-users of the system, from 
the CEO right down to the cleaner so as to create the urge to work 
towards system safety whenever they interact with the computer 
system. 
 
CSF 4 
Accountability 
 
An organisation’s information security architecture must integrate a 
tradition of extending policy guidance to employees. For the most part, 
end-users must be aware of what is expected of them and what 
acceptable use entails, including accountability for non-compliance.  
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 Description 
 
 
CSF 5 
Risk 
Management 
 
In every organisation’s security programme, there must be a focus on 
risk analysis and management structure plus a countermeasure plan 
to respond to eventualities. Information security personnel must have 
an inventory of the most valuable IT infrastructure as well as a forecast 
list of trending security risks which they must regularly sensitise end-
users on how to respond to such risks. 
 
CSF 6 
Performance 
Measurement 
 
A security architecture must be systematic and well-structured to a 
point where it is easy to track its performance by keeping abreast with 
improvement or lack thereof over time. Jaquith (2007) reiterates that 
one can only improve on a security programme if it is assessable.  
 
CSF 7 
Self-
assessment 
Tool 
 
CSF 8 
Business 
Continuity Plan 
 
An information security programme must have strong end-user control 
and monitoring. This must include a screening tool for new 
recruitments to measure their security awareness pedigree and check 
background to have a good understanding of their history security-
wise. 
In the event of a successful security breach that paralyses operations, 
a good security programme must have a swift recovery plan. This is 
often regarded as a business continuity plan or disaster recovery plan. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore literature on the information security 
landscape in organisations in order to identify its critical success factors to be relied 
upon in subsequent aspects of this study. This was achieved after an organisation 
business case in order to demonstrate the operations of an organisation. Furthermore, 
it was showcased how the business heavily relies on the support of ICT infrastructure 
to function competitively and meet its business goals. However, ICT infrastructure 
cannot be relied upon if it is not secured. To supplement that, the fundamentals of 
information security and how that is essential in safeguarding business information 
assets were explored. The chapter concluded with a discussion of critical success 
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factors that are required in order to consider an information system reasonably 
reliable, safe, and able to meet the required minimum standards in accordance with 
existing security models such as ISO/IE 27001:2013 and COBIT.  
The next chapter discusses the notion of digital divide and contextualises the concept 
to that of enterprise information security, leading to the relatively new concept of 
information security digital divide. 
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Chapter 3: Information Security Digital Divide in Organisations 
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3.1. Introduction  
The preceding chapter explored organisations at structural and operational levels and 
justified the need to have a secured ICT infrastructure for supporting business 
operations. A range of critical success factors were identified in the framework of 
information security. Building on that, this chapter thus conceives the concept of 
information security digital divide as an additional re-enforcement measure to 
information security. This chapter is relevant to the research in the sense that it helps 
an organisation to relook at information resource accessibility and usage to measure 
control levels in order to upscale overall information security. This is achieved by first 
understanding the organisational ecosystem and then examining the flow of 
information in order to establish the best possible accessibility and information use 
control. In so doing, the research question “How can the concept of digital divide be 
leveraged in the context of information security at organisation level?” will be 
addressed. This ultimately will result in the identification of critical success factors for 
information security digital divide. 
This chapter provides an overview of information security digital divide by first 
describing and then dissecting types of digital divides. It illustrates how information 
security and digital divide are combined to form the core concept of information 
security digital divide. The organisational ecosystem is then addressed for 
understanding the flow of information to determine how stakeholders interact in 
reference to their functions, roles and responsibilities, and how that affects 
accessibility and use of information together with the impact it may have on the overall 
organisation. The impact of accessibility and use is then introduced. Lastly, critical 
success factors (CSFs) of information security digital divide (an extension of 
information security) are explored before concluding the chapter. 
3.2. An Overview of Digital Divide 
Since the inception of the digital divide, it has become a topic that is researched more 
from an information and communication technology for development (ICT4D) point of 
view. Nevertheless, there are many varying definitions and types of digital divides. For 
instance, Van Dijk (2006:178) defines the digital divide as ‘‘the gap between those who 
have and those who do not have access to computers and the Internet’’. However, the 
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most popular definition of digital divide is that of Partridge (2005), who explains that, 
traditionally, digital divide is globally perceived by many researchers with a socio-
economic perspective, predominantly focused on accessibility to telecommunications 
technology, the Internet, and the capability to use this technology to fully participate in 
business. Figure 3.1 depicts an example of the digital divide in the context of ICT4D. 
 
Figure 3.1: Digital divide overview indicating the haves and have-nots  
Source: Adapted from Eubanks (2007) 
In theory, according to Figure 3.1, if the technology accessibility gap between the 
haves and have-nots is too wide, it is not good for economic development. That said, 
the concept of digital divide can also be extended and used in other perspectives such 
as ICT security within an organisation, which is the focus area in the next segment of 
the chapter. 
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3.3. Digital Divide in the Context of Information Security  
In addition to the literature in the preceding section on digital divide, Warschauer 
(2002) maintains that not only should digital divide be understood from a physical 
access to computers and connectivity viewpoint, it must also incorporate people’s 
ability to make full use of systems. Likewise, Rao (2005) observes that digital divide 
could also be as a result of differences based on access to information and other 
information technologies, including the ability to use information. Albrechtsen and 
Hovden (2009:477-478) further substantiate this by positing that the digital divide is 
not only a question of access to information systems that have implemented adequate 
information security technology, it is also about considerable differences in skills, 
knowledge, roles and responsibilities, perceptions, and interpersonal relationships 
between various members of an organisation. Some of these differences, in effect, 
build towards the concept of information security digital divide (ISDD). 
Based on the foregoing and in the context of this research, the digital divide is then 
contextualised in terms of accessibility and usage of corporate data by end-users, 
partners, and stakeholders. Primarily, this is supposed to be dictated according to the 
standard information security policy which regulates access and usability. It is further 
characterised by the alignment of system end-users, partners, and stakeholders to 
their business functions, roles, and responsibilities. This is similar to the concept of 
Role-Based-Access-Control (RBAC) where specific rules are defined for each 
individual within an organisation to restrict access to system resources according to 
their job or function (Fadhel, Bianculli, & Briand, 2015). 
Therefore, in this research, information security digital divide will be defined as follows: 
The control of access to corporate data and its use within and outside an organisation 
according to the relevance it has to an end-user, partner, or stakeholder based on their 
business roles and responsibilities, and functions within the structure of an 
organisation. Additionally, a partner, stakeholder or end-user is defined as a system 
operator or person who legally has permission within and outside an organisation to 
access and use certain relevant ICT resources and information. 
In summarising both types of digital divides explored, it is evident that according to 
ICT4D, a high digital divide is bad for economic development, whereas with 
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information security digital divide, a high divide is good for the safety of corporate data. 
Having defined and contextualised ISDD, the subsection that follows will combine the 
rationale of information security and digital divide to utilise this concept to demonstrate 
the value ISDD has in strengthening information security.  
3.3.1. The Digital Divide Theory 
Information security as discussed in Chapter 2 and demonstrated further in the CIA 
triangle in Figure 3.2 ensures information possesses confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA). In sum, the combination of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
produces favourably safe corporate data and services. 
 
Figure 3.2: Information security requirements  
Source: Adapted from Kaya (2012) 
However, there is a range of assumptions that information security on its own does not 
completely provide answers to in the context of security, such as addressing ever-
changing systems access control complexities and environment. But with the 
incorporation of ISDD, those concerns can be mitigated. These assumptions include:  
 
Confidentiality
Integrity
Secure 
data
Availability
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 Information security on its own offers limited internal and external accessibility 
control techniques, while digital divide aims to create information accessibility 
haves and have-nots in harmony with what every end-user, partner, and 
stakeholder needs in order to perform their work. For example, internally, the 
finance department should only be able to have physical access to finance 
department computing resources. More so, such a divide is narrowed at 
individual end-user level to only provide accessibility and usage to those end-
users who have the necessary credentials based on their functional role in the 
organisation. As such, those computing resources should be the only ones they 
can log on to and on top of that, these associated computers from a network 
perspective should only be able to view resources on specific servers and 
intranet resources. 
 While information security protects ICT infrastructure, digital divide takes that 
information infrastructure and splits it into segments to safeguard it digitally. For 
example, in high technology organisations, certain departments that do not 
require access to the Internet can have computers that can connect to internal 
resources such as intranet, payroll checking, and many others, but they cannot 
surf the Internet. 
 The human factor is considered the biggest threat to security (Gate Protect, 
2015). However, information security focuses more on technical solutions such 
as firewalls, virus prevention, spam filters, and packet tracing. Digital divide, on 
the other hand, is a non-technical security approach that concentrates on the 
human factor, primarily on accessibility of information resources by end-users. 
Therefore, it will complement information security to improve overall security 
performance. 
Combining Figure 3.2 and the assumptions raised in this subsection generates Figure 
3.3. It also justifies the contextual definition of information security digital divide in this 
study. 
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Figure 3.3: Information security digital divide and how it strengthens overall 
information security 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the accessibility interrelationship of corporate data between 
internal stakeholders. For example, a high divide (A, B, C) is inevitable among all the 
three stakeholders, namely, chief executive officer (CEO), middle manager, and data 
entry clerk while ensuring the three characteristics of information security (CIA). The 
role of the divide is to ensure stakeholders have accessibility to corporate data 
according to the relevance. The relevance of corporate data to every end-user is 
guided by their business function, roles, and responsibilities, and it is explained in a 
living document called information security policy, which acts as terms of reference.  
Further on, the intersection labelled D in Figure 3.3 indicates the common area that 
should be accessible to everyone in the organisation irrespective of business function, 
roles, and responsibilities. However, from a DD accessibility and usage perspective, 
the traditional information security proxies (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) 
alone fall short of defined strategy to efficiently isolate this corporate data in D in the 
event of a security breach by internal or external threats. Characteristically, A should 
only be exclusive to the CEO, while B to the middle manager and C to the data entry 
clerk. In the same order, information sharable between the middle manager and data 
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entry clerk BC should be strictly unavailable to other stakeholders including, for 
example, the CEO. Although he is senior to the data entry clerk, he must not interfere 
in the scope of work by virtue of his seniority status on the organisational structure. 
However, when there is a need for the two business roles (CEO and data entry clerk) 
to work together, the system must temporarily make provision for such occasions. 
Equally, other aggregations in Figure 3.3 such as AB and AC must follow the same 
pattern. This demarcation matrix can extend to not only access to information but also 
the resources supporting them on an information system. 
The level of maturity of ISDD in an organisation can then be determined based on how 
well accessibility is controlled and successfully highly restricted only to relevant end-
users. For example, if IT support staff come and perform preventive maintenance on 
the CEO’s computer, the profile used to access that computer must not be permitted 
to view any of the CEO’s documents or explore any other areas not necessary for their 
role on that computer. However, given a circumstance where a business role may be 
required to break the principles of ISDD in order to perform a duty, e.g. IT support 
needing to resolve a failure on a hardware which directly stores the finance manager’s 
sensitive data, such cases must be protected through a non-disclosure agreement to 
ensure no information accessed or viewed may be revealed or moved. All the 
aforesaid should be contained in the IT security policy. 
The next subsection considers a sample of an information security template with 
accessibility policies that are aimed at demarcating end-users as well as act as a first 
line of security to a computer system. The sample used is inspired by that of another 
template (Trinity College Dublin, 2015). 
3.3.2. Information Security Template Sample 
Organisations invest a substantial amount of resources in order to support business 
operations through a sound information and communication technology landscape. It 
is therefore for this reason that criteria for protecting this vast investment should be 
instituted. This information security template applies to all computer system end-users 
including internal staff, company partners, stakeholders, and other external end-users 
not itemised. Everyone categorised herein must comply with all appropriate parts of 
the IT code of conduct as outlined in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Sample of security policy 
I. Network Access Policy 
 Only authorised network administrators or personnel may connect devices to the 
computer system 
 Only authorised devices may be connected to the company system 
 Authorised devices include PCs, laptops, handheld devices, and workstations 
owned by the company that complies with the configuration guidelines and 
standards of the organisation 
 
II. Remote Access Policy  
 Only permitted secure remote access technologies should be allowed, e.g. VPN, 
voice recognition, remote desktop connection, telephone 
 All devices connecting to the company system must be approved by IT experts, and 
all such devices must comply with secure connection standards 
II.(a) Non-standard Remote Access Connections  
 External end-users who wish to use non-standard remote access technologies 
must obtain prior consent from the IT department for clearance 
 External end-users adopting third-party technologies must be made aware of the 
expectations from them of the ICT experts  
 
III. Data Protection and Handling Policy 
 All corporate data or programs formed/retained/stored by an end-user or connected 
to the computer system may be subjected to random inspection by IT support staff 
without any prior notice, especially when any breach of security is suspected 
 
IV. Non-disclosure Agreement Policy 
 All agents, contractors, partners, suppliers, and external end-users should be made 
to enter into a non-disclosure agreement for the purpose of security  
V. Password Policy 
 End-users may not share a password or write it down where it is visible to others 
 All passwords must meet the required minimum complexity of 10 characters mixed 
with lower and uppercase, numbers, and other special characters such as 
!@#$%^& 
 Passwords must be changed every 90 days 
 End-users that suspect passwords have been compromised must change them 
immediately 
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In Table 3.1, a security template with specific policies to manage aspects of security 
such as accessibility, non-disclosure agreement, data protection, and password 
management were briefly described. The next section will now present the flow of 
information within an organisation, taking into consideration all the various reporting 
structures in accordance with the design of the organisational structure. Often, the flow 
of data determines how the access matrix policy can be customised by internal 
information ICT experts. 
3.4. Access and Usage of Information Resources within an Organisation 
In this section, the focus is on information flow, how it is accessed and the use within 
and outside the organisation by relevant stakeholders. The section concludes with the 
impact of accessibility and usage of information resources on business operations. As 
a disclaimer, although the organisational structure discussed next was already 
introduced in Chapter 2, the fact that it is revisited in this section is for highlighting 
information flow necessary for the implementation of ISDD.  
3.4.1. Organisational Structure 
To facilitate cross-boundary information sharing within an organisation, an 
understanding of factors influencing information sharing is critical to establish and 
maintain collaborative relationships (Creswell, 2005; Gil-Garcia, Soon Ae, & Janssen, 
2009; Pardo, Creswell, Dawes, & Burke, 2004; Zheng, Jiang, Yang, & Pardo, 2008). 
To realise that, one useful tool organisations could turn to is the organisational 
structure. An organisational structure shows the relationship between internal 
departments and subsystems (Petrauskas, 2006). Potentially, it is the operating 
manual that informs members how the organisation is structured and how it works 
(Community Tool Box, 2014). An effective organisational structure facilitates 
management and clarifies relationships, roles and responsibilities, levels of authority, 
and supervisory or reporting lines. Most organisations follow the traditional 
organisational structure style, where the hierarchy resembles a pyramid (Pathfinder 
International, 2014), as shown in Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4: A generic traditional organisational structure  
Source: Adapted from Organisational Development (2000) 
Figure 3.4 is a summary of the different reporting lines according to business functions, 
and roles and responsibilities in harmony with the organisational structure. It will help 
in understanding some business functions and how business roles and responsibilities 
need to interact internally, in the process making them primary generation points of 
corporate data. On the other hand, while being considered consumers of data, which 
they rely on to interact with external stakeholders such as suppliers, partners, and third 
parties, some business roles also in return collect external data valuable to business 
operations. This makes them information generators. 
3.4.2. Information Flow in an Organisation 
“Information flow is so important to a business such that it can be compared to the 
value oxygen has to human life (Al-Hakim, 2008). Drawing on that reasoning, 
information sharing has been stressed as an important driver of organisational 
performance (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). According to Hatala and Lutta (2009), 
information flow relates to the movement of information or data between members of 
an organisation. In organisations, information flows in verbal, written, or electronic form 
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(Yazici, 2002). It can also be classified according to the direction of the flow (Rishipal, 
2014). Traditionally, information in organisations flows upwards, downwards, or 
horizontally (Lunenburg, 2010). Vertically, information flows up and down among 
managers. For example, production supervisors constantly communicate with 
production line workers and their own managers. In contrast, in the horizontal case, 
information flows sideways among departments. One such good example is regional 
sales managers from the marketing department who set their sales goals by 
interacting with IT and logistics managers as shown in Figure 3.4 over a new product 
dependant on logistics and IT departments. 
No matter how information is designed to flow in an organisation, it is required to do 
so freely among members if the organisation is to compete firmly (Hatala & Lutta, 
2009). By examining the culture of information flow, one can get an idea of how well 
people in the organisation are cooperating, and also, how effective their work is likely 
to be in providing a safe operation (Westrum, 2014).  
With the help of a graphic representation of an organisation’s structure, a manager will 
be able to define tasks and determine information flow within the organisation 
effectively (Pathfinder International, 2014). This then enables the flow of business 
processes and workflows to be understood better because when information flow is 
uncontrolled, a client’s sensitive and proprietary information about an unpatented 
business concept, business plans, customer list, salaries, trade secrets, and financial 
plan, just to mention but a few, cannot be protected (Demski, Lewis, Yao, & Yildirim, 
2010).  
Understanding information flow requires the understanding of stakeholders within and 
outside the organisation. In the next subsection, stakeholders are discussed as well 
as how they interact to the benefit of an organisation. 
3.4.3. Stakeholders Interaction and Access to Information 
Knowledge produced in organisations by individuals is the product of the interactions 
and information sharing of individuals within the environment (Vicka, Naganoa, & 
Popadiuk, 2015). It, therefore, makes knowledge sharing very critical to an 
organisation’s competitiveness. Knowledge in an organisation may flow in two 
possible ways, namely, intra- and inter-organisational flow. The intra-organisational 
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flow is confined to the boundaries of the organisation and is only available to internal 
stakeholders. On the other hand, inter-organisational knowledge flow extends beyond 
the organisation and involves external parties such as suppliers, shareholders, 
business partners, competitors, and industry regulators, amongst others.  
3.4.3.1. Internal Stakeholders 
Internal stakeholders are people or personnel who work within the organisation; they 
can be classified as employees, investors, and owners (Boundless, 2015). An 
employee is a person employed for wages or salary (Oxford Dictionary, 2015). Each 
employee has their own role to play and their own scope of responsibility, which 
contributes towards realising the organisation’s goals (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). 
Because of the uniqueness of their business function, roles, and responsibilities, 
employees require accessibility and use of corporate data for different reasons and at 
different levels. Examples include the CEO, senior managers, middle managers, 
supervisors, and data entry clerk, which are briefly discussed next. 
 Chief Executive Officer 
The CEO is qualified as the top executive on the hierarchy responsible for a firm’s 
overall operations and performance (Business Dictionary, 2014). He or she is the 
leader of the firm, serves as the main link between the board of directors (the board) 
and the firm’s various parts or levels and is held solely responsible for the firm’s 
success or failure. During their day-to-day roles and responsibilities within and outside 
the organisation, CEOs interact with various stakeholders, and in the process, they 
access, generate, and use corporate data. 
Internally, the CEO may interact upward, downward, or horizontally depending on what 
kind of information he/she may need to access or use. For example, if the CEO 
requires a financial report to present to the board of directors, he/she may request that 
from the finance manager. Figure 3.5 reveals how a CEO may channel instructions or 
request information within an organisation.  
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Figure 3.5: Information flow in an organisation  
Source: Adapted from Liang (2011) 
Externally, the CEO may engage other stakeholders for better understanding of 
organisational performance. When decisions are made in colaboration with 
stakeholder input, there is a greater chance of success. A CEO may then engage 
various stakeholders for first-hand experience in order to update the board on the 
progress the organisation is making or obstacles faced in an effort to meet the overall 
strategic objective.  
As much as the CEO may be the highest in the hierarchy, from an information system 
standpoint, he/she should have no control over certain workflows. For example, he/she 
cannot approve leave for a system programmer without knowing whether there is a 
resource to continue business services anchored by that resource. This is because 
despite already not having knowledge of that department’s operations, he/she may 
also fall short of correct technical insights to make that call. Such a decision is best 
made by well-placed personnel within the organisational setup, e.g. a qualified senior 
manager in the field. This is a befitting reason for not allowing a CEO to have control 
all across the organisation. 
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 Senior Managers 
Senior managers are responsible for the vision of the organisation; they are more 
concerned with long-term strategic planning (Fergusson, 2013). To sustain their roles 
and responsibilities, they require interaction with all departments within an 
organisation to plan for future growth and the overall direction of the organisation. For 
example, they might need to plan for the marketing or sales department for the next 
five years. They also act as the link between the CEO and middle managers. 
Their overall roles and responsibilities include managing both long- and short-term 
policies to sustain the business (FFIEC, 2015). To achieve this, senior managers may 
require access to certain information resources applicable to their line of duty from 
various departments, and in the process, also generating, accessing, and using 
corporate data.  
Senior managers ensure the organisation produces results and that those results are 
produced consistently over time (Faust, 2012). Realistically, this means that most of 
the firms may decide to enter global markets, thus consequently improving their 
innovativeness (Smirnova, Kouchta, Podmetina, Vaatanen, & Rebyazina, 2009). 
Interaction with global markets by default means senior managers engage external 
stakeholders such as industry partners and suppliers. In the process, they generate 
access and use corporate data at almost all levels, since they also supervise middle 
managers. 
Similar to the foregoing discussion on the CEO’s roles and responsibilities, even 
though senior managers may be placed above everyone in the organisation except 
the CEO, they should not be empowered to dictate all work processes above or below 
them on the hierarchy which they are not well-suited for or do not have expertise on. 
For example, a senior manager should not have the power to command a process 
change in the production department where he/she has no know-how. Such an activity 
must be in consultation with a well-qualified middle manager in that department. 
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 Lower Managers 
Middle managers are mainly specialised in summarised information such as reports 
but may also be involved in decision-making. The information they require for their 
work may flow both vertically and horizontally within the boundaries of the 
organisation. They mainly work with budgeting and performance evaluation. They also 
focus on the implementation of long-term strategic plans raised by senior management 
(Darkow, 2015). Most crucially, they act as the link between the CEO, senior 
management, and the rest of the staff complement such as supervisors and data entry 
clerks. 
Internally, middle managers receive instructions from senior management and pass 
that on to the staff complement below them on the organisational structure as an 
implementation process strategy. Equally, they make follow-ups to see whether this 
implementation is falling in place in accordance with its intended plan. They then 
resubmit this information through reports to senior management. They, therefore, 
access data in various places. In some cases, their responsibilities may require them 
to make contact with external stakeholders. 
From a hierarchy perspective, middle managers should also be limited to profile 
expectations as guided by the organisational structure. They may not for instance 
initiate a payment process by electronically authorising online processes on behalf of 
the accounting department. 
 Supervisors 
Supervisors are generally individuals who on behalf of the organisation are skilled in 
making different groups work together in an organised way to achieve something 
(McNall, 2011; Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2015). They deal with up-to-date daily 
information which is primarily flowing vertically. All personnel that fall under a 
supervisor are directly responsible to the supervisor. Primarily, a supervisor’s 
requirement for information mainly flows vertically.  
Since they specialise in making groups within the organisation work together, 
supervisors on a daily basis generate performance-driven reports and information 
required by middle managers for their reporting to superiors (McNall, 2011). This 
requires supervisors to append existing reports as new data comes in. For example, 
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data entry clerks verify and ensure data is accurate before it is dispatched to the 
system or sent over through email to relevant personnel. Supervisors in most cases 
only interact with internal stakeholders. They mostly generate information for internal 
usage. 
Similar to the rest of the employees, supervisors should be limited to their roles and 
responsibilities by virtue of position on the organisational structure. However, because 
of eventualities such as a resource under them falling sick untimely, there should be a 
contingency plan improvised by the supervisor to maintain continuity. That plan could 
involve positioning some other resource to execute the duty of the ill resource in order 
to avoid taking the blame when business operations come to a standstill as a result of 
the unavailability of a resource.  
 Data Entry Clerk 
Data entry clerks in most organisations compile and transfer information for business 
and other organisations. The roles and responsibilities of a data entry clerk are 
summarised as compilation, entering, sorting, interpretation, and verification of data 
into the system (Nurse-Family Partnership, 2009). The nature of the job description 
leads to mostly generation of raw data while at the same time needing access and use 
of this same data. 
In an organisation, the data entry clerk is at the front collecting information and 
updating it when necessary. Being the entry point of raw data, this responsibility 
requires the clerk to interact with other staff members such as field workers that may 
conduct field work for the organisation. This is important, for example, for brand 
popularity or consumer reference surveys which are done by word of mouth or 
interviews. 
It is mandatory that the profile of a data entry clerk be confined to its duties by the 
system to avoid overlapping of information access. For example, a data entry clerk 
must not be allowed to change information on the middle manager’s profile after data 
is already processed and converted into meaningful information. 
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 System Administrator 
According to Limoncelli, Hogan and Chalup (2007), a system administrator is a 
computer professional with access level to a system that exceeds that of a normal 
end-user. Their primary role is to upkeep and ensure that a system functions efficiently. 
They achieve this objective by installing, configuring, and supporting ICT infrastructure 
such as servers, routers, computers, and all the front- and back-end software 
applications that work with it. 
The responsibilities of a system administrator allow them to generate information as 
they interact with both the system and its end-users on issues that affect their work. 
They can create documentation on end-user performance, network performance, 
threats, risks, and other new security trends. They use this information to create 
awareness campaigns and also to present to management on IT operations. 
Further to their scope of work, system administrators are empowered to view and 
access all ICT infrastructure including servers and computers. However, it is 
mandatory that there be some form of control to ensure they are also regulated to only 
manage work processes that are in line with their scope of work as prescribed by 
management. For example, during their routine IT support maintenance or response 
to a fault on the CEO’s computer, their ability to view, access, or manipulate data 
without prior consent must be highly restricted. It could also be that they must not be 
given privileges to financial services of an organisation, be it physically or from an 
application point of view. 
 Super User 
A super user is an account on a computer system with elevated privilege levels that 
exceed an ordinary user account (Holme & Thomas, 2008). In most cases, this is 
allocated to a junior IT support staff or an advanced user that performs some simple 
IT support tasks such as creating new users, resetting passwords, connecting printers, 
and managing antivirus services. 
This user may have mini-administrative duties to document any network activities as 
delegated by the system administrator or chief information officer. However, this 
delegation should not exceed any privileges beyond their technical expertise. Given 
an instance where the system administrator is unavailable, a junior IT support staff 
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should not be empowered with delegation rights that permit them to fidget with highly 
critical server processes that need advanced skill sets to manage or rectify. Also, when 
he/she is tasked to check on an antivirus problem on a senior manager’s machine, 
using his/her profile, he/she should not be able to view any of the manager’s sensitive 
documents. 
 Chief Information Officer 
A chief information officer (CIO) is a dedicated IT director who is not only responsible 
for synchronising information technology, information security, and information 
strategy to business needs (Avison & Wilson, 2002). Today’s CIO is also a business 
leader (Deloitte, 2004). This business function acts as the connection between 
business IT projects and the management of the organisation with the sole purpose of 
maximising returns from ICT investment to improve operation efficiency (Avison & 
Wilson, 2002; Deloitte, 2004). 
Lawry, Wadell and Singh (2007) state clearly that the CIO is about designing strategy. 
That in itself is generation of data. Given that this position is executive, it must not, 
however, spill over its responsibilities. As an example, if the CIO wants to pay for a 
phase of a project, he/she must not have a direct role in the payment system – that 
must be handled by the finance director who owns the right procedures. 
3.4.3.2. External Stakeholders  
According to Avison and Wilson (2002), external stakeholders to a business could 
include customers, suppliers, shareholders, and investors. In accordance with their 
business functions, and roles and responsibilities, their interests in corporate data 
vary. 
 Customers 
Customers basically define the client base of the business. Their focus is always goods 
on offer, promotions, customer service, and the pricing of goods (GCSE Business, 
2015).  
Customers interact with the organisation’s information system in different ways 
depending on the services and products they may require. They help the business 
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generate information through activities such as leaving comments on website blogs 
on service delivery satisfaction or how to improve business. 
Customers require access to the system, for example, through the portal to check on 
latest products, online shopping, pricing, promotions, or any information from the 
business that concerns them. Regardless of how they access business systems, it 
does have an impact on the security of business systems. As customers access the 
system through the portal, they should, for example, not be able to order goods from 
suppliers on behalf of the business. The system should not take any other service 
request other than what customers are defined to access.  
 Suppliers  
Suppliers are considered as trusted external end-users. They are very critical to most 
businesses today. Their relationship with the organisation is unique and direct because 
they also hold a stake in the business (Business Case Studies, 2014). They supply 
specific products which they agree on with the business (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 
2014).  
Since they have a stake in the business, suppliers may require access to business 
information systems in order to effectively perform their responsibilities such as to 
deliver goods and services on behalf of a business in a timely and reliable manner. 
They might need to know delivery schedules, places, and customer details. One way 
of achieving this could be to give them access to a Web portal, email, or instant 
messaging. However, these services such as instant messaging or email should be 
protected from risks that are associated with external connections into the internal 
system. 
 Investors 
An investor is a person who allocates a share of their capital to a business, with the 
expectation of financial gain in the future. Their role is to monitor their investment and 
the overall performance of the organisation (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2015). 
Technically, investors are the owners of the business. Business owners refer to 
persons who have invested in an enterprise to own its’ stock, and that management 
are merely their employees (Aguila, 2014). This means that constantly they need to 
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be kept up to date on the operations of the organisation through regular meetings, and 
quarterly and annual financial reports. 
They interact with the board and management of the organisation through email, 
instant messaging, faxes, and the phone. They hardly generate data, since they are 
always feeding off reports from the organisation. They, however, require access to 
corporate data as and when they need it for their own use. Some of the data they need 
access to includes financial reports, future strategies, and news on potential 
competition in the market to understand threats to their investment.  
This subsection explored the information flow amongst an organisation’s stakeholders. 
This forms the basis for the advocacy for an information security digital divide. The 
next subsection focuses on accessibility control and the accompanying impact. 
3.4.5. Information Access Control 
Access control in computer systems and networks refers to a structure implemented 
and entrusted with the role of managing end-user access to information, resources, 
and services to counter malicious attacks (Zhang, He, Zhao, Huang & Liu, 2015:133). 
Ward and Smith (2002:358) further articulate that logical access control 
implementation on computer systems is considered an integral component in the 
protection of systems and information. However, installing a control mechanism in 
isolation is not advisable without first identifying what approaches should be adopted 
with regard to security across the organisation. 
Given the above, user access management can then be summarised as the selective 
authorisation approach overseeing who can use, change, or view systems or 
information and the circumstances in which such access is permissible. Nevertheless, 
with increased emphasis on cross-functionality, teamwork, and multiple views of 
information (prescribed by job roles), it is more difficult to assign effective security 
parameters (Post & Kagan, 2007). For instance, within the same organisation, three 
personnel business functions from three different departments with three different 
roles and responsibilities need access to three varying resources authorised by the 
same information system. To avoid the overlapping of information, these end-users 
should not have the same access rights; their access must be carefully limited to 
resources that are required for their tasks, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: Accessibility to company information resource based on roles and 
responsibilities  
Source: Adapted from Fuchs, Pernul and Sandhu (2011) 
In Figure 3.6, given that resource A is the CEO’s computer on the system, if a super 
user comes from the IT department to attend to a call on the CEO’s computer, he/she 
should only be able to respond to the fault logged without being empowered by access 
level rights to initiate activities such as view sensitive data or applications. Additionally, 
an investor being an external stakeholder must not trigger an internal process such as 
preparing a payment voucher through resource B (Finance application). Also, 
resource C is not supposed to be used by a customer to procure goods for the 
organisation. In another example of access scenarios, the CEO must have some level 
of human resource (HR) roles in his scope of work, for example, it is in the CEO’s 
interest to view whether HR policies are adhered to during recruitment of new 
personnel. This thus makes the CEO partners with the human resource department. 
That means the CEO should have some form of authorisation to view what is 
necessary in the human resource department; it could also be that he/she is supposed 
to be able to approve leave for the CIO or a senior manager using the HR system. 
Such an efficient access control management mechanism forms the backbone of the 
organisation becoming mature in ISDD.  
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3.5. Mature Information Security Digital Divide 
A mature ISDD entails a well-organised, established, and appropriate mechanism for 
the management of the ability to access and process information and data within an 
organisation in such a way that security breaches are well contained. In this case, any 
access to information is fully traceable and aligned to the predefined security 
guidelines and policies established by the organisation. Within an organisation, ISDD 
is mature when the following key questions are answered and well-documented with 
regard to generation, access, and usage of information: “Who needs it?” “Why do they 
need it?” “How do they need it?” “For what purpose do they need it?” and “Is this in 
alignment to their business function, roles and responsibilities?” As such, by 
addressing the foregoing key questions, there will be a high degree of confidence that 
there is no overlap in the process of granting access to stakeholders. To that effect, 
only authorised access is experienced at any point in time. The following are a few 
examples of business rules for promoting a mature ISDD:  
 The finance director should not be able to authorise leave on the system for a 
system programmer on behalf of the CIO. The finance director has no technical 
insight to understand the consequences of letting a system programmer go on 
leave without knowing whether there is a backup programmer to continue 
projects at the same level or not. 
 Despite being the most senior personnel in an organisation, a CEO must not 
be empowered with credentials to view any information in the organisation such 
as tracking the cheque authorisation process – that is the work of the finance 
department. 
 The system should not permit a cheque to be found in finance processing 
orders, which is the responsibility of the procurement department. 
 IT support staff or system administrators, by virtue of their roles and 
responsibilities, should not be able to access or view the CIO’s sensitive 
information on the company’s business strategy when they come and perform 
routine maintenance. 
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 Employees must not be able to access one another’s computer profiles 
containing both work and private information such as electronic payslips, health 
status, trade secrets, and appraisals.  
 A supplier’s interaction with the logistics department on the strategy to improve 
service delivery must only be available to relevant employees dealing with 
logistics. 
 Investors cannot order goods for the organisation through the computer system 
nor should they be able to authorise a transaction on behalf of the finance 
director. 
3.5.1. Impact of Accessibility and Use of Corporate Data 
The impact of accessibility and use on corporate data can be divided into two sides: 
positive and negative. In the real world, every organisation would obviously want to 
have a positive side as opposed to a negative one. 
3.5.1.1. Positive Side – Improved Business Operations 
In this competitive business landscape, most businesses are profit-orientated. To that 
end, there is nothing as important as ensuring good service delivery to customers. 
According to Santouridis and Trivellas (2010), customer satisfaction with a business’ 
products and services is straightforwardly connected to good returns on investment. 
For any organisation to keep the competitive advantage, they must be well coordinated 
internally. Being coordinated goes hand in hand with the flow of information, especially 
the flexible accessibility in real time and using it to deliver that quality service. However, 
while flexible accessibility and usage are critical to business operations, they might 
also create a downside. 
3.5.1.2. Negative Side 
Relaxed access to and use of information can pose a danger to security and the 
system, especially if trade secrets, for example, end up in the hands of direct 
competition. Information can be exposed accidentally as discussed earlier in Chapter 
2 through stakeholders, especially when they interact with external stakeholders or 
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intentionally through internal end-users who are less informed about good use of 
information facilities. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 provides a rich overview of how information flows 
through interactions among stakeholders within and outside the organisation. This 
creates a complex demand for accessibility and usage, which has the potential to 
weaken the traditional information security measures of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. It is then inevitable to look at the structure of the existing information 
security based on identity critical factors that must function appropriately to ensure 
that information accurately and correctly gets accessed by who legally needs it, why 
they need it, what they need it for, and how they need it. 
3.6. Information Security Digital Divide Critical Success Factors 
According to Frenzel and Frenzel (2004), CSFs are those few areas in a business 
where things must go right – they are an executive’s necessary conditions for success. 
In the context of information security in an organisation, they relate to information 
technology (IT) executives, their subordinate managers, and to other relevant 
executives within. Table 3.2 lists 10 ISDD critical success factors relevant to this study 
which will be used in the next chapter to develop maturity level metrics. 
Table 3.2: ISDD critical success factors 
CSF Description 
 
 
 
 
CSF 1 – 
Ecosystem 
Information Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
A clearly defined ecosystem according to the organisational 
structure (Fadhel, Bianculli & Briand, 2015). This will allow 
the assessment of workflow, data movement, as well as the 
way data should be accessed and used in order to promote 
a mature information security digital divide. Also, it allows 
individuals to observe their boundaries when dealing with 
the access, use, and sharing of corporate data. 
 
Security awareness as a culture is mandatory in every 
organisation that invests in a computer system (IS/IEC 
27001, 2013). Security awareness must involve internal 
end-users, stakeholders, partners, and other external 
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CSF Description 
CSF 2 – 
Culture of Security 
Awareness 
 
 
 
CSF 3 – 
Business Function, Roles 
& Responsibilities 
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
CSF 4 – 
Access Control 
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
CSF 5 – 
beneficiaries of the computer system in accordance with 
how they interact with it. This awareness should be tailor-
designed to build protection according to the design of the 
specific IT landscape. 
 
Business functions, and roles and responsibilities of each 
individual must be structured according to the work scope 
as indicated by the organisational structure (Fadhel, 
Bianculli & Briand, 2015). This makes it easy for the system 
to be configured to allow individuals within and outside the 
organisation to access information resources according to 
how their work scope dictates. For instance, when the 
logistics manager works outside the workplace, he needs 
access to logistics-related information externally. Also, he 
needs to be able to use email to communicate to suppliers 
while outside the organisation. 
 
A well-managed access control policy to corporate data or 
system resources is based on the relevance of the 
information to an individual (Humphreys, 2008). Every end-
user must have an ID and password for authorisation. 
Uncontrolled access to information could result in security 
that could breach the divide policy. For example, individuals 
working in the finance department must be confined to 
finance-related resources only. A controlled environment 
reduces the risk of information leaking to other departments 
within the organisation that are not relevant to the operations 
of finance. 
 
Standard information security policy custom-made to 
properly support accessibility and use of corporate 
information resources and information (IS/IEC 27001, 
2013). This is a standard reference document that provides 
guidelines to all individuals and constantly reminds them of 
the dos and don’ts around the use of organisational 
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CSF Description 
Security Policy 
 
 
 
 
CSF 6 – 
Information Security 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
CSF 7 – 
Physical Access 
information technology within and outside the premises of 
the organisation. It promotes a strong divide which is 
essential for the safety of corporate data. 
 
Among all individuals, sound information security 
knowledge, skills, and its application is a must 
(Nikolakopolous, 2009). Without good information security 
knowledge and its application, it is difficult for individuals to 
interpret some, if not all, the content of the information 
security policy. It also makes it hard for end-users to conduct 
themselves in a manner that promotes a mature information 
security digital divide. Unknowingly, they can engage in 
activities that can compromise the divide. 
 
Well-controlled physical access to information resources 
within the premises individual (Humphreys, 2008). Before 
access to information resources such as computers and 
laptops can be discussed, access to physical buildings 
where these resources are kept must be considered to 
ensure the concept of digital divide is upheld. Individuals’ 
access must be carefully regulated, for example, issue 
individuals access cards or keys which only give access to 
offices and other places permissible according to the scope 
of their work. Finance department must only access 
computers within their department as well as interact with 
the part of the Intranet relevant to financial matters. 
 
 
 
 
CSF 8 – 
Audit Trail 
 
A comprehensive audit trail to enable the computer system 
to determine what resource was accessed, by whom, why, 
and when (Holme & Thomas, 2008). This security feature 
also reinforces the fact that all activities on a computer 
system may be closely monitored. This also enables breach 
to be identified early enough to counteract in order to 
minimise the extent of damage in cases of security breach. 
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CSF Description 
 
 
 
CSF 9 – 
Identity Management 
 
 
Identity Management is the beginning point of access 
control on a computer system. It is a requirement that all 
end-users are authenticated and authorised before they can 
use the system (IS/IEC 27001, 2013). 
 
 
CSF 10 – 
Culture of Protecting  
Information 
 
System end-users and stakeholders must conform to a 
culture of using system resources according to the confines 
of the security policy (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010). Such a culture 
promotes standards and best practice vital for mature ISDD. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on accessibility and use of information systems and their 
alignment to the concept of digital divide to complement traditional fundamentals of 
information security (confidentiality, integrity, and availability). The concept of 
information security digital divide was derived by aligning information security and 
digital divide. To demonstrate the significance of dividing information to enhance 
information security, the organisation ecosystem was assessed, and stakeholders’ 
interaction based on their roles and responsibilities was described. It was further 
highlighted that system stakeholders vary based on roles and responsibilities, some 
are more primary sources of information generation than consumers, others more 
consumers than sources. In some cases it can be both. 
This analysis boils down to the fact that while all the users might need to access and 
use information, accessibility, and use must be regulated by the relevance of the 
information to their roles and responsibilities. It is then vital to realise that a high 
information access divide is good for the enhancement of information security, 
whereas a low divide is not. However, this is contrary to the concept of information 
and communication technology for development, which dictates that a low divide is 
good as opposed to a high divide.  
The chapter that follows will address the theoretical foundation on which this study 
relies for the construction of a conceptual framework. 
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Chapter 4: A Framework for Information Security Digital Divide 
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4.1. Introduction  
The foregoing two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) focused on exploring information 
security and information security digital divide from literature in the context of this 
study. Building on that, the purpose of this chapter is to propose a theoretical 
framework for ISDD. The chapter thus seeks to answer the third research question on 
the development of a conceptual framework for benchmarking information security 
digital divide. The framework is intended to assess the maturity level of ISDD in any 
given organisation in a real-life context. This is achieved by relying on the maturity 
assessment approach of COBIT, which will be used as the roadmap for the 
characterisation of maturity levels. 
The chapter begins with the definition of a framework, its objectives, characteristics, 
and life cycle in Section 4.2. It then provides an overview of COBIT in Section 4.3, as 
well as metrics that determine compliance levels. Section 4.4 deals with principles of 
software capability maturity and further explores the significance of capability maturity, 
focusing on conditions used to determine security capability maturity criteria. Section 
4.5 presents the proposed information security digital divide framework and its various 
components are discussed. Compliance and maturity levels in the context of ISDD are 
further elaborated on in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. A conclusion to the chapter 
is provided in Section 4.8.  
4.2. Overview of a Framework 
An information security framework is a series of documented processes that are used 
to define policies and procedures around the implementation and ongoing 
management of information security controls in an organisation (Granneman, 2013). 
Granneman (2013) goes on to elaborate that frameworks are basically outlines for 
building an information security programme to manage risk and reduce vulnerabilities. 
In addition, an information security framework should not only focus on technological 
issues but also incorporate other mission-critical components within an organisation 
such as people, process, and business strategies which also dictate the need for 
information security (Patil, 2008:5). In security models, people, process, and 
technology must combine to increase security performance (Saleh, 2011), as depicted 
in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between, people, process, and technology  
Source: Adapted from Kumta and Shah (2002) 
Figure 4.1 is identical to the logic of Saleh, Abdulkader and Alfantookh (2011) on 
security, which underlines the reality that combining essential information security 
factors enhances standards of security practice and is fast becoming a popular trend. 
Saleh et.al (2011) furthermore spot the example of the strategy, technology, 
organisation, people, and environment (STOPE) framework, which entails combining 
all the aforesaid factors to create a good framework. The subsection that follows 
discusses the objectives of a framework. 
4.2.1. Objectives of a Framework 
The aim of an information security framework is to connect people, process, and 
technology in order to deliver practical IT guidelines for standard practice (Patil, 
2008:8). However, even with the best planning and implementation, it is often 
impossible to obtain a perfect information security framework (Whitman & Mattord, 
2008). Principally, the idea of a framework is to minimise the information security risk. 
This is also known as creating the operational security environment (OSE). The OSE 
is supplemented by all installed information security countermeasures. Figure 4.2 is a 
demonstration of the legacy concept of OSE which was masterminded by Von Solms, 
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van de haar, von solms and Caelli (1994). A carefully designed framework should 
be able to sustain or at least come close to the ideal OSE because then the prescribed 
countermeasures would have been met. One way of attaining OSE in an organisation 
is by utilising a custom framework based on combining the capabilities of other existing 
frameworks such as IS0/1EC 27001:2013 and COBIT. 
 
Figure 4.2: Operating security environment  
Source: Adapted from Von Solms, van de haar, von solms and Caelli (1994) 
According to Arora (2011:8), standard frameworks on information systems 
management can be dissected into information security standards or information 
security governance standards. COBIT is a high-level IT governance and 
management framework. It focuses on broader decisions in IT management and does 
not dwell on technical details. On the other hand, ISO 27001:2013 implementation 
concentrates on security controls, centred on a risk management approach. This 
implies that both COBIT and ISO/IEC 27001:2013 deliver foundations that are 
essential towards the development of a sound information security plan (Garcia, 
2015). To get the desired security level, every custom framework requires going along 
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with industry-approved characteristics applicable to the security of its business 
operations. The next subsection discusses framework characteristics. 
4.2.2. Characteristics of a Framework 
According to some authors (Patil, 2008:8; Basani, 2012), a well-designed information 
framework should at all costs integrate the following important components:  
1) A life cycle: This contributes to ensuring that there is continuous improvement 
in a process by looking at its critical phases (Basani, 2012:6).  
2) The next item must be a recommended and well-constructed information 
security governance that is complete. Patil (2008) points out that this is only 
realistic by, for example, putting in place properly organised and clearly outlined 
policies within an organisation.  
3) Sound controlled access practices for, amongst others, stakeholders, 
processes, technology, and crucially information resources.  
4) The use of popular, successful existing frameworks as guidelines. Good 
examples of those could include COBIT, IRSM, HIPAA, and ISO 27001:2013.  
5) A guide of acceptable criteria on alternatives to helping in tailoring a framework 
to suit the operating information security environment in which it will be 
applicable. 
4.2.3. Life cycle 
To ensure that all aspects of information security are considered in a properly 
designed framework, it is essential that a framework follows an approach based on a 
comprehensive life cycle (Basani, 2012:108). One such example is the “Plan-Do-
Check-Act-(PDCA)” process (Siponen & Willison, 2009; ISO 7799, 2002; Locke & 
Gallagher, 2010). It offers a good approach to be used as a guideline to develop and 
implement a successful framework. Table 4.1 is a summary of PCDA in combination 
with how the proposed ISDD framework of this study will benefit. 
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Table 4.1: The PDCA - based life cycle of a framework 
 Activities 
 
 
 
 
Plan 
 
The first quadrant: Planning entails forming goals and having in place appropriate 
processes to get the desired outcome (Siponen & Willison, 2009; Basani, 2012). 
Planning in the context of ISDD in Figure 4.6 equates to points 1, 2, 3, and 4. The 
planning around how external stakeholders and busines roles according to which 
business functions they are attached to use technology 3 and 4 in a manner that 
complies with mature ISDD in the organisation. 
 
 
 
Do 
 
 
The second quadrant performs monitoring and measuring of the process 
performance in comparison to the objective of the improvement process. This 
stage incorporates point 5 in Figure 4.6 in the framework, and how people 
process and technology have been combined in accordance with the set 
performance target goals. Appraise targets according to the ISDD maturity level 
 
  
 
Check 
 
The third quadrant: Implementation of the appropriate processes and then 
assessing and measuring performance, and setting up for process improvement. 
Once planning of how to combine people, process, and technology is achieved 
to retain high ISDD as explained in the previous stage, all metrics that constitute 
roles, functions, and systems in point 6 in the proposed framework in Figure 4.6 
need to be assessed and measured for compliance. 
 
  
 
Act 
 
The fourth quadrant involves actioning lessons learnt; corrective action must be 
performed to correct any irregularities (Mind tools, 2015). Using the outcome of 
the maturity level grading attained after going through all stages in the proposed 
framework, the organisation reflects on the wrongs identified during the entire 
cycle. They draw upon those mistakes and go back to the planning “table” to 
narrow down on faults identified and make amendments to enhance security. 
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Figure 4.3 is a graphical illustration of PDCA in accordance with the explanation 
offered in Table 4.1 regarding the transition of the four quadrants.  
 
Figure 4.3: PDCA model  
Source: Adapted from Humphreys (2008) 
Directly or indirectly, most information security frameworks – one way or the other – 
incorporate the PCDA strategy discussed in Figure 4.3. One such successful and 
industry-approved framework is COBIT; it uses this methodology to develop the 
concept of capability maturity level in IT.  
4.3. The COBIT Framework 
The business orientation of COBIT by default is more concerned with linking business 
objectives to information technology goals (ISACA, 2008:5). It further provides 
leverage and maturity metrics to measure a security programme’s overall 
performance. It does this by clearly identifying key IT processes and business 
functions critical in building a solid, measurable security programme as illustrated in 
the flow chart in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: How COBIT links IT to business corporate strategy  
Source: IT Governance Institute (2008) 
As depicted in Figure 4.4, in order to integrate IT into corporate business strategy, 
COBIT delivers clearly defined policies and good practice for internal information 
technology control. It also allows organisations to measure internal processes, 
manage resources, infrastructure, controls, and procedures against industry standard 
metrics reliable enough to allow organisations to weigh the maturity level of their 
control (Arora, 2010). It is for this reason that COBIT has been selected as the 
foundation of this study. The foundation on which the COBIT metrics are based is 
highlighted next. 
4.3.1. COBIT Metrics that Determine Compliance Levels 
COBIT derives its maturity model by using 34 generic processes. The basic principle 
of these processes is to act as a means to determine the current level of an IT 
programme and how to set its priorities for potential improvement. Appendix G in the 
appendices section shows the critical success factors on which COBIT bases its 
maturity model. Based on these metrics provided in Appendix G, COBIT uses maturity 
levels indicated in Table 4.2 as a summary of the various suitable levels. 
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Table 4.2: COBIT Maturity Levels 
 
Maturity Level 
 
Description 
 
 
Level 1 
Initial 
 
Process need is acknowledged but not defined. 
 
 
Level 2 
Repeatable  
 
 
Processes are defined and can be tracked but still immature. 
 
 
 
Level 3 
Defined Process 
 
 
Processes are well-defined and properly tracked but not 
quantitative. 
 
Level 4 
Managed and 
Measurable 
 
 
Processes are well-defined, tracked, and quantitative. 
 
 
Level 5 
Optimised 
 
 
Processes are well-defined, tracked, quantitative, and 
continuously improving. 
 
Source: Xiao-yan, Yu-qing and Li-leic (2011) 
The next section presents the notion of software capability maturity. This will lead to 
the benchmark for the criteria used to develop compliance metrics to be used in 
developing similar levels to that of COBIT in Figure 4.2. 
4.4. Software Capability Maturity Level 
According to Kerrigan (2013:20), generally, capability maturity is a concept that 
enables one to grade the extent to which an organisation applies formalised processes 
to the management of its various business functions. Equally, Goksen, Cevik and 
Avunduk (2015:209) charectarise capability maturity by stating that it is a fact built on 
principles that people, organisations, functional areas, and processes over time 
change towards an advanced maturity, in the process passing through various distinct 
levels. Most critically, just as the name indicates, the concept is about capability and 
the accompanying maturity improvement strategy of an enterprise (Pooley & Wilcox, 
2004). In other words, it simply identifies the critical success requirements that a 
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process needs to exhaust in order to improve both capability and maturity. In recent 
years, according to Kerrigan (2013), a couple of reference models have surfaced from 
different authors describing the techniques and processes involved in capability 
maturity. By default, most capability maturity models use a five-tier approach as 
described in Figure 4.5, showing an advancement path from a chaotic and immature 
process to a fully developed orderly process (Kumta & Shah, 2002). 
                                                                   
 
Figure 4.5: The five levels of Capability Maturity Model for software development  
Source: Adapted from Curtis, Hefley and Mille (2009) and Pooley and Wilcox (2004) 
Each of the maturity levels 1 to 5 shown in the iterations in Figure 4.5 comprises a 
number of key process areas (KPA). Each of the KPAs has a succession of related 
activities which require working together in order to attain a set of goals. According to 
Pooley and Wilcox (2004), it is a must that all set targets of a KPA be reached to satisfy 
that KPA and consequently accomplish a certain desired level of maturity in the 
framework. With a view to determining key process areas required in each of the levels 
from 1 to 5 in Figure 4.5, there are special sets of metrics that are used as parameters 
that must be considered.  
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4.4.1. The Significance of Capability Maturity Models 
To benchmark the importance of information security models, Carney (2013) lists the 
reasons as: 
1) First, they set direction which develops a decisive roadmap. It further carves 
out a foundation for building a concrete security programme. 
2) Second, they ensure that priority is placed on all information and 
communication technology valuable assets. 
3) Third, they show security gaps. This provides for the perfect opportunity to fully 
develop a security programme to the required industry standard and better 
management of security. 
4) Fourth, they aid in articulating the security programme’s value alongside its 
associated progress. This value ensures continued evaluation of the 
programme versus best practices. 
In this section, the theoretical foundation of capability maturity was defined. In its 
entirety, capability maturity is the heartbeat of this research. To achieve this objective, 
a generic framework in accordance with information security is first outlined, then the 
characteristics of a good framework are considered. To demonstrate how capability 
maturity is determined to come up with various compliance maturity levels, COBIT as 
a tried-and-tested framework is explored. Finally, the section is closed off with the 
advantages of capability maturity. With the theory of COBIT and the capability maturity 
levels having been explained, the next section will develop the preliminary framework 
based on the concepts discussed herein.  
4.5. Information Security Digital Divide Framework 
Based on the lessons resulting from previous sections on the theoretical foundation of 
software capability maturity, together with the critical success factors of both 
information security and ISDD which were the focal points of Chapters 2 and 3, this 
section will now devise a model for determining ISDD maturity metrics for a security 
programme. The section is the cornerstone and the main contribution of this study. It 
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describes key process metrics which will enable the model to achieve its intended 
objective by categorising five varying ISDD levels of capability maturity.  
Every capability maturity level is custom designed to measure an organisation’s 
security profile, with level 1 representing non-existence of ISDD, level 2 the base entry, 
all the way to the highest attainable level, which is level 5, a reflection of mature ISDD. 
This framework subscribes to a security principle by Saleh (2011:321), which states 
that what cannot be measured cannot be managed. Invariably what cannot be 
managed also cannot be improved on. Much as the framework may base its capability 
maturity ideology on COBIT and ISO/IEC 27001:2013, it does not, however, try to 
reinvent the wheel of either framework; it comes up with an approach in a different 
technique while not defying the principles of both. 
 
The proposed information security digital divide maturity framework (ISDDMF) in this 
study is intended as a self-assessment tool to help organisations to appraise their 
information security programme. The model helps in suggesting where an organisation 
should be and informs on issues leveraging IT maturity to reach an acceptable 
maturity. The proposed model furthermore carefully outlines key processes that 
govern, evaluate, and regulate all facets of information accessibility and general 
security in accordance with critical success factors of ISDD. Largely, it triggers a 
security structure that ensures it is able to prevent, detect, and react to security threats 
and risks efficiently. To accomplish this, the framework pivots on five basic indicators 
called compliance metric levels, with level 5 representing an organisation with a 
mature information security digital divide. These compliance metric levels are mapped 
to the critical success factors that were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Figure 4.6 
highlights a breakdown of the building blocks of the entire framework.  
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Figure 4.6: Information Security Digital Divide Maturity Framework  
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Figure 4.6 reflects the alignment of business, information technology, and information 
security in order to apply ISDD policies that help in decision-making on the capability 
of an organisation’s security programme. The different building blocks of the 
framework will also be discussed. 
4.5.1. Enterprise and the Business Function 
An enterprise is simply a business organisation (United States International Trade 
Commission, 2010). Additionally, a business consists of its members and their 
interactions. Each member has their own role to play and their own sphere of 
responsibility, which contribute towards meeting the mission of the organisation. The 
core of any enterprise lies in how people, processes, and technology combine to 
deliver business goals according to the mission statement. Each stakeholder has a 
role to play and is assigned to a business function. Every stakeholder undertakes their 
routine duties through the use of technology, for example, the HR manager assigned 
to the middle office in the human resource department uses a laptop that has a front-
end application such as Payroll. Through the intranet, HR is able to access back-end 
services to manage employee records, recruit new staff, evaluate the performance of 
individuals, and make monthly payments. Human resource also uses email to contact 
external stakeholders for routine services that support the business. 
 
Human resource is the most valuable asset to any business. A business organisation 
relies on internal service roles combined with external stakeholders to manage it. 
These service roles and external stakeholders make use of technology to drive their 
associated business functions and roles which, in turn, creates a successful business. 
Collectively, an enterprise, its associated functions, and technology is made up of the 
following building blocks: 
1) External stakeholders who require system access externally  
2) Business service roles that require internal and external system access  
3) Business functions within an organisation that work separately but routinely 
while supporting one another to attain the mission of the organisation; equally, 
information here must be confined to business functions it is relevant to  
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4) Access channels provide system access methods for all internal and external 
stakeholders; these channels must be used correctly on devices they are 
accessed from to prevent any security breach  
5) IT systems support all business operations technologically  
6) Security strives to provide defence mechanisms to facilitate smooth operation 
without any breach that may compromise systems, at the same time ensuring 
data is made available correctly based on its need to business roles  
The next subsection will narrow down the building blocks of the proposed framework. 
4.5.2. External Stakeholders 
An external stakeholder could be a person, group, or organisation that is not directly 
involved in the business but affected by decisions and operations of the enterprise 
(Business Dictionary, 2015). These may include customers, suppliers, and other 
partners. While they are not directly involved in the business, their services are very 
important to operations such that they require access to systems. For example, 
transport suppliers may require access to a company’s Web portal, VPN, or email 
system to verify delivery or pick information of goods. However, the system should be 
accessible to such suppliers using an access channel strictly authorised within the 
confines of their business involvement. The supplier must access the system on the 
basis of a trackable profile that requires authentication. All these measures must be 
incorporated into the organisational security policy. 
4.5.3. Business Roles 
Business roles is a general term that describes personnel that belong to various 
business functions. These roles range from chief executive officer, upper 
management, middle management, lower management, and the rest of the staff 
complement. They all integrate into the business functions according to their work 
scopes to meet the mission statement of the enterprise. For example, the CEO may 
be the head of the organisation, but system-wise, he should not be able to access and 
control the accounting department’s payment system because it is not part of his work 
profile to process and release payments through accounting applications. 
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4.5.4. Business Function 
A business function is an operation that is performed routinely to carry out a part of the 
mission of an organisation. It can be broken down into three areas, namely, front-end 
office, middle office, and back-end office. 
4.5.4.1. Front-end Office  
Front-end office is the part of the business that directly interacts with clients. Examples 
include service desk, marketing, and sales departments. As much as the front-end 
office work relies on both middle and back-end offices for certain support, e.g. if a 
customer enquires from a sales person at front desk on how far an application for the 
purchase of a product on hire purchase is, the sales person may through a written 
undertaking or telephone contact personnel in the middle office that handles 
processing of such to get an update of issue to the client; front-end office personnel 
should not be able to track middle office processes system-wise directly. However, 
they should be able to view incidents that may be in line with their roles. 
4.5.4.2. Middle Office  
In a business setup, this is a part of operations that provides support to both the front- 
and back-end offices and also draws on resources of both. Such departments could 
be product control, IT, legal, or compliance. Given an incident where an IT support 
staff receives a support request to rectify a software issue on a computer in the HR 
department based in the back-end office through their profile which they use to gain 
access on the HR computer with the fault, IT support staff may not possess the ability 
to view sensitive data or manipulate services such as leave applications on the payroll 
application. 
4.5.4.3. Back-end Office 
The back-end office acts as a support system to the front-end office. Work is escalated 
to them from the front office. For example, service desk may pass on a new application 
to human resource for processing. In the real world, an accounting department in the 
middle office may not be able to view at what level an application on the HR system 
has reached because of access restriction levelled against their profile. However, 
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through enquiry in writing or a phone call, the personnel may engage the HR 
department through permitted procedure. 
In conclusion, stakeholders and business partners need to interact with part of the 
enterprise or business function suited to their business involvement. This interaction 
is facilitated by an assorted choice of available access channels.  
4.5.5. Access Channels 
Access channels interface system end-users, be it internal or external to the system. 
This avenue details how business service roles and other stakeholders such as 
partners, customers, and suppliers are able to access an organisation’s information 
system. 
4.5.5.1. Access Channels for External Stakeholders 
Externally, a number of access options are available including Virtual Private Network 
(VPN), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), internet, telephone, and face-to-face 
communication. For example, a customer can – through online shopping – log on to 
an organisation’s Web portal to purchase goods which they have delivered to their 
residence. However, such access by the client must be highly secure and only 
available to that unique client and nobody else. In another circumstance, a supplier 
providing delivery of goods through transportation must also be able to access the 
same organisation’s system through a Web portal to check delivery bookings; the 
system must limit both the client and transport supplier to what is necessary in order 
to avoid information overlap. 
4.5.5.2. Access Channels for Internal Stakeholder  
Internally, the majority of internal end-users depend on the intranet to access the 
system irrespective of the service role and business function they operate in. For 
instance, a manager in the finance department uses a laptop with an accounting 
application required to access accounting information stored on back-end servers. 
However, if a manager in the research department wishes to access information in 
order to prepare a report, they might have access to the same intranet, but they need 
to request that information from the finance manager because they do not deal with 
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financial matters; hence, they have no need for financial applications to be installed 
on their devices. 
All access channels discussed herein are facilitated by an information system. This 
information system makes it possible for end-users and other stakeholders to access 
information resources as at when and where they need them. 
4.5.6. Information Technology Systems 
Information Technology Systems (ITS) such as Management Information Systems 
(MIS) which are supported by components such as the ones in Figure 4.6 support 
business operations. For example, it can provide a marketing manager with real-time 
information or reports on clients’ response on a new product launched in order to know 
whether to continue or discontinue the product or campaign. The CEO can use MIS 
reports to compare overall organisational performance to previous years. 
The previous section explored ITS, which also rely heavily on a combination of both 
software and hardware to successfully support business operations. 
4.5.7. Software 
In general, software is a collection of computer instructions that offer precise desired 
functionality or output to a user (Schach, 2011:24). Software applications facilitate the 
smooth operation of mission-critical business processes without which any business 
cannot operate efficiently. 
4.5.7.1. Application Software 
These can also be referred to as the front-end or client program because it is what the 
end-user interacts with directly. Application software interface the end-user to the back 
end, e.g. Payroll, Microsoft Dynamics, Microsoft Outlook, QuickBooks, Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP), and Internet Explorer. In a more applicable example, an 
email program such as Microsoft Outlook is what an end-user depends on to send and 
receive emails. However, this software does not perform everything by itself; it is 
dependent on a back-end application server such as Microsoft Exchange Server. 
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4.5.8. Service 
These are components of applications such as ERP, customer relationship 
management (CRM), and third-party application programming interface (API) which 
can be consumed by system end-users and stakeholders as a service. 
4.5.9. Application Servers and Storage  
This is the back-end or server-side of an application. The end-user does not come into 
contact with this, but they will always rely on it to perform a function within an 
organisation. For example, Microsoft Exchange Server hosts the mailbox of an end-
user who only accesses it through front-end application software such as Microsoft 
Outlook. The entire software landscape discussed operates on a combination of 
various hardware. 
4.5.10. Hardware  
Hardware is an integral part of any information system infrastructure (Prenhall, 2015). 
The hardware layer is what supports all software such as applications, application 
services, and servers. An operating system such as Microsoft Windows Server 2011 
acts as the master program controlling this hardware to work with all software. If the 
HR person of an organisation opens the Payroll application program on their laptop 
and queries an employee, the logical database hosted on a hardware supplies the 
employee’s records for the Payroll program to present to the HR person. 
To sum up, both software and hardware require IT security governance in order to be 
protected from threats and attacks. Governance is best managed by starting with a 
comprehensively written information security policy. 
4.5.11. Information Security Policy  
An organisation’s policy on security is a plan outlining what an organisation’s critical 
information assets are and how they must be protected (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007). 
This is the first line of defence for the organisation’s information system. Its primary 
agenda is to clarify what is being protected, why it is being protected, how it will be 
protected, and by whom. In a nutshell, it provides the do’s and don’ts an end-user and 
stakeholder should be aware of when they work with the system. This ensures 
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minimised risk of system attacks and failures, thus securing the company’s critical 
systems. To summarise, a security policy is a living document which acts as reference 
for everyone using systems and information resources defined as potential targets. 
4.6. Information Security Digital Divide Maturity Framework Compliance 
Metrics 
To derive the appropriate compliance metrics that will define the different capability 
maturity levels which will befit this model, people, processes, and technology are 
combined carefully to ensure the security principle of preventing, detecting, and 
reacting is attainable by security programmes. In Table 4.3, seven decisive critical 
success factors of both information security and digital divide are used to map out 
metrics.  
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Table 4.3: ISDDMF Mapping Metrics 
 
 
 
 
Eco-System 
(Work flow & data 
movement) 
 
Access Control 
Management  
(System & Physical) 
 
Alignment of 
System End-users 
& Stakeholders to 
business roles and 
functions 
 
End-user Skills, 
Security Awareness 
& Training 
 
Security Policy, 
Procedure & 
Standard 
 
 
Culture of 
Protecting 
information 
 
Performance target 
(ability  to prevent, 
detect & correct) 
 
 
1 
 
Being a small or 
one-man firm, the 
need for an 
organisational 
structure is not a 
priority and so 
there is no 
information and 
process flow 
 
Password use is not 
mandatory, being a 
one-man or small firm. 
Physical access 
control to information 
resources is not 
practical as often 
everyone sits in one 
place 
 
No alignment of 
any form exists. It 
is a small or one-
man firm; thus, 
there are no 
unique business 
roles and 
functions. One 
person assumes 
multiple roles 
 
End-user skills 
required to operate 
the system without 
exposing it are very 
low; some rely on 
trial and error. 
Security awareness 
and campaigns are 
non-existent. There 
is no training 
programme 
 
There is no policy on 
security present to 
provide guidance. 
No standard 
procedure is 
followed when using 
information 
resources. End-
users rely on what 
they know to protect 
information 
 
There is no ISDD 
culture among 
end-users and 
stakeholders. 
They do not 
seem aware, 
responsible, and 
willing to act in 
ways that benefit 
ISDD 
 
Security processes 
are non-existent; 
therefore, the 
environment is not 
quantifiable and 
measurable  
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2 
The need for an 
organisational 
structure is being 
considered. 
Workflow and 
movement of data 
are beginning to 
be given attention 
but are still 
disorganised 
There is a desire for 
authentication through 
password when using 
the system. In the 
same vein, the need 
to partition business 
roles and functions is 
beginning to take its 
toll on operations 
System ability to 
permit access to 
information 
according to end-
user roles and 
functions is being 
looked at but not 
implemented 
There is a 
realisation that end-
user upskilling, 
security 
awareness, and 
training is 
mandatory and is 
imminent, but there 
is no understanding 
of how this should 
be done 
Security policy, 
procedure, and 
standard is 
introduced but is not 
comprehensive and 
lacks proper 
implementation 
End-users and 
stakeholders seem 
to begin 
entertaining 
awareness, 
responsibility, and 
action towards 
ISDD attributes  
Performance targets 
are set but not 
measurable entirely. 
Only certain aspects 
of ISDD are 
measurable 
 
 
3 
 
An organisational 
structure is now 
present, but 
information flow 
and data 
movement 
processes do not 
conform to the 
organisational 
structure  
 
By default, password 
authentication is 
instituted by the 
system but lacks 
consistency. Business 
roles and functions 
are physically 
partitioned but still 
lack strict control 
approach 
 
System ability to 
permit access by 
end-user role and 
function is 
implemented but 
not structured, 
hence not effective 
 
End-user skills, 
security 
awareness, and 
training are made 
part of the strategy. 
The organisation is 
beginning to realise 
the need to develop 
training plans 
according to the 
environment 
 
Security policy, 
procedure, and 
standard begin to be 
implemented but in 
a chaotic fashion 
that makes it 
ineffective. The 
policy is not written 
in low-level 
language and not 
updated regularly 
 
End-users and 
stakeholders now 
embrace 
awareness, 
responsibility, and 
actions necessary 
for mature ISDD. 
However, it is not 
uniform across all 
end-users and 
stakeholders 
 
Performance targets 
are visible and can 
be measured, but not 
entirely 
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4 
 
A clear and 
precise 
organisational 
structure is 
present. Both 
information flow 
and data 
movement are 
available but not 
completely firm  
 
Password 
authentication is a 
standard policy and 
enforced by the 
system but not 
enhanced. Business 
roles and functions 
are well-segregated 
but lack continuous 
improvement 
 
System’s ability to 
permit access 
according to end-
user roles and 
business function 
is fully effective 
but lacks 
continuous 
improvement 
 
Understanding of 
the full value of 
end-user skill, 
awareness, and 
training is high. 
Incentives to 
motivate end-users 
to upskill user 
levels is present. 
Most end-users are 
minimum 
intermediate users  
 
Security 
policy,procedure, 
and standard are 
now implemented 
and effective too but 
do not evolve with 
the changing 
environment 
 
By standard, end-
users and 
stakeholders 
comply with 
mature ISDD 
requirements but 
lack the element to 
continue observing 
activities that alter 
ISDD maturity with 
the changing 
environment 
 
Performance targets 
are set and 
measurable. 
However, continuous 
improvement lacks 
 
 
5 
 
A perfect 
organisational 
structure which 
flawlessly 
regulates 
information and 
process flow is 
automatic. 
Process 
 
Password 
authentication is 
strictly enforced. All 
end-users and 
stakeholders comply 
with password policy. 
Business roles and 
functions are well-
partitioned and 
 
System’s ability to 
permit end-user 
roles and business 
functions to 
information is 
highly efficient and 
continuously 
improves with the 
changing 
 
End-user skills, 
security 
awareness, and 
training is enforced 
at recruitment. All 
end-users are 
advanced users. 
End-user skill set is 
made a part of 
 
Security policy, 
procedure, and 
standard compliance 
have reached the 
ultimate best. Best 
practice among end-
users and 
stakeholders is a 
culture. Policy is 
 
All end-users and 
stakeholders are 
completely mature 
and ISDD 
compliant and 
continuously strive 
towards new, 
mature ISDD 
trends instituted 
 
Performance is highly 
measurable and 
spans the entire 
organisation. 
Continuous 
improvement is an 
automated part of the 
enterprise culture 
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management 
keeps on 
improving  
controlled. There is 
continuous 
improvement 
environment. It is 
well-documented 
too 
annual appraisal. 
Improvement is 
constant 
updated regularly 
and continuously to 
accommodate 
change in the risk 
and threat spectrum 
according to the 
environment 
and is well-
documented 
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The ISDDMF compliance metrics in Table 4.3 helped in pairing some critical aspects 
of IT which define various suitable compliance metrics profiles discussed in the next 
section. 
4.7. Information Security Digital Divide Capability Maturity Levels 
Capability maturity levels help organisations to weigh the strength of their information 
system security by identifying key critical success factors of various aspects of 
information technology which work dependently to mount a watertight security 
structure. Figure 4.7 portrays five high-level guidelines useful for continuously and 
operationally improving a security programme. 
  
Figure 4.7: Demonstration of ISDDMF maturity levels 
In Figure 4.7, it is clear that the lower the security profile of an organisation, the higher 
the risk of successful attacks and damaging threats to its business operations. In the 
next part of this chapter, the transition of ISDDMF compliance levels is summarised. 
Level 1: Non-compliance (ISDD Immature) 
At this capability level, ISDD maturity is non-existent. There are no policies or 
procedures to protect the business. The organisation completely does not see and 
acknowledge the value of ISDD to its business operations. Business and security are 
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parallel concepts. This kind of organisation does not subscribe to any of the principles 
of ISDD critical success factors identified in Table 4.3. Potentially, these could be one-
man or small enterprises without any need for the use of software or information 
technology as a backbone to business operations.  
Level 2: Initial Compliance (ISDD Immature) 
At this capability level, business and security are parallel concepts. However, it marks 
the entry stage to mature ISDD for any organisation because there is 
acknowledgement of the value ISDD has to business. Nonetheless, despite 
acknowledging the importance of security, there is no incentive to adopt this useful 
security approach by instituting the necessary policies and procedures for the purpose 
of securing the business. The organisation may seem overly concerned about ISDD 
in times of security breach, but the approach can be summed up as being reactive 
instead of proactive. 
Level 3: Basic Compliance (ISDD Mature) 
Proper security towards business safety begins here. At this capability level, the 
organisation has realised the need and benefit of fully embracing ISDD. Business and 
security are now synchronised to work towards a common goal of protecting the 
business. As a result, ISDD critical success factors are adopted but still unstructured, 
and funding towards IT systems is not fully dedicated. An information security policy 
template may exist, but it is not regularly updated and not written in low-level language 
to easily guide end-users, partners, and stakeholders on industry standard practice. 
End-user skills range between entry and intermediate. Generally, ISDD maturity is 
attained but still in its infant stage. 
Level 4: Acceptable Compliance (ISDD Mature) 
At this capability level, ISDD critical success factors are almost fully adopted and 
documented. Information security is now completely recognised and treated as a core 
business function, and is also integrated into corporate strategy. There is a well-
outlined IT security policy to that effect to guide end-users on standard practice. 
Access control, training, and security awareness are all proactively initiated and 
carefully managed. Management of information security is well-coordinated and 
funded. End-user training and security awareness are instituted to upskill end-users 
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to a minimum of intermediate level. Generally, ISDD is mature but lacks continuous 
improvement. 
Level 5: Full Compliance (ISDD Mature) 
This capability level is the ultimate highest attainable level. The organisation is fully 
ISDD mature. ISDD critical success factor processes are fully measurable and 
manageable. Security is by default fully in synchronisation with the business 
requirements and integrated into corporate governance. Information technology is 
allocated to a fully equipped department with personnel that are highly trained and 
suitably qualified. Additionally, a sound budget is allocated to IT. System end-users 
range from intermediate to advanced. A well-developed information security code of 
conduct exists and gets updated regularly to allow the organisation to adjust to latest 
security threat trends. The organisation as a whole manages its information security 
above expectations by executing every critical success factor proactively. Technically, 
the system is so proactive that it can detect, resolve, and correct any potential threats 
and risks it encounters with little effort. 
4.8. Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a conceptual framework for benchmarking 
ISDD. This contributed to answering the third research question, “How can a 
framework for assessing ISDD be developed and validated in a real-world context?” 
This was achieved by drawing on the theoretical capability maturity theory contribution 
of COBIT as well as guidelines from ISO/IEC 27001:2013 to produce the information 
security digital divide maturity framework (ISDDMF), which strives to combine people, 
process, and technology in the best possible way to safeguard a business. 
Furthermore, following the capability maturity assessment technique used by COBIT, 
it was possible to use a combination of critical success factors of information security 
and digital divide to come up with an assessment compliance metrics that led to 
defining the ISDD compliance levels. Theoretically, reliance has been placed on 
COBIT to produce the information security digital divide framework. With that, the 
objective of developing a tool for benchmarking ISDD in organisations pending 
validation means in a real-life context has been reached.  
The next chapter will develop a case study to practically validate the framework. 
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Chapter 5: Data Collection 
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5.1. Introduction 
Until this point, the research has undergone a range of essential logical stages in 
iteration, including a literature review on the structure of an organisation which gave 
insight into information flow within an enterprise. Continually, an overview on both 
information security and digital divide together with their respective critical success 
factors was touched on in relation to how they combine to protect information. The 
previous chapter tackled principles around which the proposed theoretical framework 
was produced. Based on all the aforesaid theories, a proposed theoretical framework 
was presented. The framework strives to combine people, process, and technology in 
a way that guides organisations on standard practice to exclusively promote mature 
ISDD. However, the proposed framework still remains theoretical; hence, it needs to 
be validated in a real-life context by experts and end-users.  
The main objective of this chapter is to set the context for the application and validation 
of the proposed framework in terms of instruments used to perform data collection. To 
meet this objective, case studies were conducted at three distinct target case 
enterprises in various environments, namely, government sector (Organisation X), ICT 
sector (Organisation Y),  and non-profit sector (Organisation Z). A survey targeting 30 
independent information ICT experts was also carried out. First, a pilot on the two sets 
of questionnaires was conducted, one for system end-users and stakeholders, and the 
other for ICT experts. This was intended to improve on initial questionnaires. Finally, 
the final questionnaires were amended and circulated to participants.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the case study in section 5.2, specifying how 
the research strategy was used and why it was deemed the best, with an inclusion of 
the following subsections: data generation, description, and quantitative and 
qualitative data. Section 5.3 discusses research instruments, questionnaire structure, 
validation of questionnaires, and survey tool employed. Section 5.4 conveys the 
sample design by highlighting the population and sampling frames, sampling 
techniques, and sample size. A conclusion of the chapter is provided in Section 5.5. 
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5.2. Case Study 
One of the contributions of this study is to produce a self-appraisal tool which 
organisations can depend on to measure both ISDD and the effectiveness of their 
information system. Selecting the most suitable strategy to use when collecting data 
is pivotal in any research. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009:600) define research 
strategy as an overall plan stating how the researcher intends to answer research 
questions. To explore further on that, a combined table (Table 5.1) illustrates some of 
the most applicable qualitative and quantitative research strategies and questions to 
help in the selection of the most appropriate strategy (Oates, 2006; Yin, 2003).  
Table 5.1: Choosing appropriate research strategies 
 
Strategy 
 
Form of research 
question 
Requires control of 
behavioural events 
Focuses on 
contemporary events 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
 
Survey 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Case study How, what, why? No Yes 
Archival How, why? No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
 
Source: Adapted from Oates (2006) and Yin (2003) 
An appropriate research strategy has to be selected based on research questions and 
objectives (Saunders, et al., 2009). Accordingly, Starman (2013) reiterates that case 
studies are relevant when one’s research addresses either a descriptive question such 
as “what is happening” or an explanatory question such as “how did something 
happen”. Considering the strategy selection guide provided in Table 5.1 and also the 
fact that the main question and sub-questions of this research subscribe to both 
descriptive and explanatory questions (“How can a framework for assessing the 
maturity of ISDD in organisations for further improvements be developed?” “What are 
the current information security organisational practices?” and “How is success 
measured in such context?”) A survey-based case study is the most appropriate 
inquiry strategy. Furthermore, case study as a data collection strategy complements 
this research even more because it advocates for the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection methods (Yin, 2009:19- 20). A case study can be summed 
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up as an empirical inquiry concerned with investigations of a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth, especially concerning issues that concern exploration and 
understanding of complex issues in real-life context (Yin, 2009; Zainal, 2007). To 
answer this study’s research questions and meet the objectives, three case studies in 
random organisations from various sectors were conducted, as well as a survey 
among ICT experts in different fields on the quality of the framework. Figure 5.1 
illustrates the structure of the case study. 
Figure 5.1: An illustration of the structure of the multiple case study used for data 
collection 
Three organisations were assessed for ISDD and system effectiveness using both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection methods through questionnaires, 
interviews, review of documents, and observation. This was to understand how the 
organisations fare when measured against core system metrics and factors. 
Independent ICT experts and heads of IT departments or internal ICT experts within 
these participating organisations were part of the sample to help with the screening of 
the framework developed with the vision of making it extensively consensual. In the 
next section, data gathering is looked at in detail to give clear insight of the approaches 
used and why they were used. 
 
Case study
Organisation X
IS Expert/Head 
of IT
End-users & 
Stakeholders
Questionnaires
Observations
Document review
Organisation Y
IS Expert/Head 
of IT
End-Users & 
Stakeholders
Questionnaires
Observations
Document review
Organisation Z
IS Expert/
Head of IT
End-users & 
Stakeholders
Questionnaires
Observations
Document review
ICT experts
Interviews
Questionnaires
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5.2.1. Data Gathering  
Even though case studies are more often considered a part into qualitative research, 
they may also be a combination of both qualitative and quantitative (Starman, 2013). 
Some of the strengths of using a case study to perform research include the following: 
they engage a diverse approach of evidence including review of documents, 
interviews, artefacts, observation, and archival records (Yin, 2003). The following 
multiple data collection methods were used in this study for all three case 
organisations plus the ICT ICT experts where applicable: questionnaires, review of 
documents, observation, and Interviews. 
5.2.1.1. Questionnaires 
Questionnaires in research refer to a set of structured questions with a choice of 
answers aimed at collecting specific information from respondents (Kaptein & Avelino, 
2005). The idea is to translate the researcher’s information obligation into easy-to-
understand questions that respondents are able and willing to answer.  
5.2.1.2. Questionnaire Administration 
In this study, questionnaires were emailed to various identified end-users in all three 
participating organisations. Also, physical distribution of printed forms directly to 
respondents was done through the researcher as well as focal personnel that 
volunteered to help. In other distribution cases, social media such as Facebook was 
used to reach some respondents, especially ICT experts all around the world. 
Questionnaire samples can be found in Appendix C of this research. 
5.2.2. Review of Documents 
Review of documents is a qualitative method of data collection which involves relevant 
documents which might aid in achieving the objective of the study (Elmusharaf, 2012). 
It is considered an ancient way of data collection but is still useful in some research 
types. In this research, documents such as IT security policy, business continuity plan, 
and brochures were targeted and looked at if present or otherwise indicated as a not 
present ISDD metric. 
  
102 
 
5.2.3. Observation 
Participant observation is a qualitative research approach which particularly works as 
a data collection method where people or processes are analysed by the researcher 
by also making themselves part of the situation or what is being investigated. 
According to DeWalt and DeWalt (2002), the intention of using participant observation 
as a method in research is mostly to come up with a complete understanding of the 
phenomena under study that is as objective and accurate as possible given the 
limitations of the method. Additionally, observation can either be structured or 
unstructured. This study used unstructured observation method of data collection, 
placing the culture of protecting information and security awareness around the 
system top of the list. 
5.2.4. Interviews  
According to Simpson (2011), most of the time interviews are used to get information 
on an individual’s experience. In this study, interviews were relied on to get some 
qualitative data which was done through structured questions with a few open-ended 
questions. Mostly interviews were for follow-up investigations on study scenarios that 
involved observation. 
5.2.5. Data Description 
For both sets of respondents (experts and end-users), data was collected in its raw 
format through the use of survey questionnaires designed using Microsoft Office Word 
2013. It was then cleaned up in preparation for it to be exported into both Microsoft 
Excel and SPSS tables. Using Microsoft Excel and SPSS, data was then imported 
according to either Experts or End-user tables with suitable categories, then manually 
entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets according to question categories. Most data 
was tabulated in rows and columns, e.g. business roles that require external access 
to systems after work hours were collected from a completed questionnaire and 
summarised in the Excel spreadsheet in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Access need to system by internal end-users externally 
 
Access need from external by end-users – 
Question 5.2.4   
       
 Org X Org Y Org Z X% Y% Z% 
Not at all 13 6 4 68 33 15 
Sometimes 5 7 14 26 39 52 
Occasionally 0 1 0 0 6 0 
All the time 1 4 9 5 22 33 
Total 19 18 27 100 100 100 
 
Descriptive statistics such as the mean, mode, and median were used to analyse the 
data statistically in order to give it full meaning or interpretation. In the case of Table 
5.2, to find out per organisation the external access needs by personnel outside of 
normal working hours or when they are in the field, the formula that follows was used. 
Mode is the number or item that appears the most (DevMaths, 2016), e.g. The 
following options were given in a question for respondents in Organisation X to choose 
“Not at all” – 13, “Sometimes” – 5, “Occasionally” – 0, or “All the time” – 1. If the 
responses are arranged in ascending order, “not at all” was the most frequent 
response. This means that the majority of the employees in this organisation do not 
require access to the system most of the time. 
MS Excel spreadsheet formulas were used in producing Table 5.2, to calculate the 
highest response percentage = (B6/B8)*100. This gave an indication that in 
Organisation X, 68% of the respondents indicate they do not require access to the 
system externally. Using the same table, the mean can also be worked out to know 
what the average response towards external access is. The response choices in 
Organisation Y towards external access to the system were not at all – 6, sometimes 
– 7, occasionally – 1, and all the time – 4. According to DevMath (2016), the mean is 
simply the average which is calculated by adding a series of numbers and dividing the 
sum by the frequency. In the case of Organisation Y, 6+7+1+4 = 18, 18/4 = 4. Using 
that response, it can be deduced that the average number of employees that need 
access to the system outside working hours and also during working hours but 
externally is four. 
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5.2.6. Response Rate 
Out of a total of 35 information ICT experts who were surveyed for their response to a 
range of ISDD questions, a total of 25 completed questionnaires successfully, 
translating into a response rate of 71%. On the other hand, 90 end-users was the 
ultimate target aimed, but only 64 completed questionnaires successfully, giving a 
response of 71%. Table 5.3 below summarises the sample target size, number of 
responses and the percentage of responses. 
 
Table 5.3: Target sample size, number of responses & percentage of responses table 
 ICT Experts End-users 
Target Population Size 35 90 
Number of Questionnaires 
administered 
35 90 
Number of Responses 25 64 
Percentage of Responses 71% 71% 
 
5.3. Case Organisation 1 – Enterprise (X) 
This laboratory is a government department in the veterinary sector, which focuses on 
research in animal disease occurring in Namibia for economic importance. The 
services it provides to the nation include livestock, pasture, and botanical research. It 
also provides diet and nutrition of livestock, as well as ecology and utilisation. 
To manage laboratory operations, Organisation Y utilises a Laboratory Management 
Information Reporting System that was developed in collaboration with an externally 
based consortium. This reporting system is composed of the following open source 
tools: Oracle 10g database as the back-end application; Apache Tom Cat web server 
using Java; Jasper report for report generation; and Firefox web browser as the front-
end application. 
The aforementioned computer system collects and manages all necessary information 
on samples, tests, and test results. The system involves the entry of sample data on 
arrival, as required by Namibian sampling plans; the tracking of samples through the 
various sections of the organisation; the collection of test results, generation of test 
reports, and monitoring of outbreaks through data interrogation functions; and 
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eliminating multiple registrations of the same data on paper records. It is a 
fundamental component of the Namibian veterinary information system. 
Organisation Y has a staff complement of 50 and comprises the following internal 
subsections: Food hygiene; Toxicology; Serology; Clinical Microbiology; Rabies; 
Pathology; and Biotechnology. 
5.3.1. Case Organisation 2 – Enterprise (Y) 
This is an international ICT-based enterprise in Southern Africa, especially in Namibia 
and South Africa. In the context of South Africa, its client base includes 14 of the 25 
enterprises listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Additionally, it employs over 
2,200 highly qualified IT professionals within Southern Africa. Its core business 
function concentrates on application services, infrastructure configuration, and 
implementation. The following departments exist in its Namibia Head Office: Finance; 
Accounting; Customer service; Sales and Marketing; Human Resource; Software and 
Training; and Information Technology. 
The IT department consists of 10 staff members serving over 60 end-users in its head 
office in Windhoek, Namibia, and many more spread across the country. All customer 
support engineers, consultants, and other travelling stakeholders are given laptops, 
PDAs, tablets, and other handheld devices, while the rest of the general staff 
complement are allocated both desktop and laptop systems. Fileshare and email 
servers in use are Microsoft Windows-based. The system further uses Microsoft SQL 
Server for its database. Back-end Software Application used includes Enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) with the following modules: Service Desk, Sales and 
Marketing, Customer Relationship Management, and Financial Accounting. 
A brief profile of the first case study enterprise has been provided. The next 
subsubsection considers the category and type of questions that were focused on and 
what the objectives of the questions were. 
5.3.2 Case Organisation 3 – Enterprise (Z) 
Organisation Z is a non-profit humanitarian organisation that is dedicated to alleviating 
human suffering by providing assistance to victims of disaster all across the 13 regions 
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of Namibia. Its core values include: promoting human values; disaster response; 
disaster preparedness; and health and community care. 
The organisation has its headquarters in Windhoek, with branch offices all across the 
country, which are linked through an information system which supports mostly 
communication channels using various technologies. Structurally, it consists of the 
following departments: Human resource; Logistics; Disaster Management; 
Programmes; and Finance. 
Being a humanitarian organisation focused on alleviation of human suffering, the 
organisation heavily depends on efficient communication on and off the ground 
through field workers and supporting staff in regional offices and headquarters. 
Communication is sustained by an information system that links regional offices and 
also links headquarters to donors across the universe to facilitate real-time reporting. 
5.4. Research Instruments 
According to Abawi (2013), research instruments are technically fact-finding strategies 
used for the collection of data such as questionnaires, interviews, review of 
documents, and observations. This study used two sets of questionnaires to execute 
two distinct objectives: one questionnaire was intended for information ICT experts to 
help in screening the quality of the framework and offer suggestions on improvement 
avenues, and the second questionnaire was for system end-users and stakeholders, 
which according to the measurement methods defined in the framework would indicate 
at what ISDD level the organisations were ranked and operating at. 
5.4.1. Questionnaire Content 
Considering the primary objectives of the survey of both ICT experts and end-users 
discussed, the questionnaire content will next be expounded on. 
5.4.1.1. Expert Questionnaire  
The majority of the questions in this questionnaire targeted the core and context of the 
framework for improvement purposes, e.g. question 5.15 explores the use of a security 
model in an organisation being mandatory as a starting pointing for security, while 
question 5.1.8 and 5.1.9 both address the value of having an organisational structure 
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and the flow of information when designing access control among end-users. On the 
other hand, question 5.1.19 investigates types of access channels most recommended 
for both internal and external end-users, and question 5.1.25 evaluates access by 
business role and function. A complete set of the questions are provided in Appendix 
C. 
5.4.1.2. End-users’ Questionnaire  
This subsubsection measures general ISDD within the organisation among system 
end-users. Randomly, questions that showcase ISDD measurement are sampled. 
Questions 5.2.4 and 5.2.6 collectively check the need for external system access by 
business roles after business hours and which access channels they make use of. 
Question 5.2.5 inspects the frequency business roles interact with external 
stakeholders. Further, question 5.2.8 checks on security culture on password use, 
while question 5.2.13 deals with physical access control to information resources, and 
finally, question 5.2.14 measures computer user skill to assess their ability to operate 
a computer and work with the system without compromising security. The 
questionnaire and its full content can be viewed in Appendix C.  
5.4.2. Expert Questionnaire Structure 
The first section of ICT experts’ questionnaire consisted of demographic information 
to provide insight on the respondents including the industry they represent, years of 
experience, and their specific occupation. Further to that, the remainder of the 
questionnaire carried the following subsections aimed at scrutinising the quality of the 
framework: 
1. Importance of security in an organisation 
2. Information system access management 
3. Policy formation, standard practice, and compliance 
4. Structure of an organisation and information flow 
The ultimate target of these questions was to enable ICT experts to criticise the 
framework and also offer counter solutions to areas they felt lacked in terms of 
security. 
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5.4.2.2. End-user Questionnaire Structure 
In the end-user questionnaire, the following was the content: demography on each 
respondent’s business role, duration of stay in the organisation, and finally the 
business function they report to. The rest of the questionnaire consisted of these 
subsections: 
1. Information system access management 
2. Computer skill set, and security awareness and training 
3. Procedure and standard practice 
4. Application use and know-how 
5. Culture of protecting information 
5.4.3. Category of Questions to be Administered and their Objectives 
This part takes a deeper dive into the types of questions addressed in end-user 
questionnaires and the intention thereof. 
5.4.3.1. Organisation X 
Being a critical laboratory, the primary focus on questions was on access control to 
the reporting application by end-users according to business roles and functions. 
Focus was also on information system access and use of data by various departments. 
The ecosystem and information security policies on application and information 
system were articulated. Here most of the questions determine application access 
control level measurement from an application point of view by evaluating whether 
laboratory employees are allocated rights according to their departments, and roles 
and responsibilities. Furthermore, questions weighed how well-structured control is by 
the application administrators and also whether the application administrators are 
empowered to modify the modules of the application from a back-end perspective. 
Overall, the primary objective of all questions in this organisation was to measure 
access control management and how the system is designed to safeguard its 
information. 
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5.4.2.2. Organisation Y 
Organisation Y offers ICT solutions and services to various organisations with diverse 
business environments. In light of that, how the organisation regulates its IT 
environment from a systems standpoint will be dealt with. How the system limits 
workflow control by portfolios from both a front and back-end application control point 
of view was randomly looked at. For instance, can the CIO access and regulate 
workflow processes outside the scope of their role? Additionally, an attempt is made 
to consider professional ethics by IT consultants and other professionals as system 
end-users with regard to standard practice and conduct when handling client 
resources at client sites as well as when they access the organisational intranet. Does 
Organisation Y have a non-disclosure agreement with its clients to ensure their 
personnel do not divulge trade secrets, patents, and other highly sensitive data they 
interact with when they have access to it due to the nature of their work?  
The main objective of the questions in line with this organisation’s environment was to 
understand the digital divide among individuals as well as how the system is set to 
filter that divide. It was also to understand standard practice within and outside the 
organisation in terms of access control at all applicable levels including network 
access, application use, and other services among especially all general staff. 
5.4.3.3. Organisation Z 
Organisation Z is mainly a field-orientated environment dealing with humanitarian-
related projects. Given that background, the target questions here were mainly on 
communication to and from the field and how that is managed in and out of the 
information system that supports the organisation. Generally, it is more about whether 
the system limits end-users correctly according to what information is necessary to 
perform their roles in the organisation or whether the system over-tightens security to 
the point that it interferes with employees’ progress. 
The main objective was to assess how accessibility is managed according to the 
various business roles and functions. Also, what kind of technologies and applications 
were deployed at field level to handle corporate data, and finally, how the flow of 
information was used to determine access control levels. 
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In this subsection, questions administrated by all organisations and their objectives 
were looked at. Despite the differences in the concentration of questions for individual 
organisations, the intention is to measure system security strength irrespective of 
sector, magnitude, budget, organisational structure etc., as detailed in proposed future 
work under section 8.4. 
5.4.4. Choice of Measuring Scales 
In general, a measuring scale can be defined as an instrument for weighing (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016). Based on that definition and considering the fact that the main 
objective of this study was to establish the level of ISDD in organisations and also to 
appraise the effectiveness of their information systems, it was inevitable to adopt a 
method for this research to efficiently rely on to measure ISDD and reveal the 
effectiveness of systems. 
1. Table 4.3 shows ISDDF mapping metrics derived from literature referenced on 
what the state-of-the-art security systems adopt as critical success factors  
2. Table 5.4 on ISDD system measuring scale is derived by summarising mapping 
metrics in table 4.3 into categorised key process areas necessary for ISDD 
measurement 
3. Table 5.5 further streamlines table 5.4 to create 5 easy ISDD levels which 
categorise an organisation according to how it fared against key performance 
areas 
On the basis of the outcome of data analysis and interpretation on end-users in 
Chapter 7, ISDD is measured in a real-world context according to the framework core 
indicators and metrics set out in Table 4.3. Every question or statement contained in 
Appendix C was measured in relation to these core indicators and metrics, and a score 
was allocated to determine how well an organisation complies with that particular 
benchmark. Questions were split into sections and subsections that would be 
combined at the end to indicate the overall rating which reflects on compliance with 
this framework. In Table 5.4, ten different ISDD capability maturity metrics categories 
are shown. Each category has a list of 10 items, the combined maximum ISDD 
maturity score obtainable is 100. Then, an actual ISDD level and system effectiveness 
is denoted using stars in Table 5.5. One star is a symbol of non-compliance to any 
level of ISDD defined in this framework, and two stars is entry level all the way to the 
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highest obtainable level (five stars), which is a symbol of full mature ISDD compliance 
and a highly effective information system. 
Table 5.4: ISDD and system measuring scale 
 
Overall rating                                                                            Org X      Org Y       Org Z 
 
1. Information flow………………………………………………………………….…  
2. Standard Practice, Policies & Procedures………………………….……………      
3. Management Support………………………………………………………..……                       
4. Security Types in Place……………………………………….………………… 
5. Security Awareness and Training………………………………………….…… 
6. Access Control Management…………………………………………………… 
7. Culture of Protecting Information…………………………………………..……. 
8. System Appropriateness…………………………………………………………. 
9. Business Continuity Plan (BCP)………………………………………………… 
10. Performance Target & Continuous Assessment………………………….……. 
Combined rating…………………………………………………… 
 
 
Table 5.5: ISDD maturity and system effectiveness summary table 
Assessment Rating Star ISDD Level 
0 - 20 * Non-compliance 
21 - 40 ** Initial compliance 
41 - 60 *** Basic compliance 
61 - 80 **** Acceptable compliance 
Above 80 ***** Full compliance 
 
Source: Adapted from Saleh(2011) 
 
0 6 4 
8 8 4 
0 4 
34 
7 
9 
10 7.5 
0 0 0 
9 9 4.5 
4 8 8 
4 6 
0 
4 
3 
2 2 2 
6 
48 60 
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5.4.5. Validation of Questionnaire 
An important component in the data collection process is piloting (Monette, Sullivan & 
DeJong, 2002). Before the final survey of this research was conducted, a pretest of 
survey questionnaires with closed-ended questions was done by circulating them to 
five ICT experts from different sectors, and also to six random end-users from all three 
organisations belonging to different business functions and occupying unique roles. 
According to Scholar Bank (2010), the main purpose for piloting a survey is to test the 
questionnaire to ensure it is coherent and comprehensible. In line with that, this study 
piloted the survey to get views and concerns before the final survey, which would lead 
to amendments suitable to improve the relevance and value of the survey 
questionnaires. Directly, that benefited the relevance and quality of the final survey 
together with the research.  
Following the piloting of survey questionnaires, a couple of suggestions that required 
changes to both sets of questionnaires were identified as follows: 
 Expert Questionnaire: Incorporate middle management as a business role; 
also add expert years of experience on demographics; change the one external 
stakeholder’s access channel from Web portal to internet; remove some closed-
ended questions; add some closed-ended questions to contextualise certain 
areas such as access control; and finally, remove some options questions with 
Yes or No options as answers to avoid a biased outcome. 
 End-users Questionnaire: Adjust years of experience under demographics to 
include 8-10 years category, include middle management as a business role, 
and include voice recognition as an authentication option. 
5.4.6. The Research Software Tools 
Administration of survey questionnaires in this study was done using three software 
tools, namely, Microsoft Office Word, SPSS, and Excel. Microsoft Office Word was 
used to design the questionnaires which were delivered in person by the researcher 
to the respondents by hand and by soft copy through email and social media 
(Facebook). SPSS was used to perform data triangulation, and Microsoft Excel 
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spreadsheets were relied on for entering data after it was cleaned up and prepared for 
interpretation and translation. 
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5.5. Sample Design 
This section discusses the techniques used in the execution of this research. In doing 
so, sampling and participant profiles are briefly looked at. 
5.5.1. Population 
Choosing the right participants is an essential part of research. Participant selection is 
mainly influenced by the applicability of the information needed from relevant 
individuals by the researcher. Participants in this study were split into two: the first 
group was end-users of the information system in every target organisation, and then 
the second comprised ICT experts within and outside of the enterprises.  
A total of 110 participants took part in this survey. Of the 110, 25 participants were 
independent ICT industry experts and the remainder system end-users from the three 
case organisations split as follows: 19 respondents from organisation X, 18 
respondents from Organisation Y, and 30 respondents from organisation Z. 
Staff in all participating organisations were targeted to better understand the 
applicability of information security digital divide. On the other hand, experts’ 
involvement would provide input on the relevance of the framework to the work 
environment. 
5.5.2. Sampling and Sampling Frame 
Sampling is the act of choosing a portion of a population with the intention of 
generalising the findings to the entire population sampled from (Kitchenham & 
Pfleeger, 2002). Sampling is applied in many types of research because in some 
cases, collecting information from the entire population is costly, time-consuming, and 
in most cases impossible. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) state that probability 
sampling techniques are key in quantitative-based research and involve selecting a 
relatively large number from a population or from specific subgroups of a population. 
To compound that, Teddlie and Yu (2007) go further to stipulate that probability 
sampling aim at getting as much representation as possible, which highly reflects the 
degree to which the sample accurately represents the overall population sampled 
from. In contrast to probability sampling, purposive sampling techniques are primarily 
used in qualitative research and are often about selecting a section of the sample 
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purposefully well-placed to aid in providing answers to the research question (Teddlie 
& Yu, 2007). 
To get an accurate representation of both ICT experts and end-user populations, 
Systematic random sampling method was adapted in this research. Both samples 
were broken into intervals by taking the total target population and dividing by a 
number to create intervals. E.g organisation X had a total of 120 system end-users, 
we divided that by 4 to get 30 intervals which ensured a rational representation of end-
users to take part in the survey, and the pattern was applied to the remaining two 
participating organisations.  For ICT experts, they were also divided into 5 intervals by 
dividing the overal target population by 5 in order to increase the chances of a wide 
range of ICT expert representation. Information system end-users helped the 
researcher to determine the level of ISDD and measurement in the appropriateness 
of the information system, while ICT security expert engagement assisted in making 
the framework largely consensual. 
A sampling frame in research refers to a record of the population from which a sample 
is taken (Singh, 2015). In simpler terms, it could be people or items forming a 
population from which these people or items are taken. ICT experts were the first 
sample. The second portion of the sample constituted all system end-users that 
interact with the systems of all the organisations, this included all external stakeholders 
such as suppliers, partners, contractors, customers, and consultants. 
5.5.3. Data Preparation and Cleaning 
Data preparation entails editing, coding and tabulating. In this research, data collected 
through the survey from ICT experts and end-users was of both a qualitative and 
quantitative nature. This data was logged in and checked for consistency and 
transformed into a format readable by tools which were used to manipulate and 
translate it into meaningful information that the researcher used to translate and 
interpret research findings in order to answer questions and reach objectives. A 
detailed explanation of data analysis will be provided in Chapter 6. 
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5.5.4. Validity and Reliability 
Reliability in research entails the stability, equivalence, and consistency of a tool used 
to conduct research from one assessment to another (Roberts, Priest & Traynor, 
2006). Primarily, if the same result can be replicated under a similar method, then the 
tool used can be considered reliable. This research took on the split-half concept 
whereby the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula was implemented and the outcome 
retained a coefficient equivalent to 0.74 as detailed earlier in section 1.9 which is a 
demonstration of the reliability and validity of the research method used over time. 
5.5.5. Limitations  
In addition to limitations discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) regarding the 
participation of only three organisations in this study and COBIT’s principles as the 
sole base reference framework, the intended sample was not met because some 
participants offered to take part but did not complete the questionnaires; this altered 
the envisaged outcome. In other few isolated cases in the last case organisation, 
respondents did not answer questionnaires in accurately and to the best of their ability 
due to time constraints, which made data analysis difficult. 
5.5.6. Ethical Considerations 
In addition to ethical considerations touched on in detail earlier in Chapter 1 (Section 
1.10), high ethical standards were adhered to during this entire study. Permission in 
writing was sought from UNISA’s ethical clearance committee, and clearance was 
issued as per Appendix A. Also, permission was requested in writing from all three 
target organisations to perform surveys and collect all necessary data required to 
complete the research; all three organisations agreed to the requests in writing as well. 
All participants from various organisations were informed of what the research was 
about including its objectives. Participants were further enlightened on their rights to 
withdraw from participation if they felt uncomfortable or not willing at any point to 
continue with the participation. They all signed the consent form that is included in 
Appendix E.  
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5.5.7. Permission to Conduct Research 
It is mandatory for institutions to make sure that all ethical review is in place and 
adhered to before giving any form of research a go-ahead in order to protect the 
integrity of organisations and respondents (Chilengi, 2009; Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 
2002). In the context of this research, an application was made to the research ethics 
committee. The research ethics committee at University of South Africa reviews and 
grants permission to do research when ethics standards need to be met. Proof of 
application and approval for this research can be found in Appendix A. 
5.5.8. Consent Forms  
Any research conducted involving respondents must have an informed consent 
provision for the participants. In that respect, all participants who agreed to participate 
in this research were given a breakdown of what the research was about. Based on 
that, they willingly signed the consent forms to indicate their acceptance to participate. 
Further to that, they were made aware of the fact that they could withdraw at any given 
time if they felt uncomfortable and/or were not willing to continue with participation. A 
sample of the consent form can be found in Appendix D. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, data collection was covered. First, the best research strategy 
applicable to this study’s research type was determined. Case studies, research 
instruments, sampling, and data description were then discussed. Details were also 
provided on both end-user and ICT expert’s questionnaire structures, the content of 
which is available in Appendix C. Furthermore, validation of questionnaires was 
touched on. The purpose of the chapter was to discuss tools aiming not only at testing 
the framework in a real-life context but also to validate it by using ICT experts for 
further improvement.  
The chapter that follows will focus on the outcome of the ISDD maturity assessment 
of case enterprises and draw a conclusion as proof that the framework can indeed be 
relied on in a real-life context. 
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Chapter 6: Maturity Assessment of ISDD in Organisations 
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6.1. Introduction  
The preceding chapter presented the layout of the instruments used to gather data as 
well as the context for the validation of the proposed framework. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to analyse data from the first part of the survey involving system end-
users in order to determine the capability maturity of case organisations. This objective 
is reached by analysing responses from end-users and stakeholders ranging from 
CEOs, upper and middle management, including general staff in each organisation in 
order to measure ISDD among all and generalising that to the entire population. In 
doing so, the objective of testing the conceptual framework in a real-world context to 
see if it can be relied upon to measure ISDD maturity is also achieved. 
The chapter begins with data analysis in detail including quantitative and qualitative 
data analysis as well as steps involved thereof in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 focuses on 
survey results for end-users; it covers aspects such as demography, access control, 
computer use skill set, and others. Section 6.4 covers ISDD maturity level assessment, 
touching on various framework metric categories such as security awareness and 
training, standard practice and policies, management support, security types, and 
many others. The section also derives the maturity assessment rating of ISDD per 
case organisation. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is provided in Section 6.5. 
6.2. Data Analysis 
Data analysis and interpretation is the process of assigning meaning to the collected 
information and determining the conclusions, significance, and implications of the 
findings (OIRA, 2013). For all the case organisations discussed in Chapter 5, data 
analysis and interpretation will be the same. This study used the method of 
triangulation to validate data generated. Data collected was both of a qualitative and 
quantitative nature. Qualitative research centres on narrative and performance 
analysis in order to discover similarities and insights in the responses. It is worth 
mentioning that a quantitative approach was used more in this research, since the 
bigger picture of the study involved sampling from a population and generalising the 
findings to the overall population. Quantitative data analysis generated for this study  
relied on statistics to examine and interpret the data collected from respondents.  
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6.2.1. Quantitative Data Analysis 
Quantitative data analysis is a representation of data in numerical form (Schulze, 
2003). Its main purpose is the quantification of data following statistical procedures to 
process data in order to give it meaning. The outcome of quantitative data is often 
measured in relation to a quantity (Nikolakopoulos, 2009). Durrheim (2002) sums up 
quantitative data analysis stages as involving, coding, entering, and cleaning of data. 
Figure 6.1 shows steps involved in quantitative data analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Steps in quantitative data analysis  
Source: Adapted from Durrheim (2009) 
The limitation of quantitative research is exposed when there is a need to investigate 
many varying realities in assorted contexts (Pickard, 2007). However, Choy (2014) 
counters that by asserting that the strength in quantitative research lies in its ability to 
produce concrete frameworks with data that is in a format easier to translate and 
analyse. This study mainly involved looking at trends and patterns in end-users’ 
activities when interacting with information systems. Therefore, quantitative research 
was more suited for the study even though qualitative was also required in some 
cases. 
6.2.1.1. Steps in Quantitative Data Analysis 
Step 1: Preparing the Data 
Quantitative data is a representation of data in its raw form; it consists of numbers that 
represent scores on variables (Wright & Losekoot, 2010). Being in its raw state, it is 
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unstructured, not in order, and may contain flaws and missing values which need to 
be corrected in order to convert it into a machine format that is executable. In this 
study, most of the data is primary, as it was collected through questionnaires with 
mostly closed-ended questions; however, in a few cases secondary data was also 
collected through observation. 
Step 2: Coding the Data  
Data coding is considered as the transformation of data into a state that computers 
and accompany application programs can understand and translate. In the case of this 
study, items from questionnaires were transformed into a format readable by computer 
applications. For example, information ICT experts were asked to rank how critical 
information security is to the operations of an organisation, with option 1 being “not 
critical”, option 2 – slightly, option 3 – fairly, option 4 – critical, and option 5 – very 
critical. The responses were assigned scores. The scores of all items were combined 
to produce a summed score to indicate the overall picture. Combined scores 
represented the thought of the various ICT experts on the value of information security 
to the operations of an enterprise. 
Step 3: Entering the Data 
Through the use of statistical application programmes, interpretation of data occurs 
through numerical data collected from questionnaires. In this study, using a 
combination of SPSS and Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheets, data was entered in 
row and column fashion on variables under investigation. Variable labels entered in 
the computer applications were identical to those in questionnaires to make it easy for 
reference and error correction. 
 
 
Step 4: Cleaning the Data 
Occasionally errors in data may occur. According to Schleicher and Saito (2005), 
cleaning of data is critical before analysis. In addition to that, data cleaning involves 
checking for any potential errors and correcting them accordingly. In this study, a 
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random sample consisting of 10% of the data collected was cross-checked to ensure 
it was error-free. 
6.2.2. Statistical Data Analysis 
Having prepared the data by cleaning and converting it to computer application 
acceptable format, the next step was to analyse the data through statistical means. 
There are two main types of analysis, namely, descriptive and inferential data analysis. 
6.2.2.1. Descriptive Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics is the conversion of raw numerical facts and figures into a state 
that will be easy to understand and interpret (Zikmund, 2003). On top of that, Larson 
(2006) claims that it is a mere summary of various aspects of the data that gives details 
about the sample and provides information about the population from which it was 
sampled. This refers to rearranging, ordering, and manipulating data to generate 
descriptive information (Zikmund, 2003). In the context of this study, calculations 
ranged from the mean, mode, and median, which helped in understanding concepts 
such as the central tendency of standard IT practice when system end-users interact 
with the system.  
6.2.2.2. Inferential Data Analysis 
Inferential statistics in research helps in making inferences about populations on the 
basis of samples collected. It is useful in making estimate population parameters and 
also testing hypothesis (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 2002). It can also be split into 
parametric and non-parametric. 
In the foregoing section, literature presumptions on approaches used to analyse both 
qualitative and quantitative data were presented. The next section focuses on the data 
analysis in a real-world context of data collected from end-users of target 
organisations. 
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6.3. Results of First Survey for Case Organisations X, Y and Z 
This part of the chapter interprets data and establishes ISDD levels. The response 
ratio as opposed to the target is calculated, followed by a brief analysis and 
interpretation of ISDD metrics and core indicator questions.  
6.3.1. Response Rate and Demography 
 
Figure 6.2: End-user participant response  
The target in this study was to reach out to approximately 30 end-user participants per 
organisation, as indicated by the total of 90 in Figure 6.2. However, it turned out that 
more than 50% of the target was reached for each organisation (96% for Organisation 
Z, 60% for Organisation Y, and 63% for Organisation X), which is above average and 
as such satisfactory.  
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6.3.2. End-user Participation 
 
Figure 6.3: Participant response by organisation 
According to Figure 6.3, regarding the distribution between target organisations, out 
of 65 end-user participants, 25% of them were from Organisation Y, 29% from 
Organisation X, and the final 46% from Organisation Z. This was a satisfactory 
distribution. 
The next subsection is the analysis of the remaining random set of questions for this 
part of the survey. The question numbering highlighted in brackets next to the 
subsection is consistent with the questionnaire numbering in Appendix C. 
6.3.3. Role-based Questions 
Some of the role-based questions in this study follow. 
  Question 5.2.1 – Please state your business role within the organisation 
The purpose of this question was to have a clear picture of the role placed by end-
user participants within the organisation and demonstrate the importance of such role 
in the context of ISDD. Figure 6.4 quantitatively depicts the various roles followed by 
discussions on the results obtained. 
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Figure 6.4: Business roles of respondents 
Organisation X had a total of 19 participants, as indicated in Figure 6.4. Five per cent 
of them were part of upper management, 20% was from middle management, another 
20% came from lower management, 45% was the representation of general staff, and 
10% was made up of in-service students. There was no IT representation. 
Organisation Y had a total of 18 participants who took part. Figure 6.4 shows that 
11% of them were upper management, 22% middle management, and 11% consisted 
of lower management. The majority of the population that participated were general 
staff at 39%, and 17% of them were members of the information technology (IT) team. 
Organisation Z had a maximum of 29 participants who responded. Of that population, 
the distribution was as follows: 3% from upper management, middle management and 
lower management all comprised 17%, 34% was general staff, 3% from IT staff, and 
7% in-service students. 
 Question 5.2.2 – State how long you have been in this organisation 
In this question, the aim was to understand the duration of each participant in the 
organisation in order to relate ISDD understanding according to length. Figure 6.5 
presents duration in the organisation per participant and discusses the findings. 
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Figure 6.5: Duration of stay at organisations 
Organisation X – According to Figure 6.5, the majority of the respondents have been 
at the organisation for less than 2 years (32%). The second majority (26%) has been 
there for 2-5 years, and the third and fourth groups making up 21% each represent 5-
7 and beyond 10 years. 
Organisation Y – In Organisation Y, 8% of the respondents have been there for less 
than 2 years. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents have been there for 2-5 years, 
23% for 5-7 years, and participants who have been at the organisation for 7-10 and 
beyond 10 years represented 15% each. 
Organisation Z – This organisation had the majority (36%) at below 2 years, 29% 
between 2 and 5 years, 7% for 5-7 years, 18% for 8-10 Years, and finally 11% for 
beyond 10 years. 
 Question 5.2.3 – Which business function do you report into? 
The purpose of this question was to measure ISDD according to a business function 
that an end-user should be confined to in accordance with the organisational structure. 
Discussions around the findings follow regarding Figure 6.6 including a quantitative 
depiction.  
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Figure 6.6: Respondents according to business function 
Organisation X – Figure 6.6 reveals that 37% of the respondents in Organisation X 
fall into middle office, 32% of them were not sure where they belong, and 16% each 
stated front- and back-end offices. 
Organisation Y – Most respondents make up the back-end office (47%), while front-
end and middle offices share 27% each, with 7% not sure where they are classified. 
Organisation Z – Organisation Z had 43% front-end office representatives, 32% 
middle office, 14% back-end office, and only 11% of them were not sure of their 
business function placing. 
The demography of the participants was the centre of this subsection. With that done, 
the next item involves analysing digital divide-related responses to some of the set 
metrics, specifically the handling of access control. 
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6.3.4. Access Control-based Questions 
The focus of this subsection is on access control-based questions, which are explored 
next. 
 Question 5.2.4 – Does your business role require you to access the system 
from outside the organisation? 
The purpose of this question was to place the number of business roles that need 
external system access so as to understand ISDD risk through devices used to access 
the system in such cases. Measurably, in Figure 6.7, end-users that require external 
access are shown and the accompanying explanation thereafter. 
 
Figure 6.7: Need for external access to the system by employees 
Organisation X – End-users were asked about the need to access the system 
externally according to their business role. Sixty-eight per cent declared that they do 
not require access at all. However, 26% sometimes require access, with only 5% of 
those who exclusively need access all the time. 
Organisation Y – Over the same question, respondents in Organisation Y fared 
differently, as 39% need access to the system externally sometimes, whereas 33% do 
not need access. It came to light that 22% need access at all times, while 11% need 
occasional access as well. 
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Organisation Z – In this organisation, the majority of the respondents (55%) 
sometimes need external access to the system, while the second-largest number of 
respondents (33%) need access at all times. The least group (15%) has no need for 
access at all. 
 Question 5.2.6 – Which access channels do you use to access the system 
when you are outside the organisation? 
In this question, the focus was on all end-users whose business roles and functions 
require them to access the system externally. It had to be established what kind of 
access technology they make use of and how the system manages access in relation 
to authentication and isolation according to roles and responsibilities which constitute 
ISDD critical success factors. Figure 6.8 depicts the findings.  
 
Figure 6.8: External access channels used by end-users 
Organisation X – According to Figure 6.8, half of the respondents (50%) who use the 
system externally do so through the Internet, whereas 13% use VPN, 4% RDP, and 
the second largest (21%) use the traditional telephone method. 
Organisation Y – In Organisation Y, it is shown that 53% resort to the Internet for 
external access, with the second most (26%) using RDP, while 11% each prefer VPN 
and telephone. 
Organisation Z – The response for Organisation Z was as follows: 58% uses the 
Internet, 35% uses telephone, and 6% uses face-to-face (F2F) channel. 
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 Question 5.2.7 – Which access channels do you use to access the system 
internally? 
The purpose of this question was to highlight how end-users access the system 
internally including physical restriction to information resources which are all part of 
factors that ISDD is measured on. Figure 6.9 demonstrates the outcome graphically 
and the interpretation comes thereafter. 
 
Figure 6.9: External access channels available to the system 
Organisation X – In Organisation X, 17% of the respondents use the Internet to 
access the system internally, 4% VPN, 17% telephone, 4% face-to-face, and 58% 
intranet. 
Organisation Y – Respondents in Organisation Y responded as follows: 32% uses 
the Internet, both RDP and VPN are at 8%, 20% uses telephone, 8% uses the face-
to-face channel, and 24% uses intranet. 
Organisation Z – Organisation Z presented the following responses: 26% internet, 
VPN and RDP both 7% each, 19% telephone, face-to-face channel at 10%, and finally 
28% intranet. 
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 Question 5.2.8 – In accordance with the access channels available, which 
authentication do you use?  
The essence of this question was to investigate authentication methods available to 
the given access methods to analyse access control as a basic of ISDD measurement. 
Statistically, Figure 6.10 illustrates the outcome, and further to that, discussions are 
detailed around authentication. 
 
Figure 6.10: Authentication type used by end-users accessing the system  
Figure 6.10 indicates all organisations (X, Y, Z) use the same authentication methods 
when accessing the system, both internally and externally. Organisation X showed that 
94% of the respondents used a password with one other unstated method. 
Organisations Y and Z had a 100% password use response. 
 Question 5.2.9 – In your opinion, does the organisation’s system limit your 
access to what is relevant to your work scope? 
The purpose of this question was to enquire from end-users how they felt over the 
access restriction rendered by the system in relation to their business roles and 
functions. 
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Figure 6.11: Access control according to business roles 
Organisation X – From the responses in Figure 6.11, close to half of the respondents 
are of the opinion that the system does not limit their access according to their work 
scope, while 32% of them strongly disagree and 16% disagree. On the contrary, 21% 
of them think the system limits them according to their work scope, whereas another 
21% of the respondents think they are not sure. The last group thinks strongly that the 
system limits them accordingly. 
Organisation Y – In Organisation Y, 39% also strongly disagree with the fact that the 
system limits them to what is relevant to their work scope. A further 39% also 
disagrees, and contrary to that 22% agrees. 
Organisation Z – In this organisation, 37% of the respondents strongly disagree, 42% 
disagree, 7% are not sure, and only 15% agree to the fact that the system limits them 
according to the relevance of the resources to their work. 
 Question 5.2.13 – Which physical access restriction method to information 
resources do you use in your business function? 
Fundamentally, here the physical partitioning of business roles and functions was the 
objective especially to control physical access to information resources – a quality 
necessary for ISDD. Figure 6.12 highlights the statistical responses and a discussion 
continues thereafter. 
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Figure 6.12: Physical access control techniques 
Organisation X – Fifty-three per cent of the respondents use access cards in order to 
physically access information resources within the organisation. Further, 32% resort 
to keys, and the minority (16%) operates in open policy workspaces. 
Organisation Y – This organisation has 65% of staff using keys to access information 
resources, 12% uses biometrics, 12% uses access cards, and another 12% uses other 
methods not mentioned. 
Organisation Z – Keys are the most prominent at 40%, while 36% of the respondents 
indicate they operate in open policy offices, and 24% uses access cards. 
6.3.5. Computer Literacy-based Questions 
Questions that are computer literacy-based will now follow. 
 Question 5.2.15 – Where do you rate your computer use skill set? 
Primarily, the question addressed the computer usage competencies of all end-users 
and equated their responses statistically, as shown in Figure 6.13, to their ability to 
interact with the system without compromising it. 
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Figure 6.13: Computer use skill set levels 
Organisation X – Computer literacy-wise, most of the respondents in Figure 6.13 are 
at intermediate level (56%), followed by advanced (39%), and finally beginners make 
up the smallest population (6%). 
Organisation Y – In this organisation, advanced users make up the biggest portion 
(39%), then comes beginners (28%), and finally professionals and intermediate split 
into 17% each. 
Organisation Z – Organisation Z reports advanced users as the majority (46%), with 
36% being intermediate users, and finally the minority (18%) are beginners. 
6.3.6. Culture of Protecting Information 
The question that follows pertains to the culture of protecting information. 
 Question 5.2.16 – I fully understand the consequences of my actions while 
interacting with/or accessing the system  
The intention of this question was to measure end-users’ awareness of their actions 
when accessing the system. The graphical depiction in Figure 6.14 is explained in 
detail in the discussion that follows. 
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Figure 6.14: End-user understanding of consequences of system misuse 
Organisation X – Of all the respondents who took part in the survey, the majority 
(39%) merely agreed that they understood the consequences of their actions while 
interacting with the system. A further 28% strongly agreed, 22% was however not sure, 
while a split of 6% each of the respondents indicated that they were in strong 
disagreement and merely disagreed. 
Organisation Y – In this organisation, more agreement than disagreement was the 
outcome, with 39% who strongly agreed, 33% who agreed, and 28% who disagreed. 
Organisation Z – Forty-three per cent agreed to the fact that they knew the effect of 
their interaction with the system. However, 25% of the respondents were not sure, 
18% strong disagreed, and the least strongly concurred with that statement. 
6.3.7. Security Awareness and Training  
The questions that follow have to do with security awareness and training. 
 Question 5.2.17 – Have you ever received information security awareness or 
training within the organisation before? 
In-house capacity building tailor-designed to suit the security structure of the 
organisation as well as activities that subscribe to strong ISDD conduct among all end-
users was the purpose of this question. Figure 6.15 represents quantitative findings, 
and further down an explanation to that effect is given.  
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Figure 6.15: In-house employee computer awareness & training 
Organisation X – Data collected on computer awareness and training shown in Figure 
6.15 indicates that the majority of the respondents (78%) in Organisation X  have never 
received training as opposed to 22% who have. 
Organisation Y – Fifty per cent of the respondents in Organisation Y stated that they 
have never received training at all, 28% of them said they did but only once, and the 
remainder (22%) periodically did receive training. 
Organisation Z – In this organisation, 54% of the respondents have never received 
training during their time at this organisation. Additionally, 14% of them said training 
was frequently received, those who indicated periodically represented 18%, and 
another group of 14% said that once only they received training.  
 Question 15.2.32 – On a scale of 1-5, what is your security awareness 
knowledge on the latest threat trends such as viruses, hacking, and spyware? 
End-user awareness to identify and detect suspicious latest security threat activities 
that are capable of breaching security when entertained on the system was the 
concentration of this question. Figure 6.16 depicts the outcome, and then an 
explanation follows after it.  
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Figure 6.16: Security awareness knowledge 
Organisation X – When reviewing statements according to Figure 6.16, many of the 
respondents (42%) in this organisation have very little knowledge and awareness of 
the latest threat trends. On the other hand, 32% of the respondents represented the 
second-largest response of those who indicated that they considered themselves 
average, 21% of them thought they were good, while 5% of them were of little 
knowledge and awareness as well. 
Organisation Y – Twenty-eight per cent of the respondents indicated that they have 
very little knowledge and awareness on the latest threat trends. In contrast, another 
28% claimed to be average. A split of 22% each of the respondents showed that they 
had good and very good awareness and knowledge of the latest threat spectrum. 
Organisation Z – In this organisation, there was a 29% claim of having good 
awareness and knowledge of activities threatening systems. Quite the opposite to that, 
two second-best responses highlighted very little and little awareness and knowledge 
both at 21% each. Another 21% had average knowledge and awareness, with only 7% 
of the respondents confidently claiming they were good in knowledge and awareness 
of the risk space. 
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 Question 5.1.20 – In your organisation, where can you find information 
regarding standard practice, access, and acceptable use when using the 
system? 
The purpose of this question was to understand end-user awareness with respect to 
the presence of a security policy or document meant to guide them on standard use, 
compliance, and acceptable use on the system. Statistically, in Figure 6.17, the 
outcome is presented and then explained. 
 
Figure 6.17: System use reference document by end-users 
Organisation X – Figure 6.17 shows that only 17% of the respondents are aware of 
the presence of a security policy. Most of the respondents (33%) referred to workplace 
policies and rules for guidance, 22% did not know what to reference, another 22% 
pointed towards their job descriptions, and finally 6% spoke about brochures from IT 
department. 
Organisation Y – At Organisation Y, 53% of the respondents acknowledge workplace 
rules and policies as security guidance, 26% of them mentioned their job description 
as guidance, and 21% of them do not know what to turn to. 
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Organisation Z – Fifty-four per cent of the respondents referred to workplace rules 
and policies, 18% to security policy, 18% to brochures from IT, and 11% to job 
description. 
6.3.8. Standard Practice, Policy and Procedure-based Questions 
Questions based on standard practice, policy, and procedure are dealt with in this 
subsection. 
 Question 5.2.23 – Do you understand the need for standard practice and 
acceptable use when interacting with the system? 
In a continuation of question 5.1.20 highlighted in Section 6.3.7, the idea behind this 
question was to see how end-users perceive the value of standard practice and 
acceptable use when using system resources. A graphical interpretation in Figure 6.18 
reveals the result and thereafter the narration. 
 
Figure 6.18: Standard practice 
Organisation X – Most of the respondents (50%) understand slightly with a doubt the 
need for standard practice and use while using system resources, whereas 33% 
understands without a problem. On the contrary, 11% of the respondents state that 
they do not understand, and 6% of them strongly understand. 
Organisation Y – This organisation exhibits more understanding of the need for 
standard practice by showcasing that 35% of the respondents understand, while an 
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additional 35% of them strongly understand. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents 
were for the option they understood only slightly. 
Organisation Z – From those in this organisation, 50% understand, 27% slightly 
understand, 23% are neutral, and 23% also understand strongly the need for standard 
practice. 
 Question 15.2.31 – For what purpose do you access your organisation’s 
information system? 
The purpose of this question was to have a clear overview of the reason for needing 
access to the system by end-user participants. Further on, participants demonstrate 
the importance of understanding the need for access in the context of ISDD. Figure 
6.19 quantitatively depicts the access reasons followed by discussions on the results 
obtained. 
 
Figure 6.19: Reasons why end-users access system 
Organisation X – Twenty-four per cent of respondent purely access the system for 
attending to clients queries, 18% to provide services to external stakeholders, 21% to 
make internal queries with other departments, 24% to undertake their daily duties, 6% 
for instant messaging, and 9% for social media. 
Organisation Y – The majority of the respondents (30%) showed that they access the 
system for the purpose of attending to client queries, while 22% of them use it to 
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provide services to external stakeholders. On the other hand, 17% of them use it to 
make queries within the organisation with other departments, another 22% to go on 
with their day-to-day duties, and finally 9% of the respondents use it for social media 
Organisation Z – The majority of the respondents (30%), according to Figure 6.19, 
use the system for attending to clients queries, secondly (28%) to undertake their daily 
roles, while a split of 14% each to provide service to external stakeholders and make 
queries with other departments internally. A further split of 7% each represents instant 
messaging and social media. 
6.4. ISDD Maturity Level Assessment  
In the previous section, questions that directly relate to the measurement of ISDD 
according to the framework core indicators and metrics were discussed. Every 
question or statement was measured in relation to these metrics and a score allocated 
to determine how well an organisation complies with that particular benchmark. 
Questions were split into sections that would be combined in the end to indicate the 
overall rating to reflect compliance with the framework. In the next subsections, all 
case organisations will be rated. 
Based on the foregoing analysis done and the interpretation made including qualitative 
data gathered from review of documents and observations, the rating sheet that 
follows will be used to gauge all three case organisations accordingly. 
6.4.1. Information Flow – Ecosystem 
From the literature explored in Chapters 2 and 3 earlier, as a security enhancement 
strategy which promotes high ISDD, segregation of information on the basis of 
business roles and functions is mandatory. This is reflected by CSF 1 in Table 3.2 in 
collaboration with associated metrics in Table 4.3. Furthermore, evidently it is 
mandatory to understand the flow of data, processes, and associated reporting 
structures as indicated by an organisational structure of every organisation. This 
emanates from Section 2.2.4 on the structure of an organisation and how that 
integrates into an information system. In this subsection, information flow compliance 
according to the design of the framework is what Table 6.1 is about. The rating scored 
per organisation is based on valid proof of data collected to measure the 
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appropriateness of information flow in the effort to design a watertight ISDD structure. 
The measurement of information flow is constant all across organisations irrespective 
of the type of organisational structure. If an organisation complies with a critical 
success factor, a score of two is allocated, otherwise a zero. 
Table 6.1: Appropriateness of information flow 
 
Appropriateness of Information Flow  
                                  
Information flow accuracy, is it standard? Y= 2, N = 0 OX OY OZ 
6.4.1.1. A proper organisational structure exists        N Y Y 
6.4.1.2. Organisational structure clearly depicts reporting structures to 
make it easy to understand the work and data flow system-wise 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
6.4.1.3. Roles and responsibilities of end-users are clear and precise 
according to the organisational structure to guide access control 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.1.4. Organisational structure conforms to the traditional design of 
data flowing upwards, downwards, or horizontal 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
6.4.1.5. All end-users know and understand their business roles and 
functions to enhance system security   
N N N 
 
Average Assessment ……………………………………………………                                                    
Comments on priority areas of improvement 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
                                 
Based on the evidence collected from the end-user survey, the information flow 
compliance metrics of every organisation were checked for compliance. The following 
were the scores per organisation: Organisation X = 0, Organisation Y = 6, and 
0 4 6 
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Organisation Z = 4. In the subsection that follows, security management is screened 
against ISDD metrics compliance. Security Management   
This subsection is based on a combination of CSF 1 in Table 2.2 and ISDD metrics 
discussed in Chapter 4 based on Table 4.3. The rationale is to use the table to measure 
general IT management and also adherence by end-users to procedures, standard 
practice, and compliance when using the system. The rating scored showcases 
whether security management by custodians of IT in organisations is upheld according 
to the design of the ISDD framework. The evaluation is based on the proof provided 
by data collected; for every metric, a score of either 2 for Yes or 0 for No is issued 
based on findings of evidence collected in the end-user survey. The metrics are then 
summed up to find the average score per organisation in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Security management 
   
Standard Practice, Policies & Procedures     Yes = 2, No = 0                       OX OY OZ 
6.4.2.1. A properly defined information security policy exists Y Y Y 
6.4.2.2. Security policy is written in low-level language for easy 
understanding of end-users                                   
Y Y Y 
6.4.2.3. End-users are compliant with security policy N Y N 
6.4.2.4. Security policy is updated to accommodate the changing risk 
landscape              
N N N 
6.4.2.5. End-users have signed a non-disclosure agreement 
 each as a part of workplace rules       
N Y N 
 
Average rating …………………………………………………………………………..                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
4 4 8 
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In accordance with general security maintenance compliance conducted in Table 6.2 
based on end-user data collected from the survey combined with review of documents, 
the following is how organisations fared: Organisation X = 4, Organisation Y = 8, and 
Organisation Z = 4. 
6.4.3. Management Support 
Caballero (2009), through CSF 2 in Table 2.2, states that security should not be looked 
at as an IT problem; it is a business problem. It is against that background that Table 
6.3 reviews management support towards security in organisations. Based on review 
of documents and interviews with relevant participants applicable to this section in all 
three organisations such as IT officers, System administrators, Helpdesk and 
Technicians.  The ratings in Table 6.3 indicate whether metrics listed are adhered to 
and to what extent. 
Table 6.3: Management support 
 
Management’s commitment to IT            Yes = 2, No = 0 
 
OX 
 
OY 
 
OZ 
6.4.3.1. Information Technology is acknowledged by management 
as a core function and important part of business strategy 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
6.4.3.2. Management allocates sufficient budget to IT N Y N 
6.4.3.3. Management fully supports enforcement of security 
policies 
N Y N 
6.4.3.4. Management fully attends security-related 
awareness and training and encourages other end-users to 
do so           
N Y N 
6.4.3.5. Security is looked at as a business and not an IT 
problem alone by management     
N N N 
 
Average rating …………………………………………………………………………….                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
0 0 8 
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In this subsection, using set ISDD metrics, organisations were measured against 
management’s involvement towards security. Organisation X scored 0, Organisation 
Y scored 8, and Organisation Z scored 0. 
6.4.3.1. Security Types 
Table 2.2 lists security types as a part of security architecture. This aspect is a critical 
success factor. ISDD metrics in Table 6.3 equally adopted that quality. In ISDD context, 
rating allocated to organisations in Table 6.4 indicate whether security types listed are 
present in organisations and how well they match industry standards. 
Table 6.4: Security types 
Indicate the security type by acknowledging whether they exist 
or not  (Yes = 1 for main question, 0.25 for sub-question, No = 
0 for all) 
OX OY OZ 
6.4.4.1. Antivirus software is present  Y Y Y 
6.4.4.1.1. Antivirus software constantly has the latest updates N Y Y 
6.4.4.2. A firewall is present (Security centre) Y Y Y 
6.4.4.2.1. The firewall is regularly updated and policies 
tweaked to suit environment (latest patches and content 
filtering) 
Y Y Y 
6.4.4.3. Password authentication is enabled by default on the 
entire system  
Y Y Y 
6.4.4.3.1. Password authentication is strongly enforced and 
monitored against violation  
Y Y Y 
6.4.4.4. Encryption of data is enabled on the system by default N Y N 
6.4.4.4.1. All handheld and mobile devices have encryption 
software installed 
N Y N 
 
Average rating ……………………………………………………………………...……………..                                           
8.5 10 8.75 
  
146 
 
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
In terms of security types in the context of ISDD, Organisation X scored 8.5, 
Organisation Y scored 10, and finally, Organisation Z scored 8.75. 
6.4.4. Security Awareness and Training 
To avoid making costly errors on a system, end-users must be trained (Broadie, 2008). 
ISO/IE 27001:2013 in CSF 3 (Table 2.2) also allude to that by stating that information 
security must be promoted effectively to employees. In this framework, in order for an 
organisation to have end-users that are well-equipped to operate the system 
effectively in a way that by-passes threats and risks, training and awareness are a top 
priority to uphold high ISDD attributes. To measure organisations on that aspect, 
scores in this subsection makes it possible to indicate whether this framework metric 
is observed and to what extent. For every metric in this table, a Yes carries a score of 
2, while a No is equivalent to 0. An average score is issued by summing all metrics at 
the end. 
Table 6.5: Security awareness and training 
Mark the option with a Yes or No, where Yes = 2, No = 0 OX OY OZ 
6.4.5.1. A self-assessment tool is available for screening of end-users at 
recruitment to weigh security risk to the system 
N N N 
6.4.5.2. All end-users are screened for computer skill set at recruitment N N N 
6.4.5.3. Management prioritises company-wide security awareness and 
training which is performed according to latest threats and risk trends 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.5.4. Prior to joining the organisation, all end-users received security 
awareness and training from credible institutions or, if not, were upskilled 
upon recruitment 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.5.5. All end-users range from minimum intermediate to advanced 
users  
N N N 
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Average rating ………………………………………………………………..                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Summing up the performance of organisations against the aforementioned metrics 
came to the conclusion: Organisation X = 0, Organisation Y = 0, and Organisation Z = 
0. 
6.4.5. Access Control Management 
Access control is a major component of ISDD assessment. This is highlighted in CSFs 
3, 4 and 9 of Table 3.2. In the context of this research, access control regulates who 
accesses information when and where in accordance with their business roles and 
functions. The scoring issued to organisations in this subsection indicates whether the 
organisation complies with the framework metrics and to what extent. In this part, 
every question has a sub-question. On the main question, a score of 1.5 represents a 
Yes, while 0 is a No. The sub-question carries the weight of 1 for a Yes, otherwise 0 
for a No. A summary of the total is given at the end in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Access control management 
Access compliance by End-users and General system 
customisation  
Main Question: Yes = 1.5, No = 0, Sub-question: Yes = 1, No = 0  
 
OX 
 
OY 
 
OZ 
6.4.6.1. Every employee has their own distinct password N Y Y 
6.4.6.1.1. Every end-users’ password meets minimum requirement, e.g. 
complexity, strength, history, and expiry date 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.6.2. Physical access to system resources is strictly regulated by keys, 
biometrics, or access card 
Y Y N 
0 0 0 
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6.4.6.2.1. Physical access regulated according to business function and 
role 
Y Y Y 
6.4.6.3. All end-users have access cards or keys only usable when 
accessing their business function areas 
Y Y N 
6.4.6.3.1. Extra cards, keys, or biometrics solutions to offices is/are 
available on standby for end-users who forget or lose theirs  
N N N 
6.4.6.4. System by default enforces password minimum requirements, 
e.g. strength, complexity, expiry, and history 
Y Y N 
6.4.6.4.1. System locks out non-complaint end-users until IT support 
manually intervenes  
N Y N 
 
Average rating ………………………………………………………………..                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
In Table 6.6, access control management was weighed in all case organisations as 
follows: Organisation X = 9, Organisation Y = 9, and Organisation Z = 4.5. 
6.4.6. Culture of Protecting Information 
The culture of protecting information is a critical success factor regarded highly on the 
list in an effort to enforce security as shown in Table 3.2. In this framework, the culture 
of safeguarding information is an attribute that requires consistency and correct 
attitude by all end-users and enforcement to complement other critical success factors 
necessary for striving towards high ISDD. In this subsection, the score indicates 
whether the organisation complies with the framework metrics and to what extent. A 
Yes carries a weight of 1, while No is equivalent to 0. 
2.5 8.5 6.5 
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Table 6.7: Culture of protecting information 
Security Culture                        Yes = 1, No = 0 OX OY OZ 
6.4.7.1. End-users at all levels understand the consequences of their 
actions when working with the system 
Y Y N 
6.4.7.2. All end-users know the name of the antivirus in use N Y N 
6.4.7.3. All end-users are concerned about information sharing, privacy, 
and protection according to their work scope 
Y Y Y 
6.4.7.4. All end-users understand the value of compliance N N N 
6.4.7.5. Ethical conduct among all end-users towards organisational 
information resources is acceptable 
N N Y 
6.4.7.6. Strategies to enforce security culture are in place by the 
organisation 
N N N 
6.4.7.7. Overall, the ISDD culture is acceptable in the organisation at 
individual level 
N N N 
6.4.7.8. End-users are willing to support processes including change 
instituted by custodians of security to minimise risks and threats within 
the organisation 
Y Y Y 
6.4.7.9. Ethically, end-users are willing to take accountability for their 
activities when using the system  
Y Y Y 
6.4.7.10. The organisation takes action promptly on non-compliant end-
users 
N N Y 
 
 
Average rating …………………………………………………….…………………….                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
5 5 4 
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According to Table 6.7, compliance to culture of security was weighed as follows: 
Organisation X = 4, Organisation Y = 5, and Organisation Z = 5. 
6.4.7. General System Security Appropriateness 
System appropriateness concerns the general ability of the system to minimise ISDD 
vulnerabilities. In this framework, this aspect measures automated attributes 
necessary for a system that stays alert to vulnerabilities and risks. Rating on this 
aspect is based on proof presented through questionnaires, review of documents, 
interviews with IT personnel, and observation. For every metric, a Yes represents a 
score of 1 and a No stands for 0. The summary will follow at the end including the 
combined rating of the subsection. 
Table 6.8: Security appropriateness 
System Capability                          Yes = 1, No = 0 OX OY OZ 
6.4.8.1. Applications are upgraded regularly to minimise exploitation 
openings by threats and risks 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
6.4.8.2. System access audit is enabled and easily identifies 
unauthorised access or failed attempts  
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.8.3. System limits end-users according to their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.8.4. Application availability is controlled according to relevance and 
needs of end-users 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
6.4.8.5. All devices require authentication by default Y Y Y 
6.4.8.6. System regulates authentication according to business function N N N 
6.4.8.7. Security structure accommodates external end-users efficiently, 
e.g. suppliers, contractors, partners, customers, and consultants 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
6.4.8.8. System is upgradable both software and hardware-wise to suit 
new trends 
N Y Y 
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6.4.8.9. Data in and out of the system is captured by default using a 
firewall 
Y Y Y 
6.4.8.10. After hours the system is automated to make selective end-
user access according to business role and function needs 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Average rating ……………………………………………………………………………                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Based on Table 6.8, the organisations were scored as follows with regard to the 
appropriateness of the system: Organisation X = 3, Organisation Y = 5, and 
Organisation Z = 5. 
6.4.8. Business Continuity Plan 
CSF 8 in Table 2.2 elaborates on business continuity planning, which is highly 
regarded as a significant component of security. In this framework, it is a disaster 
recovery plan that enables the system to regain operations after a successful security 
breach. The rating in Table 6.9 is based on documents reviewed and interviews 
conducted with IT personnel at case organisations during the surveys to match the 
application of business continuity planning required according to the metrics of this 
framework. Every metric present signifies a score of 2 otherwise 0. The summary of 
the outcome is presented at the end. 
Table 6.9: Business continuity plan 
Ability of the system to recover after a failure  
                                    Yes = 2,  No = 0 
 
OX 
 
OY 
 
OZ 
6.4.9.1. A regular backup schedule is present N Y Y 
6.4.9.2. Backup restoration is performed frequently to test disaster 
recovery 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
3 5 5 
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6.4.9.3. There is an offsite backup which is at least 5-10 km away 
from the system for recovery during natural disaster, theft, 
organised crime or fire 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y 
6.4.9.4. All mission-critical services, infrastructure, and data are 
part of the disaster recovery plan and can be restored in the 
shortest period to preserve system uptime 
N N Y 
6.4.9.5. Alternate communication channels for all stakeholders are 
kept intact for eventualities when there is a major system outage 
N N N 
 
Average rating ……………………………………………………………………………                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Organisations in the business continuity plan category of the framework in Table 6.9 
were evaluated as follows: Organisation X = 0, Organisation Y = 2, and Organisation 
Z = 6. 
6.4.9. Performance Target 
Performance target is a metric represented in Table 4.3. According to the ISDD 
framework, this factor monitors how processes that support ISDD continue to improve 
to ensure the system subscribes to the notion of prevention, detection, and recovery 
from threats including overall system effectiveness processes. Based on data 
collected through document review, interviews with IT personnel and observation, 
scores in this segment validate performance target and measures continuous 
improvement. A Yes stands for a score of 1, and a No is 0. An average score and 
summary will then follow at the end of the Table 6.10. 
2 6 0 
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Table 6.10: Continuous improvement 
 
Performance Target and Continuous Improvement 
Yes = 2, No = 0           
 
OX 
 
OY 
 
OZ 
6.4.10.1. Security policy is updated regularly to suit the ever-changing risk 
spectrum 
N N N 
6.4.10.2. Employees are screened annually for the level of security risk on 
latest threat trends and are upskilled where necessary 
N N N 
6.4.10.3. Organisational structure and ecosystem are continuously 
updated to ensure the system too is kept high ISDD-compliant at all times 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.10.4. Management continues to get involved by supporting 
enforcement of policies and strategises IT as a business core function 
allocating sufficient funds 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y 
6.4.10.5. Culture of strong security understanding is kept sound among 
all stakeholders through regular awareness and training to keep them up 
to date with latest threat and risk trends  
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
6.4.10.6. Organisation keeps track and record of security incidents and 
outbreaks and evaluates to measure improvement 
N N N 
6.4.10.7. Physical access control is regularly reviewed and observed 
flaws improved on  
N N Y 
6.4.10.8. Access control is continuously reviewed as end-users leave the 
organisation, move business roles and functions due to resignation, 
promotion, temporal recruitment, and many others 
N N N 
6.4.10.9. Risk assessment approach is reviewed and updated according 
to the environment and threat spectrum 
N N N 
6.4.10.10. Business continuity plan is reviewed quarterly and 
recommendations made and documented 
N N N 
 
Average rating …………………………………………………………………………....                                           
Comments and areas of priority 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
4 0 0 
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Based on evidence collected in Table 6.10, Organisation X scored 0, Organisation Y 
scored 0, and Organisation Z scored 4. 
6.4.10. Derived Maturity Level Assessment of ISDD Case Organisation  
Given the scores of organisations in Tables 6.4.1 to 6.4.10 in the preceding section 
against ISDD core indicators and metrics, Table 6.11 will present the summarised total 
scores per organisation to indicate their ISDD levels.  
Table 6.11: ISDD metrics score 
 
Overall rating                                                                            Org X       Org Y       Org Z 
1 Information flow………………………………………………………………….…  
2 Standard Practice, Policies & Procedures………………………….……………      
3 Management Support………………………………………………………..……                       
4 Security Types in Place……………………………………….…………………… 
5 Security Awareness and Training………………………………………….…….. 
6 Access Control Management…………………………………………………….. 
7 Culture of Protecting Information…………………………………………..…….. 
8 System Appropriateness………………………………………………………….. 
9 Business Continuity Plan (BCP)…………………………………………………. 
10 Performance Target & Continuous Assessment………………………….……. 
Combined rating…………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
0 4 4 
4 8 4 
0 0 
26 
8.5 
8 
10 7.5 
0 0 0 
6.5 8.5 4.5 
4 5 5 
3 5 
0 
5 
2 
0 2 0 
6 
41.2
5 
50.5 
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Table 6.12: Overall rating and ISDD compliance table 
Assessment Rating Star ISDD Level Description 
0-20 * Level 1 Non-compliance 
21-40 ** Level 2 Initial Compliance 
41-60 *** Level 3 Basic Compliance 
61-80 **** Level 4 Acceptable Compliance 
Above 80 ***** Level 5 Full Compliance 
 
Going by the combined rating provided in Table 6.11, it can be concluded that 
Organisation X’s ISDD stands at initial compliance (level 2), which marks basic entry 
stage to mature ISDD. The organisation is beginning to acknowledge the need for 
ISDD processes, but this need is not acted on. This is characterised by immature ISDD 
processes. The combined rating for Organisations Y and Z (50.5 and 41.2) puts both 
under basic ISDD compliance (level 3). This means these organisations have 
embraced ISDD critical success factors. An approach towards security processes has 
now started following a certain organised structure. Security is measurable, but not 
entire. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the proposed framework was tried and tested in a real-world context 
by analysing the result of data gathered from end-users in participating case 
organisations. Results analysed revealed that the ISDD capability maturity level of 
organisation X is at 2 (initial compliance), meaning the organisation is ISDD immature; 
it needs improvement to upscale ISDD to a mature status. Further results also showed 
that Organisation Y and Z were rated at level 3 (basic compliance). This level 
translates into mature ISDD, but at entry level. This status acknowledges and 
implements CSFs, which is the beginning of ISDD maturity. The results obtained from 
this exercise demonstrated that the framework in this study can indeed be used in a 
real-life context to assess an organisation’s ISDD maturity in order to measure 
continuous improvement. However, since the framework tested is still at its theoretical 
stage, expert validation is necessary. The next chapter is dedicated to the validation 
of the framework by experts with improvements thereof. 
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Chapter 7: Improved ISDD Framework 
 
 
   Chapter 1: Introduction 
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7.1. Introduction  
In the foregoing chapter, the proposed framework was tested for applicability in a real-
world context. Survey results on end-user data analysis performed on all organisations 
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presented an opportunity to use the proposed framework to measure capability 
maturity in all organisations. Going into this penultimate chapter, the focal point is to 
analyse data collected from the ICT experts’ survey, present the results, and use that 
to improve on the proposed framework in order to produce the final contribution of this 
study to the body of existing knowledge on ISDD. Most importantly, viewpoints on the 
proposed framework by ICT experts who were in some cases internal to case 
organisations and some that were not internal made the final proposed framework 
consensual and relevant to the field of information security. 
Section 7.2 briefly outlines the data analysis approach of this study. Then Section 7.3 
follows with a detailed analysis of collected data from expert participants. Section 7.4 
provides a summary of the results, suggesting areas of improvement of the proposed 
framework. The improved version of proposed framework is presented in Section 7.5. 
Section 7.6 concluded the chapter. 
7.2. Data Analysis 
Data analysis in this section is a continuation of the first survey where system end-
users were incorporated. The second survey incorporates viewpoints on the quality of 
framework by ICT experts. 
The methodology used for data analysis was discussed in the previous chapter in 
which both qualitative and quantitative approaches were explored, and it was 
emphasised that data triangulation was used whereby various data sources of 
information were used in order to increase the validity of the study. The outcome of a 
survey administered to ICT experts so as to qualitatively and quantitatively provide 
insights aimed at improving this study’s framework will be discussed. The outcome of 
the various analyses in this study will also be presented. 
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7.3. Questionnaire Responses by ICT experts 
This section presents the analysis of the responses from ICT experts which focuses 
on the assessment of the quality of the preliminary framework. The intention is to be 
able to grasp a range of insights aimed at improving aspects of the proposed 
framework so as to come up with a vetted and improved version. Original question 
numbers as they appear in Appendix C are retained herein. 
7.3.1. Response Rate and Demography 
A total of 35 ICT experts were reached in this survey. Out of the 35 targeted 
respondents, only 25 took part in the survey, representing a return rate of 71% as 
depicted in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Expert participant response 
According to Figure 7.1, a total of 35 ICT experts were reached in survey 2. Of the 35 
ICT experts, only 25 responded and took part in the survey, representing a response 
of 71%. 
 Question 5.1.2 – Years of experience of security expert respondents 
The purpose of this question is to try to understand the years of experience in the field 
of security by experts that took part in the survey. It makes it possible to hear 
viewpoints on ISDD based on experience. Figure 7.2 presents the quantitative 
outcome and discusses the findings. 
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Figure 7.2: ICT years of security experience of the respondents 
Based on Figure 7.2, the majority of ICT expert participants had more than 5 years of 
experience, whereby 32% had between 5 and 10 years, and 44% had more than 10 
years. A small number had less than 5 years of experience including 16% of the ICT 
experts who had between 3 and 5 years, as well as those with 4% each, representing 
2-3 and less than 2 years’ experience respectively. 
 Question 5.1.3 – The occupations of information ICT experts who participated 
in the survey 
The rationale behind this question was to evaluate the areas of security represented 
by expert respondents, and then relate it to the context of this study with the purpose 
of improving the framework. Figure 7.3 is the quantitative depiction of respondents’ 
occupation and the accompanying discussion. 
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Figure 7.3: Respondents by occupation 
As depicted in Figure 7.3, from the majority of ICT experts surveyed, five were systems 
analysts, seven systems administrators, and three IT consultants. The rest were as 
follows: one CIO, one system programmer, one IT manager, one software developer, 
and finally, from the academic sector, three lecturers. It was deemed relevant to 
include respondents from the academic sector in the sense that their theoretical 
contribution to the enhancement of the framework is equally relevant. 
7.3.2. Importance of Information Security to Operations of an Organisation 
This section articulates on the opinions of ICT experts about the value of information 
security to the operations of an organisation. 
 Question 5.1.4 – Viewpoint by ICT experts on how critical information security 
is to business operations 
This question was set up to paint a picture on the value of security to business 
operations while at the same time highlighting how that is enhanced by connecting to 
ISDD. Figure 7.4 illustrates the outcome and discussion thereafter. 
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Figure 7.4: ICT experts’ viewpoints on the value of security to business operations 
Based on the responses to the question posed, Figure 7.4 show that the majority of 
the ICT experts (64%) acknowledged that security was very vital, 8% felt it was critical, 
20% felt it was fairly vital and the rest of the ITC experts (8%) were of the opinion that 
it was slightly vital. 
 Question 5.1.5 – The view of ICT experts on the use of security models such 
as COBIT or ISO/IE 27001 in organisations 
The idea behind this question was to hear from ICT experts on the applicability and 
usefulness of security frameworks such as ISDD to businesses. Figure 7.5 portrays 
the quantitative response, followed by the summary. 
 
Figure 7.5: Expert opinions on use of security models 
Of the 25 ICT experts who participated in the survey, Figure 7.5 reveals that twelve 
endorsed strongly the use of security models, which stands for 48%; ten respondents 
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also agreed, which represents 40%; and one respondent (4%) was neutral, and two 
(8%) disagreed. 
 Question 5.1.6 – Highlights the most influential factors when managing 
information security 
The focus in this question was factors which must be considered first and should be 
acted upon when addressing security enhancement activities which are favourable 
towards preserving high ISDD status in an organisation. Figure 7.4 is a graphical 
interpretation of this and is accompanied by a summary of this interpretation. 
  
Figure 7.5: Common denominators in security management 
Based on Figure 7.5, experts considered a security policy as the first line of defence 
and the most important factor in security management (30%). This was followed by 
management support (25%), while a skilled IT department and IT budget were rated 
23% and 22%.  
7.3.3. Access Control Management 
This part of data collected and interpreted now integrates information security into the 
core and context of this research, namely, information security digital divide. Access 
control management through the system determines who has access to which 
information resources based on their business functions, roles, and responsibilities. 
 Question 5.1.7 – The importance of understanding the flow of information in 
access control management to information resources 
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The purpose of this question was, through expert viewpoints, to highlight the value of 
understanding the flow of information when designing access control by end-users 
according to their business roles and functions which are held high on the ISDD list of 
CSF. Figure 7.6 presents the results, and a summary follows thereafter. 
 
Figure 7.6: The role of information flow in planning access control management 
Question 5.1.7 targeted how understanding the flow of information through reporting 
structures within an organisation was important to the designing of access control 
management in Figure 7.6. Responses provided show that 52% of ICT experts 
strongly agreed with the notion that information flow is a critical component of access 
control management, 36% additionally backed that by merely agreeing, and 8% 
strongly disagree, while 4% was neutral. 
 Question 5.1.9 – The structure of the organisation needs to be a strong point 
of consideration when assigning access credentials to end-users  
The aim of this question was to relate the organisational structure to end-user access 
control design. Expert response would illustrate that, as shown in Figure 7.7, and a 
discussion would then summarise the outcome. 
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Figure 7.7: The role of the organisational structure in access control management 
The biggest opinion (60%) on this question went towards a strong agreement that it 
was mandatory to have the organisational structure referenced during access control 
design. Figure 7.7 goes on to show that a further (24%) favoured the option, but 8% 
of the ICT experts reiterated that they were neutral, while another 8% represented ICT 
experts who disagreed.  
 Question 5.1.10 – The degree of accessing information by an individual in an 
organisation should depend on the complexity of their role and its complexity  
The objective of this question was to assess from the expert opinion on whether an 
end-user’s job complexity should be a factor when determining access management. 
Figure 7.8 showcases the quantitative depiction, and then the summary sums it up. 
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Figure 7.8: Access control by business role complexity 
Forty eight per cent of the respondents favoured the idea strongly. A further 48% also 
agreed and only 4% disagreed, as highlighted in Figure 7.8.  
 Question 5.1.11 – For external stakeholders who need services from the back-
end office through various access channels available, what do you think is the 
best authentication method to be followed? 
In this question, the most appropriate authentication option for external end-users and 
stakeholders when accessing the system was the target to understand what ICT 
experts would recommend creating a high ISDD. The outcome is revealed in Figure 
7.9 and summarised thereafter. 
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Figure 7.9: Authentication for external users to back office 
As Figure 7.9 shows, the majority of the ICT experts (54%) viewed authentication 
through the front office only as the best method for external end-users because they 
felt anything more would prolong response time and productivity of end-users. Further 
on, authentication through all three offices, namely, front, middle and back end was 
second at 23%. Bypassing the front-end and middle offices straight to the back was 
opted as the third best option (15%), with middle to back-end offices being the least 
option (8%). 
 Question 5.1.17 – Which factors are the most applicable when information 
access matrix is planned in an organisation? 
In this question, the aim was to observe what ICT experts would cite as a particular 
order of factors that must be observed as top priority when deciding the access control 
matrix in order to create a high digital divide. Graphically, that is illustrated by Figure 
7.10. A further explanation of the findings to that effect is also included. 
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Figure 7.10: Factors that influence access control during planning 
According to Figure 7.10, respondents’ views indicated that business roles standout 
at 34%. Next, business responsibilities of an end-user are at 30%. 18% represented 
business functions, with the last 15% advocating for seniority. 
 Question 5.1.18 – Is access control management to information systems 
generally significant to business operations in your industry? 
The purpose of this question was to bring forth the significance of ISDD management 
in business operations in accordance with ICT experts’ industry of representation. 
Figure 7.11 represents the opinions of the ICT experts and is then followed by a 
summary. 
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Figure 7.11: Significance of ISDD 
According to ICT experts’ opinions in Figure 7.11, 55% of them agree that it is very 
significant to security, and 24% strongly agree to significance. On the contrary, some 
ICT experts indicated that they disagree with the notion of dividing end-users 
according to roles and responsibilities, and that business function is important to 
business operations. This group of respondents represented 14%. A further strong 
disagreement represented 7%. 
 Question 5.1.19 – Access channels recommended for external system end-
users 
This question was aimed at finding out what ICT experts’ thought were the most 
appropriete access channels for external end-users. Figure 7.12 is a portrayal of the 
response, and after that, a summary follows. 
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Figure 7.12: Access channels most applicable for external system end-users 
As indicated in Figure 7.12, the most favoured external access channel according to 
ICT experts was internet (44%), while 27% chose VPN. Further, 13% endorsed the 
traditional telephone, 10% face-to-face (F2F), and the least (6%) recognised Remote 
Desktop Protocol (RDP). 
 Question 5.1.21 – Which one of the listed options is the most appropriate to 
access the system internally by end-users? 
Observing how ICT experts preferred accessibility options that offered the highest 
possible ISDD enforcement on internal end-users when they intend to access the 
system internally was the idea behind this question. In Figure 7.13, the outcome is 
shown quantitatively, and then a summary of the results is given. 
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Figure 7.13: Access channels most applicable for internal system users 
According to Figure 7.13, the intranet was the most favourite access channel at 44%. 
This was followed by RDP at 21%, telephone at 15%, VPN 12%, and finally, F2F 
received the least at 8%. 
7.3.4. Security Policy 
For an organisation to have an information system that by default ensures high digital 
divide among its business roles, it is mandatory to have a security policy that governs 
standard practice and compliance. A security policy is the starting point of any security 
programme, but for it to be relevant, it needs enforcement by the organisation. The 
next question engages ICT experts on items around policies, standard practice, and 
compliance. 
 Question 5.1.20 – An organisation must have a clearly defined access control 
mechanism to its systems. Based on this statement, which of the following must 
be enforced to ensure a highly secure system? 
The purpose of this question was to understand the preferred order of ISDD factors 
that a security policy must highlight according to ICT experts. Figure 7.14 presents the 
graphical depiction of the outcome, supported by a summary after that. 
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Figure 7.14: Factors that must be enforced to promote a highly secure system 
From Figure 7.14, it is clear that security policy was the most prominent factor (43%) 
that must be enforced to promote a highly secure system, with standard security 
practice by end-users being the second most prominent (28%). Furthermore, security 
training and awareness ranked third (13%), while role-based access control (9%) and 
the use of a self-assessment tool to screen for computer and security skill sets (7%) 
were the least two factors. 
7.3.5. Enterprise Structure 
In this subsection, from a system benefit viewpoint, multiple opinions from ICT experts 
on the structure an organisation should take on including how the business roles and 
functions should be set up to facilitate a proper management of access control was 
the main aim. 
 Question 5.1.24 – For a standard enterprise, which business functions are 
mandatory between front-end office, middle office, and back-end office?  
This question was aimed at helping to consider the most common business function 
structure across organisations represented by ICT experts, hence generalising that to 
the framework. The choice of office setup makes it possible to improve the framework 
by understanding how the flow of information should be set up. Graphically, the 
illustration in Figure 7.15 presents results that are accompanied by a summary. 
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Figure 7.15: Business functions in an organisation 
It can be observed from Figure 7.15 that 52% of the ICT experts endorsed front office 
as a must-have. Further, 27% proposed that an enterprise must have a middle office 
to support both front- and back-end offices. Finally, 21% of the ICT experts were in 
support of always having a back-end office to back the front and middle offices. 
 Question 5.1.25 – Suggest business roles which must be considered when 
planning the ISDD framework  
This question was for the purpose of getting an indication from ICT experts concerning 
which business roles must be made part of the framework and in which order of 
preference, if any, when planning a comprehensive access control management 
design. 
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Figure 7.16: Vital business roles when designing ISDD 
ICT experts listed the IT department as a top priority when designing ISDD according 
to business roles. This was followed by both upper management and general staff, 
with lower management together with CEO being of least priority. 
 Question 5.27 – Suggest the most commonly used front-end applications from 
the list 
The question was designed to entice ICT experts to state according to the sector they 
represented, the most common front-end applications and how they are protected and 
availed according to business roles. Figure 7.17 graphically depicts that, and the 
summary follows. 
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Figure 7.17: Common front-end applications 
According to their sectors of representation, ICT experts thought the most common 
front-end application is customer facing front-end application (32%). Figure 7.17 
shows that this was followed by internal front-end applications (29%), enterprise front-
end applications (21%), and finally, engineering and development applications 
 Question 5.1.28 – In an enterprise, which one is the most common software 
that can also be consumed as a service? 
To better improve on the framework from a back-end application perspective, ICT 
experts were requested to identify the most consumed software as a service. A 
quantitative depiction in Figure 7.18 reveals the outcome, and this is followed by a 
summary. 
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Figure 7.18: Software consumed as a service 
The most favoured software was Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). This was 
followed by Enterprise Integration Bus, and Enterprise Service Bus was the least 
favoured. 
 Question 5.1.29 – In your opinion, generally how applicable is the core and 
context of this framework to your area of expertise and sector? 
According to their areas of expertise and the sector they represented, the purpose of 
this question was to weigh the applicability of the ISDD framework. 
 
Figure 7.19: Appropriateness of ISDD to ICT expert sectors of representation 
Of the twenty-five ICT experts, ten (40%) commended the framework because it was 
applicable to their sector and area of expertise, as brought out in Figure 7.19. Six 
(24%) ICT experts indicated that the framework was fairly applicable, and four (16%) 
said it was moderately applicable. Five (20%) leaned towards the framework being 
slightly applicable, and two of the ICT experts (8%) were of the idea it was not 
appropriate to their expertise and the sector they represented.  
In this subsection, analysis and interpretation of data from ICT experts was the aim. 
The next section will focus on the pointers intended to be used for the improvement of 
the proposed framework. 
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7.4. Results Summary 
In this section, the outcome of the survey is summarised so as to capture aspects 
aimed at improving the framework. The survey result is summarised in Table 7.1. As 
can be observed from the table, a number of improvement recommendations were 
noted as mandatory to accommodate the views expressed by ICT experts. The areas 
that follow were factored as important. 
7.4.1. Generalisation of Access Mode by External Stakeholders 
This access channel was represented by arrow 1 in Figure 4.6, renamed from Web 
portal to internet in order to generalise the access mode to any other that may fall 
under internet. 
7.4.2. More Business Role in Middle Management 
Additional business roles were included in middle management in the framework to 
cover a wider spectrum of end-users within an organisation. 
7.4.3. More Business Roles in Upper Management 
More business roles in upper management were also incorporated in the framework 
to ensure more management involvement in IT management and support. 
7.4.4. Clarification of Business Roles 
Business roles were clearly defined and organised according to complexity. This was 
made possible by having a comprehensively organised organisational structure that is 
precise so as to guide system access configuration. 
7.4.5. External End-user Authentication 
External stakeholders should only be authenticated at front-end office and nothing 
more to improve access response time. Otherwise, it might frustrate them because of 
a prolonged procedure before authentication. 
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7.4.6. Additional Business Roles  
It would be ideal to incorporate an additional business role (middle management) 
between upper and middle management in order to complete a general outlook of 
business roles. 
7.4.7. An ISDD-specific Security Policy in Low-Level Language 
An information security policy that is written in low-level language that is easy for end-
users to understand and work with, and also specific policies that zoom in on issues 
that support ISDD is necessary. Such policies may include a strict password policy 
that strictly enforces strong passwords, ones that change over time and making it clear 
sharing of passwords is a punishable offence. 
7.4.8. Business Function Regulation  
Business functions from both a physical access and system performance perspective 
need to be regulated according to business roles and their complexity. 
7.4.9. Internal Business Roles Activation to Use External Access Channels 
Internal business roles should also be allowed to use external user access channels 
given circumstances where their access devices, e.g. laptops, are unavailable or 
unable to work using their routine options. 
7.4.10. Include Intranet as Access Channel for Internal End-users 
It is advisable to add intranet as a primary access channel for internal end-users as 
depicted by arrow 3 in Figure 4.6. Nevertheless, there should be other access 
channels such as RDP or VPN as secondary for eventualities involving linking to other 
organisational departments or sites when normal channels are down. 
This section suggested a couple of improvement recommendations based on ICT 
experts’ responses observed as mandatory to making the framework of this study 
extensively consensual and further its enhancement and performance. Table 7.1 
presents areas of concern as raised in survey responses concerning framework 
properties in relation to ISDD critical success factors.
  
179 
 
7.4.11. Results and Contributing Questions to Improvement of Framework 
Table 7.1: Framework properties and expert contributing questions matrix 
  Population 
& 
Demography 
Security 
Awareness & 
Training 
Security Policy 
Standard 
Practice & 
compliance 
Information Flow 
(Organizational 
structure) 
IT Systems 
& 
Security 
Computer 
Literacy 
Access 
Control 
Value of IS to 
organizations 
Q 5.1.1  X        
Q 5.1.2  X        
Q 5.1.3  X        
Q 5.1.4         X 
Q 5.1.5         X 
Q 5.1.6    X     X 
Q 5.1.7        X  
Q 5.1.8        X  
Q 5.1.9     X     
Q 5.1.10        X  
Q 5.1.11        X  
Q 5.1.12        X  
Q 5.1.13        X  
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Q 5.1.14        X  
Q 5.1.15        X  
Q 5.1.16        X  
Q 5.1.17        X  
Q 5.1.18        X  
Q 5.1.19    X    X  
Q 5.1.20   X X X X X X  
Q 5.1.21        X  
Q 5.1.22        X  
Q 5.1.23        X  
Q 5.1.24     X     
Q 5.1.25     X     
Q 5.1.26     X     
Q 5.1.27       X   
Q 5.1.28       X   
Q 5.1.29         X 
Q 5.1.30       X   
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In this section, areas of improvement based on expert survey outcome were presented. The next section takes those expert 
recommendations raised and incorporates them into the initial proposed framework to produce the final ISDD framework. 
7.5. Improved Information Security Digital Divide Framework  
In light of the improvement recommendations made by ICT experts in Section 7.4 on the areas of concentration and what can be 
altered to improve the quality of the framework, the final information security digital divide framework (ISDDF) depicted in figure 7.20 
will now be presented. 
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Figure 7.20: Final ISDD framework 
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7.5.1. Improvement from Previous Framework as Value Thereof  
The improved version as opposed to the initial one is more security and ISDD-centric 
through emphasis, amongst others, on: 
 A wider coverage of end-user spectrum to ensure ISDD is strongly enforced all 
across the entire organisation 
 A high concentration and control of the organisational structure, which is the 
basis of a strong and comprehensive access control management design 
 Carefully streamlined business roles to align them to the appropriate business 
functions system-wise and also creating improved access modes for both 
internal and external end-users and stakeholders. Furthermore, a physical 
access control plan that regulates all end-user effectively according to their 
work scope 
 Access channels are revised, changed and improved on to add a wider access 
opportunity for both internal and external end-users and stakeholders, which 
improves access efficiency while at the same time preserving a high ISDD 
 A security policy template which is proposed to be efficiently written in a tone 
that makes it easy for end-users to apply it as a guideline while at the same 
time emphasising on how enforcement of policies by custodians must be firm  
7.5.2. Usage of the Framework in Real-life Context 
The importance of this framework is that it is a self-assessment tool that can be used 
by organisations to measure the level of ISDD and furthermore be relied upon to 
improve on what is noted as inappropriate. Organisations can use the framework by 
comparing their ISDD compliance against a checklist of metrics and core factors 
presented by the framework. At the end of compiling checklist scores, an organisation 
is able to know its level of ISDD compliance and accompanying recommendations to 
improve on the shortcomings identified. 
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7.5.2.1. Step-by-Step Process to Measure Capability Maturity 
This framework was curved on the concept of perfectly combining people, process, 
and technology to minimise security risk and threats. As such, capability maturity was 
measured using the structure of Salaski (2013) as follows: 
 Step 1: Identify ISDD capabilities to be assessed – These capabilities are 
covered in Section 6.1 to 6.10, and the processes are summarised in Table 
6.11. 
 Step 2: Create a unit of measure – Every capability table covered in Section 
6.1 to 6.10 used different score scales ranging from 1 to 2.5 per metric question. 
The total score or rating per category was equal to 10. 
 Step 3: Identify who to add in the assessment – A wide range of end-users and 
stakeholders whose business roles require them to mostly interact with the 
system were selected. 
 Step 4: Perform the assessment – An assessment was performed by way of a 
range of questionnaires issued to mostly impacted system end-users who were 
selected carefully. This was covered in Chapter 6. In some cases, the 
assessment took some form of interviews with structured questions to make 
inferences on certain aspects of ISDD not obtainable by end-user 
questionnaires. Furthermore, observation was also resorted to so as to weigh 
ISDD applicability. 
 Step 5: Report the results – Combined rating in Table 6.11 and assessment 
rating in Table 6.12 presented the results. 
7.5.2.2. Continuous Improvement  
Continuous improvement involves ensuring that key performance indicators continue 
to improve over time. In this framework, all factors presented in Table 4.3 are key 
performance indicators that are summarised in Table 6.1 to 6.10. The measurement 
of continuous improvement in this framework follows the Plan-Do-Check-Act tool 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2 whereby: 
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 Planning involves identifying all key change processes involved in sustaining 
factors presented in Table 6.1 to 6.10 and planning for potential change. 
 Do means implementing the change to the process identified in Table 6.1 to 
6.10 in moderation. 
 Check has to do with monitoring in order to observe the performance of the 
change after application in the previous stage. 
 Act concerns actioning lessons learnt in all processes undergone from Table 
6.1 to 6.10 and making corrections where set targets did not happen as 
planned. 
7.6. Conclusion 
The objective in this chapter was to analyse data collected from ICT experts from 
different sectors and occupations within the ICT space. The idea was to interpret 
results so as to identify recommendations which would provide additional value to the 
proposed framework. The summary of the survey result was used to improve on the 
initial proposed framework. Additionally, usage of the framework in real-life context 
was presented, including how capability maturity is measured alongside continuous 
improvement.  
The chapter that follows will provide a conclusion and recommendations of this study. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
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8.1. Introduction 
The main objective of this study was to develop a self-assesment tool which 
organisations can rely on to measure ISDD capability maturity. The tool provided as a 
framework would be dependent upon for benchmarking ISDD in organisations and use 
such a benchmark for future improvements. This was achieved by first reviewing 
literature on information security and its role in business operations, followed by a 
contextualisation of ISDD and a presentation of its critical success factors. The 
foregoing provided a reasonable ground for the suggestion of a theoretical framework 
based on principles of COBIT. To assess the relevance of the framework for this study 
at organisation level, suitable data was collected from selected stakeholders and 
analysed with conclusions drawn in order to assess the relevance of this study’s 
framework and also explore avenues for its improvement.  
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise this study in order to demonstrate how 
the objectives set out in Chapter 1 were achieved. It also provides a range of future 
works that are deemed necessary to pursue in order to enrich the literature on ISDD.  
This chapter begins with research findings in Section 8.2, followed by a summary of 
this study in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 then explores future works, and then Section 8.5 
concludes the study. 
8.2. Research Findings 
The findings revealed in this study follow. They are primarily applicable to participating 
organisations. However, they can be extrapolated to the overall body of knowledge on 
organisational structure, information security digital divide, and ISDD Capability 
Maturity Assessment. The findings are as follows: 
1. Organisations must be structured in a specific order that by default 
complements system access control and strive for a mature ISDD. 
Preferably, organisations must be structured into upper-middle-lower 
management in order to take advantage of the concept of ISDD.  
2. In the same alley as the previous findings, systems need to be architected 
in a manner that is aligned to the overall concept of front-end office, middle 
office, and back-end office. This enables them to efficiently and effectively 
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manage ISDD in a segregated manner and view information security in a 
decoupled manner in order to minimise vulnerability and at the same time 
be able to identify flaws whenever they arise and, in turn, take remedial 
action flawlessly. 
3. ISDD is important in all organisations that make use of information systems 
for business operations. While digital divide is perceived as bad in the 
context of information communication technology for development (ICT4D), 
it was demonstrated throughout the study that ISDD is good for 
organisations to safeguard corporate data. 
4. A variety of existing IT frameworks in literature such as COBIT can be 
exploited to build new frameworks in various aspects of ICT at 
organisational level for the purpose of continuously improving on 
challenging ICT aspects of the organisation. 
5. Allocating ISDD capability maturity levels from 1 to 5 and defining them with 
key assessment criteria appears to be a key contribution to this study in the 
sense that it can be used in a real-life context to measure ISDD maturity 
level assessment and therefore continuously improve on security 
challenges at organisation level. 
6. Organisations can use the ISDD framework for self-assessment and 
continuous ISDD improvement. Furthermore, such a tool can be used as a 
governance and best practice tool for continuous improvement.  
7. Organisations can make use of the ISDD framework tool to conduct 
independent auditing for IT compliance.  
8. The main and final finding in this study was the developed framework 
consensually improved by the contribution of information ICT experts. 
8.3. Research Summary  
This study was initiated to equip organisations with a valuable governance tool aimed 
at not only determining their current status with regard to ISDD but also to rely on such 
evaluation to constantly improve on information security-related shortcomings in the 
organisation, thus resulting in graduation to the next maturity level. The main objective 
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as depicted in Chapter 1 was to develop, experiment, and evaluate an ISDD 
framework for maturity assessment at organisation level. A range of sub-objectives 
were identified to which appropriate research questions were aligned so as to 
collectively achieve the main objective. In the subsections that follow, each of the sub-
objectives (and therefore research question) will be revisited, and they will briefly be 
expanded on how they were achieved in this study. 
8.3.1. Sub-objectives 
The sub-objectives of this study were as follows: 
 Sub-objective 1 
Investigate the state of the art with regard to theory and practise of information security 
in organisations: The intention in this objective was to thoroughly investigate 
theoretical and practical management aspects followed by some of the best 
performing security systems in organisations. Based on that observation, the aim was 
to replicate their approach in order to identify best techniques applicable and befitting 
this study. This sub-objective was attained earlier in literature review in Chapter 2, 
whereby, the general composition of an enterprise and information systems were 
thoroughly investigated.The outcome then steered this study to identifying critical 
success factors suitable for guiding the study to produce further consolidated CSF for 
ISDD in Chapter 3. 
 Sub-objective 2  
Understand the theory of digital divide and its contextualisation to information security: 
This sub-objective defined what digital divide was and how it combined with 
information security to conceive the core concept of ISDD. In chapter 2, this sub-
objective was achieved by means of the following: theory on organisational information 
flow and structure was studied in detail. Then mostly in Chapter 3, the generic concept 
of digital divide (DD) from an ICT4D perspective was exploited and aligned to 
information security as well as information flow in an organisation to provide a 
contextual definition of ISDD that promote the segregation of information access at 
enterprise level. The foregoing culminated in the description of CSF for ISDD that 
  
190 
 
formed the basis for the definition of ISDD core metrics used for obtaining maturity 
assessment. 
 Sub-objective 3  
Develop and validate a conceptual framework for assessing ISSD in organisations: In 
this sub-objective, the intention was, based on literature review, suggest a theoretic 
ISDD framework and then set the context for validating it and finally testing it in a real-
world scenario. Practically this was the main contribution of this research. Achieving 
this objective spanned across four chapters: to begin with, relying on COBIT as the 
base framework, the ISDD conceptual framework was developed in Chapter 4. This 
was followed by the exploitation and evaluation of parts covered in Chapter 5 on data 
collection approaches for application of the framework in a real-life context and its 
validation by ICT experts. In Chapter 6, the framework developed was subjected to a 
case study in three case organisations which revealed the current ISDD maturity of 
each participating organisation and also demonstrated the relevance of this study’s 
framework. Finally, by means of Chapter 7, evaluation of the developed framework by 
ICT experts ensued, resulting in an improved version of the initial framework. 
8.4. Future Work 
This research formed the basis for the maturity assessment of ISDD in organisations. 
As a matter of future work, listed below is a range of research of varying degree of 
complexity which can be conducted in order to contribute not only to the body of 
knowledge but also to the specialised field of information security.  
 Framework automation:  A plausible next step of this research would be the 
conversion of the suggested framework into an automated system. Such a 
system can be regarded as a capability maturity measurement tool which can 
be relied upon by ICT experts to benchmark ISDD and generate appropriate 
reports.  
 Framework expansion: This study relied on COBIT to produce its final 
product; however, there are other IT governance frameworks which can also be 
considered to produce similar results. Such frameworks may include 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), the business process 
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framework (eTOM), and ISO/IEC 27001, which is a family of standards that can 
be trusted to secure system assets. As such, the proposed framework of this 
study could be expanded to produce a more comprehensive framework 
consisting of more CSFs that can be relied upon for the derivation of 
appropriate metrics. The combination of those metrics will contribute to 
enriching the definition of maturity level for more complex and accurate 
assessment and decision-making. 
 Framework specialisation: This study only relied on organisations structured 
in terms of lower-middle-upper management. However, not all organisations 
may be organised in that format. It would be interesting to conduct a similar 
study on larger organisations that may not conform to such an organisational 
structure.  
 Localisation of the framework: This study only targeted organisations based 
in Namibia. It would be interesting to observe how its applicability would fare in 
a different country. It would be worthwhile to perform a comparison on how 
effective the framework is on organisations with sufficient resources as 
opposed to small organisations experiencing budget constraints. 
 Framework replication: While this work may have solely focused on ISDD, 
the same framework can be developed in other aspects that are not necessarily 
in the IT governance space, e.g. quality assurance, banking, and any other 
fields that can conform.  
 Doing the same work but in unrepresented sectors: This framework was 
tested in a real-life context in only the following sectors: government, non-profit, 
and IT. It would be interesting to investigate the relevance of the same 
framework in other sectors such as banking, telecommunications, and logistics. 
8.5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this research was to produce a self assesment tool suitable for 
organisations to use as a benchmark when measuring information security digital 
divide maturity. This would indicate to an organisation the safety of their information 
system, and further offer countermeasures to close security gaps identified. This was 
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achieved by combining Information Security and Digital Divide to conceptualise the 
idea of Information Security Digital Divide (ISDD). This further culminated into a 
framework called Information Security Digital Divide Maturity Framework (ISDDMF). 
To develop the metrics for ISDDMF, COBIT IT Governance was used as a baseline 
framework, which resulted in the defining of a 5-level Capability Maturity Framework 
which can be used in the assessment of ISDD capability maturity. To ensure that all 
aspects of information security were considered in the design of ISDDMF, the Plan-
Do-Check-Act (PDCA) life cycle approach was adapted. To empirically validate 
ISDDMF, a survey study, using questionnaire, interview, observation and document 
review as instruments was conducted. End-user staff from three organizations, and a 
number of ICT experts were respondents. The proposed framework which was also 
tested in a real world context constitutes a significance contribution in providing a tool 
for management of business organizations for continued monitoring of their capability 
to address information security threats to which they could be vulnerable, towards 
continuous capability improvement. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Ethical Clearance Form 
ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPLICATION FORM 
Please Note That The Form Must Be Completed In Typed Script. Handwritten Applications Will Not Be 
Considered. 
SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS      
1 Details of Applicant 
1.1 Full Name and Surname: Emmanuel Chisanga 
1.2 Title (Ms/ Mr/ Mrs/ Dr/ Professor/etc.): 
1.3 Student Number (where applicable):48123412 
 Staff Number (where applicable): 
1.4 School: Computing 
1.5 College:Science,Engineering & Technology 
1.6 Campus: Florida Park,Roodepoort 
1.7 Existing Qualifications: Bachelor’s Honours degree Business Informatics 
1.8 Proposed Qualification for Project: Master of Science - Computing 
 (In the case of research of degree purposes) 
2. Contact Details  
 Telephone Number  +264.81.23.41.305  
 Cell. Number    +264.81.23.41.305 
 e-Mail     :48123412@mylife.unisa.ac.za 
Postal address (in the case of students and external applicants) 
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P. O. Box 20238, Windhoek, Namibia. Postal code 9000 
               
3. SUPERVISOR/ PROJECT LEADER DETAILS  
NAME 
TELEPHONE 
NO. 
EMAIL 
SCHOOL / 
INSTITUTIO
N 
QUALIFICATIO
NS 
3.1 Prof. Ernest 
Ngassam 
+2782355251
9 
eketcha@gmail.co
m 
UNISA Professor 
3.2      
3.3      
 
SECTION 2: PROJECT DESCRIPTION      
Please do not provide your full research proposal here: what is required is a short project description of not more 
than two pages that gives, under the following headings, a brief overview spelling out the background to the study, 
the key questions to be addressed, the participants (or subjects) and research site, including a full description of 
the sample, and the research approach/ methods  
 
2.1 Project title : Towards a conceptual Framework For Benchmarking Information Security Digital 
Divide 
 
Background 
The motivation for this research was driven by first-hand experience on the devastating impact 
information security breach may inflict on organisations. During years of IT experience, there was 
an observation that most organisations do not institute methods to demarcate corporate data 
access and use according to its relevance. Thus, in this research, critical success factors which will 
be vital in creating a security capability maturity model called information security digital divide 
maturity Framework (ISDDMF) have been identified. This proposed model strives to divide end-
users, business partners, and other stakeholders into “specific information haves and have-nots”, 
digitally. The idea is to carve out a model that helps organisations to appraise their information 
security and based on the outcome help them to tailor-design a security architecture that only avails 
information to individuals on the basis of their functionality, roles and responsibilities in accordance 
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with the organisational structure while at the same time enforcing the traditional security standpoint 
of maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of corporate data. 
Key questions  
How can we develop a framework for assessing the maturity of ISSD in organizations for further 
improvements? 
Sub-questions 
 What are the current information security organizational practices and how is success 
measured in such context?? 
 How can the concept of digital divide be leveraged positively in the context of information 
security at organization level?  
 How can a framework for assessing ISDD be developed and validated in a real-world 
context?    
Participants (or subjects) and research site 
Participants will be mostly selected strategic employees in case organisations such as the HR, IT 
manager, CIO, data entry clerk including external professionals independent from these 
organisations but ICT experts in the industry. The research sites will be mostly the IT departments 
and applicable relevant personnel to this study. 
Full description of sample 
Chapter 6 of this study will involve testing the developed framework in the real-world context by 
performing three case studies at the following target organisations in three vital sectors: 
 Government sector (Laboratory) 
 Information Communication and Technology sector (ICT) 
 None Profit Making (Humanitarian) 
 
In each organisation, certain metrics of ISDD are benchmarked as follows:  
1. Government sector (Laboratory). How are the different departments, personnel, etc. 
allocated rights, e.g. towards results to diagnosis of animals that die mysteriously as 
brought in by farmers and outbreak of any animal disease) 
 
2. ICT sector (Standard practice and permission levels among IT professionals when 
addressing resources, e.g. Can an IT professional requested to correct an e-mail failure 
on the CEO’s laptop view sensitive data or manipulate it when they log on to that machine 
using their account?) 
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3. Non Profit Making – Humanitarian – How information access is handled on and off the field 
 
Data collection  
For each of the identified case study organisations above, there will be structured questionnaires 
and interviews towards selected personnel relevant to the research, e.g. IT manager, HR, system 
administrators, and data entry clerks. Also, random IT professionals who are not part of the 
organisations will be consulted through structured interview questionnaires for the purpose of 
improving the framework. Review of documents such as IT security policy will be used as well as 
observation. 
 
SECTION 3: ETHICAL ISSUES      
The UNISA Ethics Policy1 applies to all members of staff, graduate and undergraduate students who are 
involved in research on or off the campuses of UNISA. In addition, any person not affiliated with UNISA 
who wishes to conduct research with UNISA students and/or staff is bound by the same ethics framework. 
Each member of the University community is responsible for implementing this Policy in relation to 
scholarly work with which she or he is associated and to avoid any activity which might be considered to 
be in violation of this Policy. 
All students and members of staff must familiarise themselves with AND sign an undertaking to comply 
with the University’s “Code of Conduct for Research” (the policy can be accessed at the following URL: 
http://cm.unisa.ac.za/contents/departments/res_policies/docs/ResearchEthicsPolicy_apprvCounc_21Se
pt07.pdf) 
                                            
1
 The URL for this is: 
http://cm.unisa.ac.za/contents/departments/res_policies/docs/ResearchEthicsPolicy_apprvCounc_2
1Sept07.pdf  
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SECTION 4: FORMALISATION OF THE APPLICATION  
APPLICANT  Chisanga Emmanuel 
 
I Chisanga Emmanuel have familiarised myself with the UNISA Ethics policy, the form completed and 
undertake to comply with it. I hereby declare the following with regard to my research project: 
(1) No human participants are involved in my research project; 
(2) No animals are involved in my research project; 
(3) No personal data stored in any way is used for this project; 
(4) No materials harmful to humans are in any way used in this project; 
(5) No external parties or organisations are involved in this project; 
(6) No external resources are needed for the project for which permission needs to be sought 
from any parties; 
(7) The research is not supported by funding that is likely to inform or impact in any way on the 
design, outcome, and dissemination of the research. 
 
The information supplied above is correct to the best of my knowledge. I have read the policy for 
research ethics of UNISA, and the contents of my application as presented to the CREC of CSET is a 
true and accurate reflection of the methodological and ethical implications of my proposed study. I shall 
carry out the study in strict accordance with the approved proposal and the ethics policy of Unisa. I 
shall maintain the confidentiality of all data collected from or about research participants, and maintain 
security procedures for the protection of privacy. I shall record the way in which the ethical guidelines 
as suggested in the proposal has been implemented in my research. I shall notify URERC in writing 
immediately if any change to the study is proposed or if any adverse event occurs or when injury or 
harm is experienced by the participants attributable to their participation in the study. 
NB: PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE ATTACHED CHECK SHEET IS COMPLETED  
SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ……… …………… DATE …26-01-2016…..                   
 
SUPERVISOR/DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL 
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NB: PLEASE ENSURE THAT THE APPLICANT HAS COMPLETED THE ATTACHED CHECK SHEET 
AND THAT THE FORM IS FORWARDED TO YOUR COLLEGE RESEARCH COMMITTEE FOR 
FURTHER ATTENTION 
 
DATE: …10-02-2016…………………. 
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR/ PROJECT LEADER :___  ___ 
 
RECOMMENDATION OF COLLEGE RESEARCH AND ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
RECOMMENDATION OF SENATE RESEARCH AND ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
 
NAME OF CHAIRPERSON:_________________________SIGNATURE_____________________  
 
DATE...……………………………………… 
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UNISA 
CSET – CREC 
 
ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPLICATION FORM 
CHECK SHEET FOR APPLICATION 
                  
PLEASE TICK () 
1. Form has been fully completed and all questions have been answered   
2. Signature of Supervisor / project leader   
3. Application forwarded to College Research Committee for recommendation  
 
APPLICATION: UNISA ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE 
GENERAL GUIDELINES 
Two copies each in English of the following must be submitted to the ERC:  
(i)  Complete research proposal. The proposal which is submitted for scientific or  
      technical review must be the same as that submitted for ethics review.  
(ii)  Completed application for review form.  
(iii)  Proposal summary sheet.  
(iv)  Documents related to the proposal. 
 
APPLICATION (as per 10.2) 
(i) Researchers’ names, affiliations, addresses and contact numbers.  
(ii) Organisation(s) or institution(s) involved in the study.  
(iii) Sponsors or funders.  
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(iv) Other pertinent information such a conflict of interests. There is conflict of 
interest when the researcher has an interest in the research that may jeopardise 
his/her ability to undertake the research in a scientific and ethical manner. 
PROPOSAL SUMMARY SHEET (as per 10.3) 
(i) Title of the proposal. 
(ii) List and definitions of acronyms and abbreviations. 
(iii) Name(s) of principal investigator(s)/researcher(s). If this is a student, a letter of 
confirmation from Unisa must be included.  
(iv) Names and addresses of all sponsor(s) or funder(s). 
(v) Abstract of the proposal in nontechnical language.  
(vi) Research objectives. 
(vii) Anticipated outcomes. 
(viii) Inclusion or exclusion criteria (if applicable). 
(ix) Withdrawal or discontinuation criteria (if applicable). 
(x) Methodology or research design. 
(xi) Activity plan or timeline. 
(xii) Safety procedures and criteria (if applicable). 
(xiii) Description of procedure of reporting to Unisa Research Ethics Review 
Committee 
(xiv) Description of how participants will be informed of the findings or results and 
consulted on potential or actual benefits of such findings or results to them and
 others. 
(xv) Description of the risks of the procedures which participants may/will suffer (e.g. 
no 
risk, discomfort, pain, stigmatisation, negative labelling/other potential risks) as 
well as the level of risk (as per paragraph 10.10).  
 
Paragraph 10.10 stipulates the following: 
10.10.1  It is the duty of reviewers to identify whether or not the research will 
involve vulnerable persons or groups and to ensure that adequate 
protective measures are provided for.  
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10.10.2 Special attention should be given to evaluating the risks of participants 
in relation to benefits. 
  
10.10.3 Research can be classified on the basis of the degree of risk: 
‘Category 1’ Research involving negligible or minimal risk  
‘Category 2’ Research involving greater than minimal risk but 
presenting the prospect of direct benefit to participants 
‘Category 3’ Research involving a minor increase in minimum risk and 
presenting no prospect of direct benefit to participants 
 
‘Category 4’ Research that does not fit the above categories  
 
10.10.4  While all research involving human subjects should be approved by 
an ERC and subjected to scrutiny, research involving reviews of 
administrative records which contain names of people may require a 
lower level of scrutiny, while research involving solely aggregated data 
and literature reviews needs the lowest scrutiny (if any). 
 
PROPOSAL-RELATED DOCUMENTS (as per 10.4) 
(i) Participant information sheet (if applicable). 
(ii) Description of the process for obtaining informed consent.  
(iii) Informed consent form in English and in the language of the potential 
participants. 
The language should be understandable to a lay person.  
(iv) Description and/or amounts of compensation including reimbursements, gifts  
or services to be provided to participants (if applicable). 
(v) Description for arrangement for indemnity (if applicable.)  
(vi) Description of any financial costs to participants (if applicable).  
(vii) Description of provision of insurance coverage to participants (if applicable).  
(viii) Description of steps to be undertaken in case of adverse event or when injury 
or 
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harm is experienced by the participants attributable to their participation in the 
study.  
(ix) Statement agreeing to comply with ethical principles set out in the Unisa Policy 
on 
Research Ethics. 
 
Applicant’s statement agreeing to comply with ethical principles set out in the 
Unisa policy on research ethics: 
 
I …Chisanga Emmanuel.... (Full names of applicant) declare that I have read 
the Policy on Research Ethics of Unisa and that the contents of my application 
as presented to URERC are a true and accurate reflection of the methodological 
and ethical implications of my proposed study. I shall carry out the study in strict 
accordance with the approved proposal and the Research Ethics Policy of 
Unisa. I shall maintain the confidentiality of all data collected from or about 
research participants, and maintain security procedures for the protection of 
privacy. I shall record the way in which the ethical guidelines as suggested in 
the proposal has been implemented in my research. I shall notify URERC in 
writing immediately if any change to the study is proposed or if any adverse 
event occurs or when injury or harm is experienced by the participants 
attributable to their participation in the study. 
 
. ...........................................................................................................   
(Signature)................01-01-2016..........................................................................    
(Date) 
(x) Disclosure of any previous ethics review action by other ethics review 
bodies (if applicable). 
(xi) Research instruments such as questionnaires, interview guides and similar  
documents. (Indicate the language that will be used for questionnaires and 
interview guides. Where this is different from the language of the intended 
research participants/respondents, provide details on translation). 
(xii) Research budget. 
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(xiii) Project agreement (e.g. MOA). 
(xiv) CVs of principal investigators 
(xv) Letter(s) of permission from relevant bodies. (If the research study involves  
collaborative, multi-institutional or multi-country research, this must be explained in 
detail. See in this regard, paragraph 6 of the Unisa Policy on Research 
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Appendix C – Questionnaires 
IS Expert Questions 
5. Information Security Management 
The main objective of this section is to assess the quality of information security digital 
divide (ISDD) framework by engaging with information ICT experts in the industry. The 
outcome of the analysis of these questions will help us define a broadly consensual 
framework for ISDD. 
Section1: Demography 
5.1.1 Which sector or industry do you represent? 
Government           Banking             Information, Communication and Technology         
Manufacturing          Not    for Gain          Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
5.1.2 Please inform us on years of experience in ICT and/or information security 
Less than 2           2-3          3-5           5-10            More than 10  
5.1.3 Please indicate your occupation in the industry [tick off option] 
Software developer         System Analyst          Chief Information security Officer             
IT manager            Chief Information officer           IT consultant  
System administrator           Other, specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Section 2 – Importance of Information Security to an Organisation 
5.1.4 On a scale of 1 - 5, how critical is information security to the operations of an 
organisation? 1. Not critical           2. Slightly             3. Fairly              4.Critical 
5. Very critical 
5.1.5 The use of a security model in an organisation is mandatory?  
Strongly disagree          Disagree             Agree           
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Neutral             Strongly Agree  
5.1.6 Which of the listed options below are the most influential when managing 
information security? [You can select more than one option] 
A clearly outlined security policy          Management support         
A budget for IT            An IT department with highly skilled staff       
Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Section 3 – Information System Access Management  
Please provide your assessment with the following statements and questions 
concerning access to information within an organisation.  
5.1.7 The flow of information plays an important role in designing access control to 
information systems 
Strongly disagree               Disagree                       Agree           
Neutral                   Strongly Agree  
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5.1.8 The flow of reporting structures in an organisation must form part of the basis on 
which access control to systems should be designed 
Strongly disagree                 Disagree                      Agree           
Neutral                     Strongly Agree  
5.1.9 The structure of the organisation ought to be considered when assigning 
credentials to end-users 
Strongly disagree                  Disagree                     Agree           
Neutral                     Strongly Agree  
5.1.10 The degree of accessing information in an organisation depends on your role 
and its complexity 
Strongly disagree                  Disagree                   Agree           
Neutral                      Strongly Agree  
5.1.11 For external stakeholders who need services from the back-end office, through 
various access channels available, what do you think is the best authentication method 
to be followed? 
Through front-office only         Through Front, Middle and Back-end offices  
Through Middle and Back-end offices        Directly through to the Backend             All 
the above-listed options    Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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5.1.12 Information Systems in an organisation should be accessed based on business 
roles  
Strongly disagree                     Disagree                          Agree          
 Neutral                      Strongly Agree  
5.1.13 Personnel responsibilities must also be strongly considered when deciding 
access levels to an Information System  
Strongly disagree                      Disagree                          Agree          
 Neutral                       Strongly Agree  
5.1.14 Should information systems in an organisation be accessed based on 
experience? 
Strongly disagree                        Disagree                      Agree          
 Neutral                        Strongly Agree  
5.1.15 The more you are senior in an organisation, the more wide is your degree for 
accessing information 
Strongly disagree                         Disagree                   Agree          
 Neutral                      Strongly Agree  
5.1.16 The more you are junior in an organisation, the more you are prevented from 
accessing information 
Strongly disagree                          Disagree                       Agree          
Neutral                    Strongly Agree  
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5.1.17 Which of the options listed below are relevant when determining the ability of 
an individual to access information resources among employees in an organisation? 
Roles       Responsibilities              Business function       Position      Seniority      
Experience       Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.1.18 Is access control to Information Systems generally significant to business 
operations in your industry? 
Strongly disagree          Disagree         Agree            Strongly Agree  
5.1.19 For external end-users such as partners, suppliers, customers and other 
stakeholder that require access to a system mostly from outside, suggest which 
options are the most viable for accessing the system [Select all that apply] 
Internet                Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)           Telephone       
 Face-to-face (F2F)      VPN    Others, specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Section 4 – Policy Formation, Standard Practice and Compliance 
5.1.20 An organisation must have a clearly defined access control mechanism to its 
systems. Based on this statement, which of the following must be enforced to that 
effect?  
Standard security practice           Enforce policy & regulation         
Role-based access control according to Hierarchy             Security Training & 
Awareness      Employee Self-assessment tool       Other, please specify 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
5.1.21 For internal Information System end-users or stakeholders, which of the access 
options below do you suggest are applicable? [Select all that apply] 
Intranet               Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)                   Telephone         Face-
to-face (F2F)                VPN      Other, specify 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5.1.22 Which security measures do you think are the most appropriate when 
accessing the system through the channels indicated below? [Tick the options] 
 Security methods 
Access 
channel 
 
Authentication 
 
Encryption 
Antivirus 
Software 
Access 
Card 
 
Firewall 
Policy & 
Regulation 
VPN       
Intranet       
Internet       
Telephone       
RDP       
F2F       
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Other, specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.1.23 A system should be able to temporarily allow the work scope of a business role 
such as a middle manager or general staff to be upscaled or downscaled in an event 
where they require to perform a duty below or above their work scope? 
Strongly disagree                          Disagree                  Agree          
 Neutral                      Strongly Agree  
Section 5 – Structure of an Organisation and Flow of Information 
5.1.24 For a standard enterprise, the structure of the business function should 
compose of? [Tick off options] 
Front-end office                    Middle office              Back-end office        
Other, specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.1.25 Suggest business roles which must be considered when planning ISDD 
management in an enterprise 
CEO              Upper management         Lower management         General staff      
IT support       Other, specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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5.1.26 Authentication to the system must be determined according to the business 
function end-user reports into and/or which parts of the system they wish to get a 
service from 
Strongly disagree                    Disagree                           Agree          
 Neutral                       Strongly Agree  
5.1.27 Suggest the most commonly used front-end applications from the list below  
Internal front-end applications            Customer facing front-end applications         
Enterprise front-end applications         Engineering and development applications  
Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………..…………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..   
5.1.28 From the list below, mark the most common software consumed as a service 
in your sector? 
Enterprise resource planning (ERP)           Enterprise Service Bus (ESB)   
Enterprise Integrated Bus (EIB)       Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.1.29 On a scale of 1 – 5, how applicable is the core and context of this framework to 
your organisational environment? 
1. Not applicable            2.  Slightly                  3. Moderately                      4. 
Fairly                  5. Very applicable  
5.1.30 Access to an Information System must be audited as a requirement to track 
and counteract security breach  
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Strongly disagree                  Disagree                            Agree          
 Neutral                    Strongly Agree  
System End-user and other Stakeholders Questionnaire 
ISDD General Staff Questionnaire 
The purpose of this section is to assess the information security digital divide (ISDD) 
level of an organisation. To do so, we will identify a range of Information System end-
users and stakeholders both internal and external 
5.2 Information security digital divide among general staff 
Section 1 – Demography  
5.2.1 Please state your business role/or where you fall within the organisation  
CEO            Upper Management             Middle Management        
Lower Management              General staff                IT         Other, Please specify 
…………………………….………………………………………………………………… 
5.2.2 State how long you have been in your current occupation at this organisation  
Below 2 years                   2-5 years                 5-7 years               8-10 years  
Beyond 10 years  
5.2.3 Which business function do you report into? [Select all applicable options if 
possible]      Front-end office            Middle office        Back-end office        Other, 
please specify                      
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Section 2 – Information System Access Management 
5.2.4 Does your business role or position require you to access the system from 
outside the organisation, e.g. from home after hours or other places while you work? 
Not at all              Sometimes                Occasionally              All the time  
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5.2.5 Does your business role or position require you to interact with external 
stakeholders such as suppliers, investors, customers or contractors, etc?  
Not at all                Sometimes              All the time                         I am an external 
stakeholder  
5.2.6 Which access channel(s) do you use to access the system when you are 
outside the organisation? [Select all options that apply] 
Internet             VPN            Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)           Telephone       
Face-to-Face (F2F)            Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.2.7 Which access channel(s) do you use to access the system when you are inside 
the organisation? 
Internet               VPN             Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)          Telephone      
Intranet            Face-to-Face (F2F)          Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.2.8 In accordance with the access channel(s) available to you, which authentication 
method do you use when accessing the system? [Tick or cross out applicable options] 
 Authentication Method Other, Specify 
Access 
channel 
 
 Password 
Biometric 
(Fingerprint) 
Interactive 
voice 
recognition 
Smart 
card 
 
VPN Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
Internet Yes /  No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
Telephone Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
RDP Yes /  No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
Intranet Yes /  No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
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 Authentication Method Other, Specify 
  F2F Yes /  No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No  
 
 
5.2.9 In your opinion, does the organisation’s Information System limit your access to 
what is relevant for you to perform your duties? 
Strongly Disagree             Disagree             Not sure              Agree        
Strongly Agree  
5.2.10 I am not given the right access level to the system to freely go on with my 
work  
Disagree              Not sure               Agree        
5.2.11 I am free to explore a lot of resources on the system including some items which 
are not relevant to my work scope  
Strongly Disagree             Disagree              Neutral               Agree        
Strongly Agree  
5.2.12 Do you know and understand the meaning of business functions in an 
organisation? 
Not at all              I have an idea             It is unclear                  Strongly know                                          
5.2.13 Which physical access restriction method to information resources do you use 
in your business function? 
Biometric (Fingerprint)              Keys             Access cards           No restriction; it is an 
open office policy                Other, please specify  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Section 3 – Computer Skills, Security Awareness and Training  
5.2.14 Do you have any formal computer literacy training?  
Not at all            Yes, by an accredited institution             Yes, from inside, on-the-job 
training            Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………….      
5.2.15 Where would you rate your computer skill set level? 
Beginner              Intermediate             Advanced              Professional  
5.2.16 I fully understand the consequences of my actions while interacting with/or 
accessing the Information System 
Strongly Disagree             Disagree             Not sure              Agree        
Strongly Agree  
5.2.17 Have you ever received information security training and awareness within the 
organisation before, e.g. through presentation, lectures, etc?  
Not at all               Once                  Periodically              Frequently  
It is a routine  
5.2.18 While working on your computer and you encounter a security incident that you 
think might compromise the security of the system such as a potential virus attack or 
irregular behaviour, what action do you take? [Select all that apply] 
Do nothing            Send an e-mail to IT and continue working                 Consult a 
friend          Shut down the computer immediately and inform IT       Other, specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5.2.19 When being interviewed during the recruitment process, were you screened for 
your computer use skill set? 
Yes                  No                 I don’t remember  
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Section 4 – Procedure and standard practice 
5.2.20 In your organisation, where can you find Information System regulation 
regarding standard practice, access, and acceptable use? 
Information security policy template    Workplace policies and procedures   
Brochures provided by IT                Job description            Other, please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5.2.21 If there is a reference document present with information on system access, 
use and standard practice, in your opinion, is it comprehensively written to make it 
easy for you to understand and get guidance on how to use the system to reduce the 
risk of compromising it? 
Strongly Disagree            Disagree               Neutral              Agree        
Strongly Agree  
15.2.22 If you selected strongly disagree or disagree in the previous question 
(5.2.21), how would you prefer the security policy template to be written to make it 
easy to understand? 
Less technical, using layman terms          Less words more images      
 More words less images           Other, specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
15.2.23 Do you understand the need for standard practice and acceptable use when 
interacting with the system during your day-to-day activities?  
Not at all             Slightly             Neutral              I understand   
 Strongly understand  
15.2.24 I have signed a non-disclosure agreement in this organisation  
Disagree              Not sure              Agree        
  
231 
 
Section 5 – Application Use and know-how 
15.2.25 Which front-end application programs do you use the most in your business 
role? [Select options which apply] 
Internal front-end applications           Customer facing front-end applications         
Enterprise front-end applications         Engineering and development applications    
Not sure          I don’t know              Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………..…………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..   
15.2.26 I am able to view and access any website through the Internet from my 
computer 
Disagree                Sometimes                       Agree         
15.2.27 I can download and upload any content through the Internet from my computer 
and transfer to my colleagues easily 
Disagree             Sometimes            Agree        
15.2.28 Do you use instant messaging applications such as Skype for business or  
social media? 
Not at all             Sometimes               Occasionally             Always   
It is part of my business role  
15.2.29 If you use instant messaging, are you able to interact with external contacts 
and also exchange documents and other data? 
Not at all            Sometimes                Partially able             Fully able  
15.2.30 Do you think your business role is empowered Information System-wise 
according to the organisational structure?  
Strongly Disagree             Disagree             Neutral              Agree        
Strongly Agree  
15.2.31 For what purpose do you access your organisation’s Information System? 
[You can select more than one if necessary] 
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To attend to clients queries           To provide service to external stakeholders        
To make an internal query with other departments           To undertake my daily  
duties            Instant messaging                Social media         Other, please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………….………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Section 6 – Culture of Protecting Information  
15.2.32. On a scale of 1-5, what is your security awareness knowledge on the latest 
threat and risk trends such as viruses, spyware and hacking methods? [Circle option] 
1. Very little           2. Little             3. Average           4. Good          5. Very good 
15.2.30. Do you know what the name of the antivirus your organisation is using? 
Not at all               I have an idea             I know  
15.2.33. I know how to correctly use the antivirus to scan a computer and other 
external storage devices to ensure secure access during use  
Strongly Disagree            Disagree            Neutral                 Agree        
Strongly Agree  
15.2.34. On a scale of 1-5, how concerned are you about information sharing, privacy, 
and protection according to your work scope? 
1. Not concerned at all            2. Slightly            3. Average          4. Concerned         
5. Very concerned      
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Appendix D – Informed Consent 
 
for the Master’s study entitled: 
Towards a Conceptual Framework for Benchmarking Information Security Digital 
Divide 
Conducted by Chisanga Emmanuel in Namibia at three target organisations 
 
This study is conducted for the purposes of developing a self-appraisal framework 
for evaluation information access control within an information system and the 
general effectiveness of the system 
  
I offer to take part in this information security research voluntarily  
I understand that:  
 
 My views and opinions will be recorded  
 Data and information I share today will be handled confidentially and 
anonymously  
 I can withdraw from this study at any time and have the information provided 
in my questionnaires removed in entirety from this study  
 My personal data will be protected to the extent provided by law and all 
references to information about my data will be kept anonymous to the extent 
provided by law  
 
Signature: ………………………………. 
Name: Contact details (Cell Phone #) ………………………………………………….. 
                                                                                     (Please print)  
Date:………………………………… 
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Appenidx E – Technical editing declaration 
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Appendix F - Turn –it-in Digital Certificate 
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Appendix G - COBIT Information Technology Maturity Metrics 
 
  
Awareness & 
Communication 
 
Policies, 
Procedures & 
Standards 
 
Tools & 
Automation 
 
User 
Management 
 
Responsibility 
and 
Accountability 
 
Goal Setting and 
Measurement 
 
 
1 
 
Recognition of the 
need for process is 
eminent, and so is 
irregular 
communication of 
issues 
 
Approach to process 
and practice is 
unstructured  
 
Tools are present, 
but use is basic and 
limited to desktop 
tools. Tool use is not 
planned 
 
Required skills for 
process are not 
identified.  
Training is non-
existent 
 
Accountability and 
responsibility are not 
defined. People rely 
on their own 
discretion 
 
Goals are not clear, 
and no measurement 
takes place 
 
 
2 
 
There is 
acknowledgement 
for the need to act; 
thus, management 
communicates 
overall issues 
 
While process may 
arise, it is mainly 
instinctive.  
Individual 
expertise creates 
informal policy and 
procedure 
understanding  
 
Approach to use of 
tools is common but 
is centred on 
solutions developed 
by key individuals. 
Tools may be present 
but not used  
 
Minimum skills are 
identified for critical 
areas. 
Training is reactive, 
not proactive, 
leading to on-the-
job training 
 
Pro-activeness 
exists. Individuals 
know their roles are 
held responsible 
even if there is no 
formal agreement. 
Accountability is 
confusing, leading to 
shift of blame 
 
Some goals are set. 
Financial measures 
may be established 
but do not span the 
entire organisation. 
Monitoring may exist 
in a few areas 
P
h
a
s
e
  
237 
 
 
3 
 
Communication by 
management is 
now organised 
because of the 
understanding of 
the need to act  
 
Good conduct 
develops. Policies and 
process are 
documented and are 
processes of key 
activities  
 
Tools are 
standardised to 
automate processes. 
There is use of tools 
but not in alignment 
with the plan 
 
The need for skills 
is clear and 
documented. 
Training is planned 
but is not 
mandatory  
 
Process 
responsibility and 
accountability are 
clear. Process 
owners are known 
and take ownership 
 
Performance 
measurement is 
possible but poorly 
communicated. A link 
to business goals 
exists. Process 
measurement is 
present but 
inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
There is 
understanding of 
the full 
requirements. 
Mature 
communication 
techniques are 
applied, and 
standard 
communication 
tools are in place 
 
Process is complete 
and internal best 
practices are 
deployed. 
Documentation 
processes are 
advanced and 
supported by 
management 
 
Implementation of 
tools is standard. 
Automated tools now 
manage, control, and 
monitor critical 
activities  
 
Need for skill is 
routinely updated. 
Training  
techniques are 
applied according 
to plan. Knowledge 
is well shared 
 
There is complete 
accountability for 
process, such that 
process owners are 
now able to execute 
their roles as a 
culture 
 
Performance is 
measurable and 
communicated and 
linked to business 
objectives and IT 
strategic plan. 
Continuous 
improvement is 
emerging  
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5 
Communication 
techniques, trends, 
and pro-activeness 
are at their ultimate 
best  
External best 
practices and 
standards are 
commonplace. 
Processes, policies, 
and procedures are 
completely 
documented and 
recognised thoroughly  
Standardised toolsets 
are used across the 
enterprise. 
Tools are fully 
integrated with other 
related tools to 
enable support of the 
process and 
continuous 
improvement of 
process  
Knowledge sharing 
is now an 
enterprise culture. 
Continuous 
improvement 
of skills is primary 
through training 
and awareness 
to support external 
best practices  
used for guidance 
Process owners are 
empowered to make 
decisions and take 
actions. Process 
management is 
strong and 
consistent 
throughout the 
enterprise  
Performance is highly 
integrated and 
measureable, linking 
IT strongly to business 
goals. Continuous 
improvement is a part 
of the enterprise 
culture 
 
Source: ISACA (2011) 
 
